Skip to main content

The Role of Competitive Framework for Sound Banking Sector in the EU-15 and the EU-12

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Institutional Diversity in Banking

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to present the role of market structure and competitive framework in the EU banking sector, with particular emphasis on the change in concentration and competition, in an attempt to determine the relationship between size and competition and risk-taking by banks. The empirical results based on panel data analysis find that the banking sectors with EU-27 are not homogeneous and find asymmetry between performance of EU-15 and EU-12 banking sectors. In fact, we have obtained different results concerning the impact of competition and size on financial stability for EU-15 banks (i.e., large banking sectors) and for EU-12 (i.e., small banking sectors).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    The figure for Luxembourg was approx. 2000 % in 2011 and approx. 3000 % in 2002. See also Bijlsma et al. (2013).

  2. 2.

    The CR5 ratio represents the market share of the five largest banks. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market share of individual commercial banks (e.g., in the net assets). The index can range from 0 to 1, with higher values of the index denoting a greater concentration of the market.

  3. 3.

    An update from Blundell and Bond (1998). In this paper was used one-step GMM estimator.

  4. 4.

    http://www.worldbank.org/en/research , and the St. Louis Fed’s Economic Research website.

References

  • Abildgren, K., B. Vølund Buchholst, Atef Qureshi and Jonas Staghøj (2011), Real economic consequences of inancial crises, Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, 3rd Quarter, Part 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arellano, M., & Bond, S. R. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277–297.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bain, J. P. (1951). Relation of profit rate to industry concentration: American manufacturing 1936–40. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65(3), 293–324.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt A., & Levine R. (2003, January). Bank concentration and crises, World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger, A. (1999). The ‘big picture’ of relationship finance. In J. L. Blanton, A. Williams, & S. L. Rhine (Eds.), Business access to capital and credit, a Federal Reserve System research conference (pp. 390–400). Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1995). Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance. Journal of Business, 68, 351–381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (2002). Small business credit availability and relationship lending: The importance of bank organizational structure. Economic Journal, 112, F32–F53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger, A. N., Goldberg, L. G., & White, L. J. (2001). The effects of dynamic changes in bank competition on the supply of small business credit. European Finance Review, 5, 115–139.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bijlsma, M. J., Gijsbert, T., & Zwart, J. (2013). The changing landscape of financial markets in Europe, the United States and Japan. CPB discussion paper, 238.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bikker, J. A., & Leuvensteijn, M. (2014). A new measure of competition in the financial industry. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bikker, J. A., & Spierdijk, L. (2008). How banking competition changed over time. DNB working paper, no. 167/February.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bikker, J. A., Spierdijk, L., & Finnie, P. (2007). The impact of market structure, contestability and institutional environment on banking competition. DNB working paper, no. 156/November.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bikker, J. A., Shaffer, S., & Spierdijk, L. (2012). Assessing competition with the Panzar-Rosse model: The role of scale, costs, and equilibrium. The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, 94(4), 1025–1044.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blundell R., Bond S. (1998), Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics 87, pp. 115-143.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boot, A. W. A. (2000). Relationship banking: What do we know. The Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9, 7–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boot, A. W. A., & Marinc, M. (2008). The evolving landscape of banking. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(6), 1173–1203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000). Can relationship banking survive competition? The Journal of Finance, 55(2), 679–713.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boot, A. W. A., Greenbaum, S. I., & Thakor, A. V. (1993). Reputation and discretion in financial contracting. American Economic Review, 83, 1165–1183.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carbó, S., Humphrey, D., Maudos, J., & Molyneux, P. (2009). Cross-country comparisons of competition and pricing power in European Banking. Journal of International Money and Finance, 28(1), 115–134.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cetorelli, N. (2004). Real effects of bank competition. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(3) (June 2004, Part 2), 544–558. The Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, C., Liao, G., Yu, X., & Ni, Z. (2010). Information from relationship lending: Evidence from loan defaults in China. Discussion paper, no. 2009-10S, European Banking Center.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chortareas, G. E., Girardone, C., & Ventouri, A. (2013). Financial freedom and bank efficiency: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(4), 1223–1231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Claessens, P., & Laeven, L. (2004). What drives bank competition? Some international evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36(3), (June 2004, Part 2), 564–583. The Ohio State University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clerides, S., Delis, M. D., & Kokas, S. (2013). A new data set on bank competition in national banking markets. Working paper 08-2013, University of Cyprus.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cole, R. A., Goldberg, L. G., & White, L. J. (2004). Cookie cutter vs. character: The micro structure of small business lending by large and small banks. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39, 227–251.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Degryse, H., & Ongena, S. (2001). Bank relationships and firm performance. Financial Management, 30, 9–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Degryse, H., Kim, M., & Ongena, S. (2009). Microeconomics of banking: Methods, applications and results. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Degryse, H., Masschelein, N., & Mitchell, J. (2005). Staying, dropping, or switching: The impacts of mergers on small firms. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(4), 1102–1140.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Delis, M. K., Staikouras, C. H., & Varlagas, P. T. (2008). On the measurement of market power in the banking industry. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35(7–8), 1023–1047.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Detragiache E., P. Garella, L. Guiso (2000), Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence, The Journal of Finance, 55(3), pp. 1133-1161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, H. (1973). Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy. Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1), 1–9.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, D. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of Economic Studies, 51, 393–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, D. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 689–721.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Efthyvoulou, G., & Yildrim, C. (2013). Market power in CEE banking sectors and the impact of the global financial cries. Case network studies & analysis, No 452.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elsas, R. (2005). Empirical determinants of relationship lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14, 32–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elsas, R., & Krahnen, J. P. (1998). Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 1283–1316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ergungor, O. E., & Thomson, J. B. (2005). Systemic banking crisis. Policy discussion papers, no. 9/2005.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haldane, A. G. (2012, 25 October). On being the right size, Bank of England.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heffernan S. (2007), Nowoczesna bankowość, PWN, Warsaw.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hicks, J. R. (1935). The theory of monopoly. Econometrica, 3(1), 1–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hughes, J., & Mester, L. (2011). Who said large banks don’t experience scale economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost function. Working papers 11-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keeley, M. C. (1990). Deposit insurance risk and market power in banking. American Economic Review, 80, 1183–1200.

