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Kotarbiński’s Praxiology and Analytic Philosophy of Action

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The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture

Part of the book series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook ((VCIY,volume 21))

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Abstract

The main goal of this paper is to shed light on the relationship between the theory of action formulated by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (1886–1981) in the context of praxiology and the selected contemporary theories of action presented and defended by the analytic philosophers, concerning the problem of agency. The following considerations are motivated mostly by the fact that Polish philosophy of action still remains little known among many contemporary theorists of action. In light of the increasing significance of philosophy of action in the field of analytic philosophy, the answer to the question of whether Kotarbiński’s theory and contemporary approaches have something in common seems needed and valuable.

This article is a result of the project “The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in European Culture” supported by the Foundation for Polish Science.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    T. Kotarbiński, Praxiology. An Introduction to the Science of Efficient Action. Warsaw: PWN 1965, p.14.

  2. 2.

    Ibid., p.15.

  3. 3.

    Notabene, Kotarbiński’s definition reveals a close convergence with J.L. Mackie’s version of the Regularity View of Causality in the form of INUS condition (see J. L. Mackie, “Causes and Conditions”, in: American Philosophical Quarterly 12, 1965, pp.245–265).

  4. 4.

    T. Kotarbiński, “The Concept of Action”, in: The Journal of Philosophy 57, 7, 1960, pp.215–222; pp.215–216.

  5. 5.

    According to some philosophers, the appropriate theory of agency requires the existence of so-called agent-causality, which is characterized as a heteronymous causal relation between two relata belonging to different ontological categories: an agent (a substance) and an event (see E. J. Lowe, “Event Causation and Agent Causation”, in: Personal Agency. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, pp.121–140).

  6. 6.

    D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” [orig. 1963], in: Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001, pp.3–20; D. Davidson, “Causal Relations” [orig. 1967], in: Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001, pp.149–162; D. Davidson, “The Individuation of Events” [orig. 1969], in: Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001, pp.163–180.

  7. 7.

    J. Kim, “Events as Property Exemplifications”, in: M. Brand, D. Walton (Eds.), Action Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 1976, pp.159–177.

  8. 8.

    D. Lewis, “Events”, in: Philosophical Papers 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986, pp.241–269.

  9. 9.

    See T. Kotarbiński, Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Pergamon Press 1966; T. Kotarbiński, Zasadnicze myśli pansomatyzmu [The Fundamental Ideas of Pansomatism] [orig. 1935], in: T. Kotarbiński, Dzieła wszystkie: Ontologia, teoria poznania i metodologia nauk [Collected Works. Ontology, Theory of Knowledge, Methodology of Sciences]. Wrocław: Ossolineum, pp.139–148; T. Kotarbiński, Fazy rozwojowe konkretyzmu [The Development Stages of Concretism] [orig. 1958], in: T. Kotarbiński, Dzieła wszystkie: Ontologia, teoria poznania i metodologia nauk [Collected Works. Ontology, Theory of Knowledge, Methodology of Sciences]. Wrocław: Ossolineum, pp.196–205; J. Woleński, “Reism“, in: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/reism/.

  10. 10.

    It should be emphasized that in this paper I focus exclusively on the canonical version of reism that refers directly to the Aristotelian concept of thing. According to Barry Smith, however, there was “the transition from an essentially Aristotelian ontology on Kotarbiński’s part in the period up to 1931, to a quite different ontology of phases [temporal parts] in the years thereafter.” (p.141) One may raise doubts whether Smith’s original interpretation of Kotarbiński’s views is correct, but if Kotarbiński really accepted the theory of temporal parts, then the ontological difference between things and events would not appear and the problem would presumably lose its weight. See B. Smith, “On the Phases of Reism”, in: J. Woleński (Eds.), Kotarbiński: Logic, Semantics and Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp.137–183.

  11. 11.

    See M. Zaręba, “Reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego a prakseologiczna koncepcja sprawstwa” [Kotarbiński’s Reism and Praxiological Theory of Action], in: Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria 3 (83), 2012, pp.559–575.

  12. 12.

    T. Kotarbiński, Praxiology, p.15.

  13. 13.

    Ibid., p.21.

  14. 14.

    See T. Kotarbiński, “The Concept of Action”, pp.216–217.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., p.218.

  16. 16.

