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Contributions of Experimental Research to Network Governance

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Networked Governance

Abstract

The empirically oriented research tradition of network governance has not yet made use of laboratory experiments. Nevertheless, experimental investigation can complement a systematic analysis in two central aspects. On the one hand, experimental tools have been used to study network formation. On the other hand, experimental research has created knowledge about power distributions in networks. A profound understanding of how specific networks are formed and how network structures influence power relations has the potential to improve systematic examination in the field. This chapter relates the aforementioned literature to governance networks and lays the groundwork for potential future contributions of experimental research to network governance.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Prominent contributions include “present bias” (Laibson 1997; Strotz 1955), “prospect theory” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), or “inequality aversion” (Fehr and Schmidt 1999).

  2. 2.

    For overviews of experimental research in the social sciences, see, for example, Druckman et al. (2011), Fréchette and Schotter (2015), Kagel and Roth (1995), Kittel et al. (2012), Plott and Smith (2008) and Webster and Sell (2014).

  3. 3.

    For an exception, see, for example, Gluesing et al. (2016).

  4. 4.

    The benefits depend, for example, on the network structure, which will be discussed in the following section. As no bargaining takes place here, the power aspect in network-formation models is typically neglected. However, models include externalities of connections affecting other network members. Also, there are some experiments, which we will discuss later, in which the connection yields no direct payoff. In this case, the link allows the actors to play a game to create payoffs.

  5. 5.

    Networks are described in different ways in the fields discussed in this chapter, for example, by reference to the number of nodes, the number of links, or the overall pattern (such as a line or a kite). At the risk of generating some ambivalence in terminology, we stick to the labels used by the original authors.

  6. 6.

    These variations parallel the tradeoff between external costs and decision costs introduced by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).

  7. 7.

    Note that in this model agents do not base their decision on reciprocity but only on their own rationality and that of other agents.

  8. 8.

    Bargaining does not imply the division of some kind of profit (points, money) per se. Also, tasks or responsibilities can be divided between organizations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090, Vienna, Austria

    Manuel Schwaninger, Sabine Neuhofer & Bernhard Kittel

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  1. Manuel Schwaninger
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  2. Sabine Neuhofer
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  3. Bernhard Kittel
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Correspondence to Bernhard Kittel .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. SOCIUM—Research Center on Inequality and Social Policy, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany

    Betina Hollstein

  2. Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences IPA Institute for Employment Relations and Labour, Helmut-Schmidt-University—University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

    Wenzel Matiaske

  3. Political Science Department, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

    Kai-Uwe Schnapp

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Schwaninger, M., Neuhofer, S., Kittel, B. (2017). Contributions of Experimental Research to Network Governance. In: Hollstein, B., Matiaske, W., Schnapp, KU. (eds) Networked Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50386-8_11

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