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Judicial Homogeneity as a Fundamental Principle of the EEA

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The Fundamental Principles of EEA Law

Abstract

Homogeneity is a concept often used in sciences, statistics and the law. In chemistry, for example, a homogeneous suspension of material means that, when dividing the volume in half, the same amount of material is suspended in both halves of the substance. However, it might be possible to see the particles under a microscope. In the EEA, the principle of homogeneity guarantees a level playing field for individuals and economic operators (One may have expected that the equally important principle of reciprocity had played a similar preeminent role as the homogeneity principle. However, the notion of that principle is only gradually emerging into homogeneity’s twin sister or brother (see further the chapter by Carl Baudenbacher, Reciprocity)). Without homogeneous interpretation of the common rules the playing field would, in the long run, develop into two separated internal markets. The homogeneity principle therefore simply has to work. The understanding of homogeneity, however, is not as homogeneous as one may expect (see Fredriksen, Judicial protection in the European economic area, pp. 188 et seq., 2012; Magnússon, Nord J International Law 80(4):507–534, 2011; Baudenbacher, The Handbook of EEA law, 2016; Hreinsson, The handbook of EEA law, 2016), in particular with respect to judicial homogeneity. It is undoubtedly a special challenge in the EEA’s system with two independent courts, each with full jurisdiction about the interpretation of the EEA agreement in their pillar, to achieve homogeneity. Against this background that branch of the principle and how it has been (pragmatically) approached in Luxembourg shall be (re-)assessed.

The author is indebted to Michael-James Clifton, Luísa Lourenço, Vilhelmiina Ihamäki and Korbinian Geiger. Views expressed are personal only.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Skouris (2014), p. 6.

  2. 2.

    Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.

  3. 3.

    Report on the 1988 Lugano Convention by Jenard P and Möller G, OJ C 189/1990, paragraph 1.

  4. 4.

    The Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 319/9).

  5. 5.

    EEA/EFTA States at the time: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Liechtenstein, which is the only state to accede to the EFTA after 1988 has neither signed the 1988 Convention nor its successor, the 2007 Lugano Convention.

  6. 6.

    Under the Brussels Convention it was given jurisdiction in 1971 (Kohler 2014, p. 239; Protocol on 3 June 1971 giving jurisdiction to the Court of Justice of the European Communities to rule on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention). The Report on the 1988 Lugano Convention by Jenard P and Möller G points to two reasons, see OJ C 189/1990, paragraph 110(2).

  7. 7.

    Ibid., paragraph 111.

  8. 8.

    Article 2(1) of Protocol 2 to the Lugano Convention of 1988. A similar structure can be found in Articles 105 & 106 of the EEA Agreement, according to which the EEA Joint Committee shall keep the case law with EU/EEA relevance in constant review, and a system of exchange of information concerning the judgments of the relevant courts is managed by the Registrar of the ECJ.

  9. 9.

    A database accessible on the Curia website provides for extensive jurisprudence, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/.

  10. 10.

    Declaration by the Representatives of the Governments of the States signatories to the Lugano Convention which are members of the European Communities and Declaration by the Representatives of the Governments of the States signatories to the Lugano Convention which are members of the European Free Trade Association.

  11. 11.

    Heerstrassen (1993), p. 181; Duintjer Tebbens (1993), p. 53; Kohler (1992), p. 11 et seq.

  12. 12.

    European Community signed the Convention with Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark (Denmark signed separately as a result of its opt-out from the judicial cooperation provisions of the EU treaties); OJ L 339/1.

  13. 13.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.

  14. 14.

    Recitals 3 and 4 of the preamble to Protocol 2.

  15. 15.

    Article 1 of the Protocol 2 to the Lugano Convention of 2007 (emphasis added).

  16. 16.

    Kohler (2007), pp. 141, 151 ff.

  17. 17.

    In Case C-394/07, Gambazzi [2009] ECR I-2563, paragraph 35, the ECJ mentioned that the parties to the main proceedings referred to a judgment of the Swiss Supreme Court concerning parallel provision of the Lugano Convention, and that the Court needs to pay due account.