    T. Kotarbiński, O istocie działania na tle paradoksów bierności pozornej [The Essence of Action and the Paradoxes of Apparent Passivity] [orig. 1967], in: T. Kotarbiński, Dzieła wszystkie: Prakseologia [Collected Works: Praxiology]. Vol. I. Wrocław: Ossolineum 1990, pp.391–399; p.395.

  17. 17.

    See T. Kotarbiński, Praxiology, pp.47–60.

  18. 18.

    Ibid., p.23.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., p.17. It is worth noting that Kotarbiński also provides a very developed classification of events (he distinguishes i.a. the permutative/perseverative, constructive/destructive, direct/indirect events, etc.) and consequently of the results of actions (see T. Kotarbiński, Praxiology, pp.23–29).

  20. 20.

    Ibid., p.30.

  21. 21.

    It should be emphasized that in this paper I focus exclusively on the canonical version of reism that refers directly to the Aristotelian concept of thing. According to Barry Smith, however, there was a “transition from an essentially Aristotelian ontology on Kotarbiński’s part in the period up to 1931, to a quite different ontology of phases [temporal parts] in the years thereafter.” One may raise doubts whether Smith’s original interpretation of Kotarbiński’s views is correct, but if Kotarbiński really accepted the theory of temporal parts, then the ontological difference between things and events would not appear and the problem would presumably lose its salience. See B. Smith, “On the Phases of Reism”, in: J. Woleński (Eds.), Kotarbiński: Logic, Semantics and Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp.137–183.

  22. 22.

    T. Kotarbiński, O stosunku sprawstwa [On the Concept of Agency] [orig. 1925]. in: T. Kotarbiński, Dzieła wszystkie: Prakseologia [Collected Works: Praxiology]. Vol. I. Wrocław: Ossolineum 1990, pp.121–132; p.127.

  23. 23.

    T. Kotarbiński, Praxiology, p.18.

  24. 24.

    An event can of course be intentional under one, and not under another description, but there must be at least one intentional description of that event to call it “an action”.

  25. 25.

    D. Davidson, “Agency” [orig. 1971], in: Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001, pp.43–62; p.46.

  26. 26.

    See D. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”.

  27. 27.

    See D. Davidson, “Agency”, p.45.

  28. 28.

    See T. Kotarbiński, O stosunku sprawstwa [On the Concept of Agency], pp.127–128.

  29. 29.

    As Davidson explicitly writes, “part of the point then of speaking of an action or event ‘under a description’ is merely to make explicit the fact that some context is intensional. [...] It was intentional of Oedipus that there was an event that was his striking the old man at the crossroads. But though that event was identical with his striking his father, it was not intentional of Oedipus that there was an event identical with his striking his father. We may harmlessly compress the point by saying: the striking of the old man was intentional under one description but not under another. This does not mean the event did and did not have a certain property, but that the event, Oedipus, and a certain description, have a relation that does not obtain between the same event, Oedipus, and a different description” (D. Davidson, “Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events” [orig. 1971], in: Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001, pp.189–204; pp.194–195).

  30. 30.

    Nevertheless, Kotarbiński also formulates very interesting observations concerning the problem of descriptions of actions (T. Kotarbiński, Praxiology, p.22). He tries to answer the question of whether one can act retrospectively and asks, using the suggestive example, whether John with his record-breaking throw caused Peter’s previous record to cease to be the record. As Kotarbiński’s argumentation goes, this problem results directly from the way of (re)describing the events. So it is the case when some proposition about an object changes its truth-value (because something else has happened). It is worth noting that very similar considerations in the context of redescribing action can be found in the following books: J. Bennett, “Shooting, Killing and Dying”, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3, 2, 1973, pp.315–323 and G. E. M. Anscombe, “Under a Description”. in: Noûs 13, 2, 1979, pp.219–233.

  31. 31.

    See K. Bach, “Refraining, Omitting, and Negative Acts”, in: T. O’Connor, C. Sandis (Eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2010, pp.50–58.

  32. 32.

    T. Kotarbiński, O stosunku sprawstwa [On the Concept of Agency], p.126.

  33. 33.

    A similar idea can be found in Mossel’s paper: “Likewise, standing at attention does not involve movement but consists, similarly, in bodily and mental effort and is therefore a positive kind of action. The activity forming part of a positive action may be purely mental. To multiply numbers in one’s head is, in contrast to a thought’s or image’s popping up, a positive action. What is it to be active? I suggest that a person is active, if, and only if, she makes an effort, no matter how small, which consists in sustaining and controlling the bodily or mental events required for what she intends to do” (B. Mossel, “Negative Actions”, in: Philosophia 37, 2, 2009, pp.307–333; p.309).

