Abstract
Like a “black box” the critical juncture holds in it the explanation for the relations between countries and the evolving positive or negative reciprocal cycle. There are four important variables to account for during the critical juncture including power symmetry, issue saliency, images, and prospect theory’s domain of operation. Each of these variables is thoroughly examined and a framework combing all four variables and their relevant measurements is presented in preparation for a qualitative analysis.
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Notes
- 1.
One can make the argument that if all decision makers were rational and all had perfect information then we would only have positive TFT cycles. But because we have many negative cycles as well, there is a need to allow some “noise” and subjective elements into the analysis.
- 2.
To be fair, it is not that neorealism ignores issues, but the different reasons for specific conflicts are not important for the large-picture structural explanation that enables those specifics to become immediate causes of a conflict. In other words, in a different system the outcome of those specifics might be different, that is, nonconflict as well.
- 3.
Game theory models focus on the game and payoff structures while ignoring the motivation for engaging in conflict altogether. Decision-maker type models may look to organizational variables (Allison 1972), personal and psychological factors (Hermann and Hagan 1998), social and group factors (Janis 1972; Maoz 1990), or problems with cognition and communication (Brecher 1973; Jervis 1976; Bercovitch 1986; Berejekian 1997) but they also ignore the source of the dispute as an explanatory variable.
- 4.
Proximity to the state should be conceptualized as distance from the core decision makers and access by international observers (i.e., capital city, geographic core versus periphery), as well as the geographical impact itself.
- 5.
Expected utility theory argues that actors will try to maximize expected utility by weighting each outcome’s usefulness by the probability that that outcome will occur. Then an actor would choose the alternative with the highest expected utility (Levy and Levy 2002).
- 6.
One caveat here is those narcissistic pathologies that are responsible for distorted view of the self and the other, such as demonizing the other and purifying the self are normal in international politics and are likely to result in distorted reference points (Moses 1990).
- 7.
Prospect theory is about individual decision making. As such, prospect theory deals with individual preferences and not with group preferences and group decision-making. This is important for international relations because most decisions are made within a group setting or with the advice and consult of a number of individuals. It is then important to consider the relative weight of different group members, as the importance of military personnel, for example, increases whenever there is a military option on the table (Shafir 1992; Taliaferro 2004). Group dynamics and socio-psychological approaches to decision- making attempt to explain how a foreign policy decision is made taking into account the impact the group around the decision maker has on the result. The assumption underlying these approaches is that important decisions are made inside groups and especially in the small groups at the top of the hierarchy (Hart et al. 1997, p. 8). These groups can be formal or informal and are always ruled by certain dynamics. Some factors considered here include the leader’s management style (can be authoritative or collegial) (Boyer 2000), the rules that govern the group, the relative status of members inside the group, and “groupthink” (Janis 1982; Callaway and Esser 1984; Kameda and Sugimori 1993; Hart et al. 1997, pp. 132–133). The latter has been researched extensively and studies have shown that group members in many settings feel that their group is highly cohesive and complete and so they strive for unanimity (Janis 1982). Such an aspiration can in turn result in failure to assess all the risks associated with a specific choice, exclusion of information contrary to the group’s dominant position, and failure to survey and review additional options (Callaway and Esser 1984). The dynamics of groupthink can also result in the selective choice of group members to either choose members with no knowledge on the subject or members with similar opinions to avoid opposition (Hart et al. 1997, p. 126). For scholars, groupthink and other small group “side effects” complicate the analysis, as they make it harder to apply individual decision making and psychological theories when attempting to explain a situation. Prospect theory would lead us to believe that in international relations, leaders would take more risks to protect what they (and their country) already have (territory, reputation, domestic support, or otherwise) than to possess those things in the first place. But whenever suffering losses, leaders are likely to take higher risks (higher than what expected utility theory would predict) to restore what was lost instead of adjusting to the new reality and learning how to function under the new conditions. In addition, after winning new gains leaders are more likely to protect those gains as if they were always there (Levy 1997, p. 93). At the same time, group dynamics in decision making suggests that the combination of the decision-making group, even if only one individual makes the decision at the end, can be more or less risk-prone even though the attitude of each individual in the group is fixed (Shafir 1992). Put simply, the risk propensity of a group does not equal to the sum of risk propensities of the individual members in the group (Taliaferro 2004). Finally, a growing body of literature supports the applicability of prospect theory to group settings. With this possible weakness in mind, the analysis assumes that it is permissible to use prospect theory in foreign policy decision making when group dynamics might be operating.
- 8.
An implicit assumption here is that the status quo was stable and nonviolent and so taking the risk and breaking the pattern of behavior amounts to belligerent behavior.
- 9.
In the short term or as an added possibility, such cases (A losses and B gains) might end up with no cycle at all.
- 10.
Such a scenario is especially true in democracies but can operate in all other cases where decision makers are open to hear opposing ideas.
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Niv-Solomon, A. (2017). Inside the Critical Juncture. In: Cooperation and Protracted Conflict in International Affairs . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45805-2_2
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