Abstract
Game Theory is the main tool used to model the behavior of agents that are guided by their own objective in contexts where their gains depend also on the choices made by neighboring agents. Game theoretic approaches have been often proposed for modeling phenomena in a complex social network, such as the formation of the social network itself. We are interested in the dynamics that govern such phenomena. In this paper, we study a specific class of randomized update rules called the logit choice function which can be coupled with different selection rules so to give different dynamics. We study how the logit choice function behave in an extreme case of concurrency.
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Acknowledgements
Vincenzo Auletta and Giuseppe Persiano are supported by Italian MIUR under the PRIN 2010–2011 project ARS TechnoMedia – Algorithmics for Social Technological Networks.
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Auletta, V., Ferraioli, D., Pasquale, F., Penna, P., Persiano, G. (2017). Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local Interaction Games. In: Díaz, J., Kirousis, L., Ortiz-Gracia, L., Serna, M. (eds) Extended Abstracts Summer 2015. Trends in Mathematics(), vol 6. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51753-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51753-7_3
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