Abstract
Studies in international relations point to the utility and importance of the concept of reciprocity allowing actors to mitigate and overcome some of the inherent difficulties in international interactions, including mistrust and uncertainty. Through the process of tit-for-tat (TFT) actors learn to trust and engage in a positive reciprocal cycle. Yet reciprocity could as easily evolve into a negative cycle. The concept of reciprocity and the two options of positive and negative cycles are examined here. Critical junctures, or key decision points, and the processes occurring during these times become crucial for understanding the direction of the reciprocal cycle. The questions of why such critical junctures are important and how to identify and define these are addressed and discussed
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Notes
- 1.
In the discussion to follow the terms positive TFT and negative cycle will be used to describe the two options respectively.
- 2.
Symmetry in issue saliency refers to the equivalence in the attention given to the issue at hand and how important the actors perceive it to be. What is most important is that both actors perceive how important the issue is in similar terms. An issue can be highly salient to both actors or of low saliency to both actors but that will still be considered symmetry. Asymmetry of issue saliency occurs when an issue is highly salient with one actor but not with the other.
- 3.
The independence of the action means that it is isolated and can clearly be identified as what it was meant to be. In real-world situations, identifying an action in isolation of everything else in the background is not easy.
- 4.
The literature on rivalries replaced in recent years most of the research on protracted conflicts but even then there is no or very little attention to the role played by reciprocity and the related challenge to theories of cooperation using reciprocity.
- 5.
As the analysis progresses the possibility and option of “no cycle” is allowed and discussed. But for the purpose of this introductory chapter I do not include this possibility here.
- 6.
In such cases, because there is no reciprocal loop relations are not “fixed” in any specific way and so consideration of reciprocal cycles becomes irrelevant. This study does argue later on that the possibility of no cycle becomes more likely under certain conditions.
- 7.
While Hogan (2006) goes into great length explaining the importance of his suggested criteria in creating a more rigorous analysis, he has a hard time operationalizing and measuring how significant a case is. Thus Hogan advocates objective but case-specific measures. For international relations and events of interstate war and peace, the significance measure is arguably present almost by definition.
- 8.
In a later stage of the relationship actors might reach another crossroad in which other and even all other possibilities will be open or reopened. But actors cannot return and reverse a decision.
- 9.
The analysis also allows for a no-cycle possibility, but such an outcome is less relevant or interesting to the questions presented in this study that is focused more on finding the reasons why positive reciprocity does not develop and when a negative reciprocity cycle develops.
- 10.
ICB is a dataset developed in five stages starting in 1975. Currently ICB covers 455 cases of international crises occurring between 1918 and 2007. Available information for each case includes the actors involved and domestic variables on each actor, as well as information about the crisis itself such as which actor was first to act and what was the type of action taken, how long did the crisis last, how was the conflict managed, how did it end, international involvement, and a host of other variables. ICB is accessible online at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/
- 11.
The possible values for PROTRAC are nonprotracted conflict, nonlong-war protracted conflict, long-war protracted conflict, or missing data; for GLOBORG the values are no global organization activity, general activity, General Secretary, General Assembly, Security Council, or missing data; for REGORG the values are No Regional/Security Organization (RSO) involvement, League of Arab States, NATO, Organization of the Americas, Organization of African Unity, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Warsaw Treaty Organization, CENTO, Council of Europe, Other, Multiple, or missing data; for MEDNUM the possible values are no mediation, single mediator or mediation team, multiple instances of mediation, or missing data; for CRACTR the values include one actor, two actors, three actors, four actors, five actors, six actors, more than six actors, or missing data.
- 12.
A crisis can be the starting point of a protracted conflict or occur within the context of such protracted conflict but the protracted conflict itself does not have to be characterized by an active ongoing war. Thus it is important to differentiate between a crises that take place as part of a long war and crises that occur outside of that context because cases under the former conditions are not likely to lead for cooperation because of the environment of open violent hostilities. For the purpose of this study, the possibility of cooperation has to exist so the models can be falsified. Consequently, cases used here were limited to non-long-war protracted conflicts.
- 13.
Future development of this study will include multi-actor cases, as well as cases with third-party interventions.
- 14.
On a personal note, it was rewarding to find out that data was available even for those cases in which it was least expected. It was further interesting to read the different accounts and various points of view which brought up the personal and human dimension especially when dealing with historical cases and therefore many times “dry” data.
- 15.
This data originated at the Vietnam Center Archive located at Texas A&M and is entirely accessible online.
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Niv-Solomon, A. (2017). When Reciprocity Sometimes Fails. In: Cooperation and Protracted Conflict in International Affairs . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45805-2_1
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