  18. 18.

    Article 2 of the Protocol 2 to the Lugano Convention of 2007.

  19. 19.

    Kohler (2012), pp. 222–223.

  20. 20.

    See on this topic Kohler (2014), pp. 237–238.

  21. 21.

    Magnússon (2011), p. 512; according to Article 108 EEA, the EEA/EFTA States established the EFTA Court and ESA to enforce and safeguard the operation of the Agreement. In order to give effect to the aforementioned Article, the EEA/EFTA States fulfilled their obligation by signing the SCA on 2 May 1992, together with the EEA Agreement, and by having established their own institutions. In addition, the Statute of the EFTA Court can be found in Protocol 5 to the SCA and the Court has also adopted its own Rules of Procedure.

  22. 22.

    Carl Baudenbacher wrote with respect to the institutionalisation of the relationship between Switzerland and the EU: “Switzerland can only recognize a Court in which it is represented by one judge. It’s not just about democracy policy. Only an own judge would be able to explain to his or her colleagues the political, legal, economic and social characteristics of the Swiss referendum democracy”, see Neue Luzerner Zeitung of 20 July 2013, and Handelszeitung of 18 July 2013.

  23. 23.

    See Case E-9/97, Sveinbjörnsdóttir [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95, paragraph 59.

  24. 24.

    Baudenbacher (2016a), p. 139.

  25. 25.

    See more on the establishment of the EFTA Court in: Kanninen (2014), pp. 17–20.

  26. 26.

    And 15th recital of the preamble EEA.

  27. 27.

    Baudenbacher (2016b), p. 191.

  28. 28.

    Article 106 EEA uses the expression “in full deference to the independence of courts”.

  29. 29.

    Baudenbacher (2016b), p. 191.

  30. 30.

    Baur (2014), pp. 169–185.

  31. 31.

    Article 105 (1) EEA and 15th recital of the Preamble to the EEA.

  32. 32.

    Case E-9/07, L’Oréal Norge AS v. Per Aarskog AS and Others [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 259, paragraph 28: “… Article 3(2) SCA, an obligation for the EFTA Court to “pay due account to the principles laid down by the relevant rulings” of the ECJ given after the date of signature of the EEA Agreement. In its interpretation of EEA rules, the Court has consistently taken into account the relevant rulings of the ECJ given after the said date.”

  33. 33.

    Magnússon (2011), p. 513.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., p. 514.

  35. 35.

    There have been more than 170 referrals from the CJEU since 1997.

  36. 36.

    Skouris (2014), p. 6.

  37. 37.

    See Article 20 of the EFTA Court’s Statute.

  38. 38.

    Article 36 of the EFTA Court’s Statute.

  39. 39.

    See Articles 23(3) and 40(3) of the ECJ’s Statute.

  40. 40.

    See Clifton (2013).

  41. 41.

    Magnússon (2011), p. 513.

  42. 42.

    Case T-115/94, Opel Austria [1997] EU:T:1997:3.

  43. 43.

    Case E-1/94, Restamark [1994] EFTA Ct. Rep. 15.

  44. 44.

    Case E–2/9,4 Scottish Salmon Growers [1994] EFTA Ct Rep 59.

  45. 45.

    Opel Austria, cited above, paragraph 108.

  46. 46.

    Sveinbjörnsdóttir, cited above, paragraph 59.

  47. 47.

    See in general on the judicial dialogue Skouris (2014), pp. 3–12.

  48. 48.

    Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in the Case C-300/10 Marques Almeida, EU:C:2012:414, footnote 25.

  49. 49.

    Barnard (2014), p. 154.

  50. 50.

    Baudenbacher (2016b), p. 192.

  51. 51.

    Rosas (2007), p. 13 ff. (emphasis added).

  52. 52.

    Baudenbacher (2016b), p. 183.

  53. 53.

    Fredriksen (2012b), p. 868.

  54. 54.

    Restamark, cited above, paragraphs 32–35.

  55. 55.

