Abstract
This paper is a brief commentary on the specific proposal advanced by Jagers op Akkerhuis, Spijkerboer, and Koelewijn in the present volume (Chap. 6) on how Darwinian evolutionary theory could be generalized. However, I want to take the opportunity to present a broader criticism of Generalized Darwinism that focuses on what in my view is the fundamental epistemological problem faced by Generalized Darwinism (Sect. 7.1) and the ontological solution that proponents of Generalized Darwinism offer (Sect. 7.2). On the basis of this criticism, I will examine the proposal by Jagers op Akkerhuis and coauthors and argue that while the proposal is a very useful way ahead toward the formulation of Generalized Darwinism, that is toward constructing a formalism for Generalized Darwinism into which all cases of Darwinian evolution can be fitted, it is insufficient as an ontological solution to the foundational ontological problem that Generalized Darwinism faces (Sect. 7.3).
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
As Jagers op Akkerhuis, Spijkerboer, and Koelewijn put it in the present volume, without however endorsing it in this specific form, “evolutionary phenomena in different domains can be viewed as identical in their basic structure if they are analysed at a sufficiently abstract level of analysis” (this volume, Chap. 6). Alternatively, this claim can also be formulated as involving systems rather than processes—Darwinian systems—that are found in a variety of domains and all behave in roughly the same way, making all members of the class susceptible to the same general description with details being filled in differently for different systems.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Lacking reproduction in nonbiological systems, reproduction is usually replaced by the retention of traits in the population .
- 6.
For reasons of space I cannot elaborate this issue in more detail, but see Reydon and Scholz (2014) for some points. Most importantly, proponents of Generalized Darwinism have not yet shown that their candidates for replicators (such as institutional habits), interactors (such as firms and institutions), and reproduction /retention (institutional traits) are indeed sufficiently similar to the parallel aspects of biological evolution such that they would be more than mere superficial analogues between the different domains.
- 7.
Note my use of the word “potentially.” What proponents of Generalized Darwinism have delivered is a potential ontology of Darwinian evolution. But as a potential ontology, it still needs to be shown that it is adequate to the phenomenon that we want to study and understand, i.e., that it is an adequate ontology of Darwinian evolution, irrespective of the additional question in which domains instances of this phenomenon actually are found. In this sense, proponents of Generalized Darwinism have two ontological questions to answer which I highlighted in the main text as (1) and (2). My criticism of Generalized Darwinism is that it does not answer question (2) and only partly answers question (1).
- 8.
Jagers op Akkerhuis (personal communication) also advocates this approach.
- 9.
Evolutionary theory is not as such stable through time, but rather is susceptible to considerable change and quite a number of competing versions of evolutionary theory have been advanced in the history of biology. While currently the Modern Synthesis version of the mid-twentieth century still is the most widely used version by biologists, numerous attempts are being made to change, revise, and/or extend Darwinian evolutionary theory (see, e.g., Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Pigliucci and Müller 2010). While theoretical adequacy thus is a requirement on the ontology , this requirement itself is to some extent fluid in time as the theoretical basis changes under the influence of new developments in biology.
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Reydon, T.A.C. (2016). A Critical Assessment of Graph-Based Generalized Darwinism. In: Jagers op Akkerhuis, G. (eds) Evolution and Transitions in Complexity. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43802-3_7
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