Abstract
The position that the deductive-inductive distinction is primarily a distinction between types of support is defended against objections. Allowance is made for additional types of support, notably from relevant but not conclusive considerations.
Bibliographical note: This chapter was first published in Informal Logic Newsletter 3(2) (1980), 7–15.
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Notes
- 1.
Added in the present republication: An example of an objective probability is the probability of 0.25 that a man and a woman who are each carriers of the same single-gene recessive disorder will have a baby with that disorder if they conceive a child. One could adopt either a propensity or a frequency account of the probability in question.
- 2.
Correction in the present republication: The original article had ‘B’ instead of ‘A’.
- 3.
Added in the present republication: One might wonder how the argument can be valid if one can object to it by citing additional reasons. The answer is that this chapter uses the term ‘valid’ in a broad sense that includes inductive strength and conductive adequacy as well as deductive validity. In this broad sense, it is possible to object to valid arguments by citing additional reasons that count against the conclusion or the inference, as long as their “validity” is not deductive validity.
- 4.
Added in the present republication: The difference between the last two kinds of probabilities is that the percentage of the population belonging to the subset is a known datum (e.g. from a recent census) rather than an empirically supported general hypothesis. In Toulmin ’s vocabulary, the first sort of probability is a mathematical deduction from data, whereas the second sort of probability is an inference from data justified by established warrants .
References
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Fohr, Samuel D. 1980b. Deductive-inductive: reply to criticisms. Informal Logic Newsletter 3(1): 5–10.
Giere, Ronald N. 1979. Understanding scientific reasoning. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Govier, Trudy. 1980a. Critical review of Carl Wellman’s Challenge and Response. Informal Logic Newsletter 2(2): 10–15.
Govier, Trudy. 1980b. Assessing arguments: What range of standards?” Informal Logic Newsletter 3(1): 2–4.
Hitchcock, David. 1979. Deductive and inductive: Types of validity, not types of argument. Informal Logic Newsletter 2(3): 9–10.
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Weddle, Perry. 1980. Good grief! More on deduction/induction. Informal Logic Newsletter 3(1): 10–13.
Wellman, Carl. 1971 Challenge and response. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
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Hitchcock, D. (2017). Deduction, Induction and Conduction. In: On Reasoning and Argument. Argumentation Library, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_1
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