Abstract
In reasoning by analogy, we project a queried property from one or more source cases to a target case on the basis of one or more assumed similarities. There are three ways in which such reasoning can be inferentially sound. First, the variables of which the assumed similarities are values may determine, tightly or loosely, the variable of which the queried property is a value. Second, we may recognize that the source cases have the queried property in virtue of having the assumed similarities. Thirdly, and most weakly, sources and target may share many and varied similarities and have few dissimilarities.
Bibliographical note: This chapter was previously published in The generalizability of critical thinking: Multiple perspectives on an educational ideal. ed. Stephen P. Norris (New York: Teachers College Press, 1992), 109–124. Copyright © 1992 by Teachers College Columbia University. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of the Publisher. An earlier version of the chapter was presented at a workshop on the generalizability of critical thinking held at Memorial University of Newfoundland in St. John’s, Newfoundland, in September 1989.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Ashley, Kevin D. 1988. Arguing by analogy in law: A case-based model. In Analogical reasoning: Perspectives of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and philosophy, ed. D. H. Helman, 205–224. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Barker, Stephen F. 1965. The elements of logic. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Beardsley, Monroe. 1950. Practical logic. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Bolzano, Bernard. 1972. Theory of science: attempt at a detailed and in the main novel exposition of logic with constant attention to earlier authors. Ed. and trans. Rolf George. Berkeley: University of California Press. German original first published in 1837.
Copi, Irving M. 1986. Introduction to logic, 7th edition. New York: Macmillan.
Davies, Todd R. 1988. Determination, uniformity, and relevance: Normative criteria for generalization and reasoning by analogy. In Analogical reasoning: Perspectives of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and philosophy, ed. D. H. Helman, 227–250. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
George, Rolf. 1983. Bolzano’s consequence, relevance and enthymemes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 12: 299–318.
Govier, Trudy. 1985a. Logical analogies. Informal Logic 7: 27–33.
Govier, Trudy. 1985b. A practical study of argument. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Ennis, Robert H. 1992. The degree to which critical thinking is subject specific: Clarification and needed research. In The generalizability of critical thinking: Multiple perspectives on an educational ideal, ed. Stephen P. Norris, 21–37. New York: Teachers College Press, 1992.
Helman, D. H. (editor). 1988. Analogical reasoning: Perspectives of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hitchcock, David. 1985. Enthymematic arguments. Informal Logic 7: 83–97.
Hitchcock, David. 1987. Enthymematic arguments. In Argumentation: Across the lines of discipline, ed. Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A. Willard, 289–298. Dordrecht: Foris.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1921. A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan.
Levi, Edward H. 1949. An introduction to legal reasoning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Montague, Richard. 1974. Formal philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Nagel, Ernest. 1961. The structure of science. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
Paley, William. 1963. Natural theology: Selections, edited, with an introduction, by F. Ferre. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. Original work published 1802.
Perkins, David N., and Rebecca Simmons. 1988. Patterns of misunderstanding: An integrative model for science, math, and programming. Review of Educational Research 58: 303–26.
Plato. Euthydemus. 1961. In Plato: Collected dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, 385–420. New York: Pantheon Books.
Russell, Stuart. 1988. Analogy by similarity. In Analogical reasoning: Perspectives of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and philosophy, ed. D. H. Helman, 251–269. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Shaw, William H., and L. R. Ashley. 1983. Analogy and inference. Dialogue 22: 415–432.
Stebbing, L. Susan. 1939. Thinking to some purpose. Middlesex: Penguin.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1971. A defense of abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 47–66.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1985. The trolley problem. The Yale Law Journal 94: 1395–1415.
Toulmin, Stephen Edelston. 1958. The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wisdom, John. 1991. Proof and explanation: The Virginia lectures, ed. Stephen F. Barker. Lanham: University Press of America.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Lee Brooks, John Burbidge, Robert Ennis , Nick Griffin , Ralph Johnson , John McMurtry , and Harvey Siegel for helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hitchcock, D. (2017). Reasoning by Analogy: A General Theory. In: On Reasoning and Argument. Argumentation Library, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_12
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-53561-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-53562-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)