  34. 34.

    R. Clarke, “Absence of Action”, in: Philosophical Studies 158, 2012, pp.361–376; p.363.

  35. 35.

    T. Kotarbiński, Traktat o dobrej robocie [Treatise on Good Work], [orig. 1955], in: T. Kotarbiński, Dzieła wszystkie: Prakseologia [CollectedWorks: Praxiology]. Vol. I. Wrocław: Ossolineum 1990, pp.271–272.

  36. 36.

    T. Kotarbiński, Gnosiology, p.19.

  37. 37.

    More about the concept of material, i.e. something of which the product is made, see: Ibid., pp.30–32.

  38. 38.

    D. Davidson, “Agency”.

  39. 39.

    See G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1957; D. Davidson, “Agency”.

  40. 40.

    D. Davidson, “Agency”, p.59.

  41. 41.

    “If we interpret the idea of a bodily movement generously, a case can be made for saying that all primitive actions are bodily movements. The generosity must be openhanded enough to encompass such ‘movements’ as standing fast, and mental acts like deciding and computing” (Ibid., p.48).

  42. 42.

    According to one radical version of internalist account, all actions are mere mental events (i.e. volitions) – not external movement of an agent’s body. Under the term “volition” Jenifer Hornsby means tryings. So for example, when John tries to move his hand and in consequence he moves it, only a specific mental event, namely trying to move his hand, is an action of John, and the movement of his body (his hand) is just an effect of an action, not an action itself (see J. Hornsby, Actions. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980).

  43. 43.

    “These are two descriptions of the same event – the queen moves her hand in that way; she did something that caused the death of the king. (Or to put it, as one would rather, in terms of a definite description: The moving of her hand by the queen on that occasion was identical with her doing something that caused the death of the king.) Doing something that causes a death is identical with causing a death. But there is no distinction to be made between causing the death of a person and killing him. It follows that what we thought was a more attenuated event – the killing – took no more time, and did not differ from, the movement of the hand” (D. Davidson, Agency, p.58).

  44. 44.

    J.J. Thomson, “Individuating Actions”, in: Journal of Philosophy 68, 21, 1971, pp.774–781; J.J. Thomson, “The Time of Killing”, in: Journal of Philosophy 68, 5, pp.115–132; I. Thalberg, Perception, Emotion & Action. A Component Approach. Oxford: Blackwell 1977.

  45. 45.

    T. Kotarbiński, Praxiology, pp.18–19.

  46. 46.

    T. Kotarbiński, O stosunku sprawstwa [On the Concept of Agency], p.123.

  47. 47.

    T. Kotarbiński, Czyn [Act] [orig.1934], in T. Kotarbiński, Dzieła wszystkie: Prakseologia [Collected Works: Praxiology]. Vol. I. Wrocław: Ossolineum 1990, p.141.

  48. 48.

    Under the term “act” Kotarbiński understands the entire process of the operation consisting in moving the agent’s body and some external events taken together (i.e. all the efforts of the baker/person going to the railway station plus the influence of the high temperature/work of the moving train, etc.).

  49. 49.

    T. Kotarbiński, “The Goal of an Act and the Task of the Agent” [orig. 1913], in: W. Gasparski, T. Pszczołowski (Eds.), Praxiological Studies. Polish Contributions to the Science of Efficient Action. Warsaw: PWN 1983, pp.1–18; p.3.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., p.8.

  51. 51.

    C.B. McCullagh, “The Individuation of Actions and Acts”, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54, 2, 1976, pp.133–139.

  52. 52.

    R. Elliot, M. Smith, “Individuating Actions: A Reply to McCullagh and Thalberg”, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55, 3, 1977, pp.209–212.

  53. 53.

    C.B. McCullagh, “The Individuation of Actions and Acts”, p.136.

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    Marta Zaręba

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    Jan Woleński

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Zaręba, M. (2017). Kotarbiński’s Praxiology and Analytic Philosophy of Action. In: Brożek, A., Stadler, F., Woleński, J. (eds) The Significance of the Lvov-Warsaw School in the European Culture. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52869-4_9

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