Abstract
The use of control-theoretic solutions to detect attacks against cyber-physical systems is a growing area of research. Traditional literature proposes the use of control strategies to retain, f.i., satisfactory closed-loop performance, as well as safety properties, when a communication network connects the distributed components of a physical system (e.g., sensors, actuators, and controllers). However, the adaptation of these strategies to handle security incidents, is an ongoing challenge. In this paper, we analyze the use of a watermark-based detector that handles integrity attacks. We show that (1) the detector is able to work properly under the presence of adversaries using non-parametric methods to escape detection; but (2) it fails at detecting adversaries using parametric identification methods to escape detection. We propose a new strategy that complements the watermark-based detector in order to detect both adversaries. We validate the detection efficiency of the new strategy via numeric simulations.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Arvani, A., Rao, V.S.: Detection and protection against intrusions on smart grid systems. Int. J. Cyber Secur. Digit. Forensics 3, 38 (2014)
Barenthin Syberg, M.: Complexity issues, validation and input design for control in system identification (2008)
Brumback, B., Srinath, M.: A chi-square test for fault-detection in Kalman filters. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 32(6), 552–554 (1987)
Corman, D., Pillitteri, V., Tousley, S., Tehranipoor, U.: Lindqvist: NITRD cyber-physical security panel. In: 35th Symposium on Security and Privacy (2014)
Do, V.L., Fillatre, L., Nikiforov, I.: A statistical method for detecting cyber/physical attacks on scada systems. In: Proceedings of IEEE Control Applications (2014)
Falliere, N., Murchu, L.O., Chien, E.: W32. stuxnet dossier. White paper, Symantec Corp., Security Response, 5 (2011)
Han, D., Mo, Y., Wu, J., Weerakkody, S., Sinopoli, B., Shi, L.: Stochastic event-triggered sensor schedule for remote state estimation. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 60(10), 2661–2675 (2015)
Heemels, W., Donkers, M., Teel, A.R.: Periodic event-triggered control for linear systems. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 58(4), 847–861 (2013)
Hespanha, J.P., Naghshtabrizi, P., Xu, Y.: A survey of recent results in networked control systems. Proc. IEEE 95(1), 138 (2007)
Ke-You, Y., Li-Hua, X.: Survey of recent progress in networked control systems. Acta Autom. Sinica 39(2), 101–117 (2013)
Kim, K.-D., Kumar, P.R.: Cyber-physical systems: a perspective at the centennial. Proc. IEEE 100(Special Centennial Issue), 1287–1308 (2012)
Mo, Y., Garone, E., Casavola, A., Sinopoli, B.: False data injection attacks against state estimation in wireless sensor networks. In: 2010 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 5967–5972. IEEE (2010)
Mo, Y., Weerakkody, S., Sinopoli, B.: Physical authentication of control systems: designing watermarked control inputs to detect counterfeit sensor outputs. IEEE Control Syst. 35(1), 93–109 (2015)
Natke, H.: System identification: Torsten Söderström and Petre Stoica. Automatica 28(5), 1069–1071 (1992)
Pasqualetti, F., Dorfler, F., Bullo, F.: Cyber-physical security via geometric control: distributed monitoring and malicious attacks. In: 2012 IEEE 51st Annual Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 3418–3425. IEEE (2012)
Rubio-Hernan, J., De Cicco, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J.: Revisiting a watermark-based detection scheme to handle cyber-physical attacks. In: 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, Salzburg, Austria. IEEE (2016)
Salt, J., Casanova, V., Cuenca, A., Pizá, R.: Sistemas de control basados en red modelado y diseño de estructuras de control. Rev. Iberoamericana de Autom. e Informática Ind. RIAI 5(3), 5–20 (2008)
Smith, R.: Covert misappropriation of networked control systems: presenting a feedback structure. IEEE Control Syst. 35(1), 82–92 (2015)
Teixeira, A., Shames, I., Sandberg, H., Johansson, K.H.: A secure control framework for resource-limited adversaries. Automatica 51, 135–148 (2015)
Tripathi, S., Ikbal, M.A.: Step size optimization of lms algorithm using aunt colony optimization and its comparison with particle swarm optimization algorithm in system identification (2015)
Weerakkody, S., Mo, Y., Sinopoli, B.: Detecting integrity attacks on control systems using robust physical watermarking. In: Proceedings of Decision and Control (2014)
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge support from the Cyber CNI Chair of Institut Mines-Télécom. The chair is held by Télécom Bretagne and supported by Airbus Defence and Space, Amossys, EDF, Orange, La Poste, Nokia, Société Générale and the Regional Council of Brittany. It has been acknowledged by the Center of excellence in Cybersecurity.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Rubio-Hernan, J., De Cicco, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (2016). Event-Triggered Watermarking Control to Handle Cyber-Physical Integrity Attacks. In: Brumley, B., Röning, J. (eds) Secure IT Systems. NordSec 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10014. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47560-8_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47560-8_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47559-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-47560-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)