    Case E-2/02, Bellona [2003] EFTA Ct. Rep. 52, paragraph 39; Case E-18/10, ESA v. The Kingdom of Norway [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 202, paragraph 26; Case E-2/13, Bentzen Transport AS [2013] EFTA Ct. Rep. 802, paragraphs 37–38. See also Case E-14/11, DB Schenker I [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1178, paragraph 76: “the Court has recognized the procedural branch of the principle of homogeneity and referred in particular to considerations of equal access to justice and compliance with judgments rendered in infringement proceedings for parties appearing before the EEA courts.”

  56. 56.

    Restamark cited above; Case E-1/11, Dr. A [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 484; Case E-23/13, Hellenic Capital Market Commission [2014] EFTA Ct. Rep. 88.

  57. 57.

    Hellenic Capital Market Commission, cited above, paragraphs 33–34.

  58. 58.

    Baudenbacher (2016a), p. 147. See more on the topic under “Obligation to refer and the role for the national courts in case of perceived judicial conflict between the EFTA Court and the ECJ?”, p. 18 ff.

  59. 59.

    Barnard (2014), p. 154.

  60. 60.

    See, for example, Case E-30/15, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, judgment of 16/12/2015, not yet reported, paragraph 14.

  61. 61.

    Restamark, cited above, paragraphs 75 ff.

  62. 62.

    Baudenbacher (2005), p. 5.

  63. 63.

    Sveinbjörnsdóttir, cited above, paragraph 60.

  64. 64.

    Case E-18/11, Irish Bank Resolution Corporation [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep 592, paragraphs 122–126. See also Sveinbjörnsdóttir, cited above, paragraphs 62–63.

  65. 65.

    Restamark, cited above.

  66. 66.

    Case E-8/97, TV.1000 Sverige, [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 68.

  67. 67.

    Case E-1/99, Finanger [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 119.

  68. 68.

    Case E-2/97, Maglite [1997] EFTA Ct. Rep. 129.

  69. 69.

    Case E-3/00, EFTA Surveillance Authority v The Kingdom of Norway (Kellogg’s) [2001] EFTA Ct. Rep. 75.

  70. 70.

    Case E-16/10, Philip Morris [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 8.

  71. 71.

    Case E-16/11, Icesave I [2013] EFTA Ct. Rep. 4.

  72. 72.

    See for more discussion on the issue Baudenbacher (2016b), pp. 187–190 and Skouris (2014), pp. 8–10.

  73. 73.

    Baudenbacher (2016b), p. 192.

  74. 74.

    Restamark, cited above, paragraphs 32–35.

  75. 75.

    Case 174/82, Sandoz [1983 EU:C:1983:213, paragraphs 17 et seq.

  76. 76.

    Kellogg’s, cited above, paragraph 28.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., paragraph 30.

  78. 78.

    Skouris (2014), p. 6.

  79. 79.

    Case C-192/01, Commission v. Denmark [2003] EU:C:2003:492, see paragraphs 47 et seq.

  80. 80.

    Commission v. Denmark, cited above, paragraphs 47 and 51.

  81. 81.

    Magnússon (2014), p. 125.

  82. 82.

    Article 28 EEA.

  83. 83.

    Articles 20–25 TFEU.

  84. 84.

    Case E-26/13, Gunnarsson [2014] EFTA Ct. Rep. 254, paragraph 80.

  85. 85.

    Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77.

  86. 86.

    At point 1 of Annex V and point 3 of Annex VIII to the Agreement by JCD No 158/2007.

  87. 87.

    See Recitals 1, 3, 5 in the preamble to the Directive; as regards case law see e.g. Gunnarson, cited above, paragraphs 79 et seq., Case E-28/15, Jabbi [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 604, paragraphs 76 et seq.

  88. 88.

    Case E-28/15, Jabbi [2016] EFTA Ct. Rep. 604, paragraphs 76 et seq.

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    Philipp Speitler

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Speitler, P. (2017). Judicial Homogeneity as a Fundamental Principle of the EEA. In: Baudenbacher, C. (eds) The Fundamental Principles of EEA Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45189-3_2

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