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Introduction: International Promotion of Labor Standards

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US and EU External Labor Governance

Part of the book series: The European Union in International Affairs ((EUIA))

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Abstract

The book’s introduction draws attention to the increasing trend of linking labor standards to trade policy. In order to systematically examine how the USA and the EU promote workers’ rights in trade agreements and in practice, Oehri offers an innovative theoretical framework, which is informed by the external governance literature. The suggested ideal types of external labor governance, comprising sanction-based enforcement mechanisms as well as cooperative dialog and assistance, enable to comparatively assess US and EU labor standards promotion in third states. In “International Promotion of Labor Standards” Oehri furthermore introduces the methodological approach consisting of a qualitative comparative case study design and highlights why Mexico, Morocco, and the Dominican Republic are target states highly promising for an assessment from an external labor governance perspective.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Normally, PTAs are starting points for FTAs. Despite the difference between PTAs and FTAs, the terms are often used interchangeably, and this will be adopted in the context of this study.

  2. 2.

    For exceptions, see, for instance, Doumbia-Henry and Gravel (2006); International Labor Organization (2013, 2016); Polaski (2004); and Van den Putte (2015).

  3. 3.

    For exceptions on the USA, see, for instance, Compa (1995); Finbow (2006); Kay (2011); Nolan García (2011a, 2011b); and International Labor Organization (2013, 2016); for exceptions on the EU, see, for instance, Bartels (2005); Van den Putte (2015); and International Labor Organization (2013, 2016).

  4. 4.

    For exceptions, see, for instance, Behrens and Janusch (2012).

  5. 5.

    This is backed by the observation of a nascent governance mode in North America (Payne, 2000, p. 212; see also Aspinwall, 2013; Kay, 2011).

  6. 6.

    Scholars are only beginning to link a governance perspective with labor standards. See, for instance, Aspinwall (2013); Deacon (2007); Hendrickx, Marx, Rayp, and Wouters (2016); and Marx, Wouters, Rayp, and Beke (2015).

  7. 7.

    For an exception, see Kahn-Nisser’s (2014) study on the effects of EU and ILO labor rights monitoring in the EU accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

  8. 8.

    The justification for highlighting governance through hierarchy and governance through network is a result of the research focus on institutional governance in which the actors involved are assumed to interact in a conscious and projected manner with each other. In a market mode of governance, defined as the third governance mode (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, pp. 799–800), however, forms of coordination occur unintendedly (Czada, 2007, p. 68) and spontaneously (Hayek, 1973, p. 115; Williamson, 1996, p. 145); the interaction stereotypically evolves in a self-interested, non-cooperative, and unconstrained fashion (Powell, 1990, p. 302).

  9. 9.

    One could claim that in PTAs, in which international or even the governance receivers’ domestic labor provisions are protected and enforced rather than those of the governance providers, there is no rule extension and therefore no hierarchical governance mode. However, it is argued here that as long as an agreement allows for reaction to violations of labor standards of any kind, one can certainly speak of labor governance through hierarchy.

  10. 10.

    In EU external governance, such coordination often takes place in bilateral or regional Joint or Association Councils and Committees as well as specific subcommittees that are established between the EU and the third parties in trade and/or association agreements (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 798). In the context of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), for instance, jointly agreed Action Plans are usually used to set the EU’s and its partner country’s objectives and agenda (Lavenex, 2008, p. 944; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 798; see also Van Hüllen, 2012).

  11. 11.

    Civil society actors can also play a pivotal role in the context of political and judicial enforcement, namely in initiating proceedings (Abbott et al., 2000, p. 416). The potential openness for actors other than state, governmental, and arbitral actors in the context of the enforcement of labor rights does not make it more network-based. Rather, such an access creates new opportunities for civil society (Keohane, Moravcsik, & Slaughter, 2000, p. 485) and therefore makes it even more hierarchical.

  12. 12.

    The distinction between rule selection, adoption, and application, as suggested by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009), has been questioned as corresponding to “a hierarchical understanding of implementation” and therefore overlooking “complex inter-organizational co-operation” (Wunderlich, 2012, p. 1428).

  13. 13.

    The EU and the USA might have engaged in labor rights activities and affected labor conditions in third states even before an agreement was concluded (see also Kim, 2012). This analysis, however, is interested in the texts of the agreements (de jure) and the engagement in the post-agreements period (de facto) only.

  14. 14.

    Given that some agreements have been in effect longer than others, the former will likely have realized more activities with regard to labor standards enforcement and promotion. The amount of and expenses for such activities, however, are less of interest to this study than whether hierarchical and network-based interaction to support labor rights have been carried out per se. This can be legitimized as many and/or expensive initiatives do not necessarily lead to better protection of workers’ rights than few and/or cheap activities. Indeed, labor rights such as safety and health in the workplace – also referred to as “cash standards” – might be protected easily and with little money by, for instance, providing fire extinguishers or escape doors in manufactories (Elliott & Freeman, 2003, p. 13).

  15. 15.

    These are the Forced Labor Convention (No. 29), the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), the Minimum Age Convention (No. 138) (Minimum age specified: 15 years), and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182).

  16. 16.

    See also the report published in 2004 by the US Department of Labor (USDOL) on Laws Governing Exploitative Child Labor in Morocco, available on the USDOL website at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/childlaborreport.pdf (accessed December 2013).

  17. 17.

    These are the Forced Labor Convention (No. 29), the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), the Minimum Age Convention (No. 138) (Minimum age specified: 15 years), and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182).

  18. 18.

    2005 Labor Rights Report on Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua by the USDOL, available on the USDOL website at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/DRLaborRights.pdf (accessed December 2013).

  19. 19.

    These are the Forced Labor Convention (No. 29), the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), the Minimum Age Convention (No. 138) (Minimum age specified: 14 years), and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182).

  20. 20.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO:::; on the HRW website at https://www.hrw.org/publications; and on the ITUC website at http://survey.ituc-csi.org/?lang=en (accessed March 2016).

  21. 21.

    Information available on the ITUC website at http://survey.ituc-csi.org/ITUC-Global-Rights-Index.html?lang=en (accessed March 2016).

  22. 22.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_211599/lang–en/index.htm (accessed March 2016).

  23. 23.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  24. 24.

    Information available on the Global Slavery Index website at http://www.globalslaveryindex.org (accessed March 2016).

  25. 25.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  26. 26.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: and on the ITUC website at http://survey.ituc-csi.org/?lang=en (accessed March 2016).

  27. 27.

    Information available on the ITUC website at http://survey.ituc-csi.org/ITUC-Global-Rights-Index.html?lang=en (accessed March 2016).

  28. 28.

    Information available on the Global Slavery Index website at http://www.globalslaveryindex.org (accessed March 2016).

  29. 29.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  30. 30.

    Information available on the HRW websites at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/morocco1012ForUpload_2_0.pdf and https://www.hrw.org/publications (accessed March 2016).

  31. 31.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  32. 32.

    ILO CEACR observation of 2013, available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  33. 33.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  34. 34.

    Information available on the ITUC website at http://survey.ituc-csi.org/ITUC-Global-Rights-Index.html?lang=en (accessed March 2016).

  35. 35.

    Information available on the Global Slavery Index website at http://www.globalslaveryindex.org (accessed March 2016).

  36. 36.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  37. 37.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: and on the ITUC website at http://survey.ituc-csi.org/?lang=en (accessed March 2016).

  38. 38.

    See HRW report of 2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/07/12/test-inequality and ILO CEACR observation of 2015, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  39. 39.

    Information available on the ILO website at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:20010:0::NO::: (accessed March 2016).

  40. 40.

    Interviewees were selected according to their expertise and experience as well as based on recommendations from former interviewees, also referred to as snowball sampling (Lynch, 2013, p. 41). With some of the interviewees more than one conversation was held (counted only as one interview). Some information was provided by the interviewees in a written manner. This is indicated in the text as “personal communication.”

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Oehri, M. (2017). Introduction: International Promotion of Labor Standards. In: US and EU External Labor Governance. The European Union in International Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49301-5_1

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