    Google Scholar 

  • KNF. (2011). Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego. Pięć lat działalności.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koch, T. W., & Macdonald, S. S. (2010). Bank management. South-Western: Cengage Learning.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leuvensteijn, M., Bikker, J. A., Rixtel, A., & Sørensen, C. K. (2007, June). A new Approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area. EBC working paper series, 768.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, R. (2004). Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. NBER working papers 10766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Louzis D. P., A. T. Vouldis, V. L. Metaxas (2012), Macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans in Greece: A comparative study of mortgage, business and consumer loan portfolios, Journal of Banking & Finance 36, pp. 1012–1027.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maudos J., F. de Guevara, J. (2004), Factors explaining the interest margin in the banking sectors of the European Union, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 28 (9), pp. 2259–2281.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maudos, J., & de Guevara, J. F. (2007). The cost of market power in banking: Social welfare loss vs. inefficiency cost. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31(7), 2103–2125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nam, S. -W. (2004). Relationship banking and its role in corporate governance. Research paper, no. 56, ADB Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ongena, S., & Smith, D. C. (2000). What determines the number of bank relationships. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9(January), 26–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pawłowska, M. (2014). Konkurencja w sektorze bankowym: teoria i wyniki empiryczne. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pawłowska M. (2016), “Does the Size and Market Structure of the Banking Sector have an Effect on the Financial Stability of the European Union?” The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Special Issue on Asymmetric Effects of Monetary Policy, Banking Union and Financial Markets operations in post-crisis era, Edited by Georgios P. Kouretas and Athanasios P. Dapadopoulos, Volume 14, Part A, (November 2016), pp. 112--127.

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small business data. The Journal of Finance, 49(1), 3–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1995). The effect of credit competition on lending relationships. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2), 406–443.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quagliarello, M. (2007). Banks’ riskiness over the business cycle: A panel analysis on Italian intermediaries. Applied Financial Economics, 17, 119–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R. G. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s-length debt. Journal of Finance, 47, 1367–1400.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R. G. (1996). Why banks have a future: Towards a new theory of the commercial bank. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9(2), 114–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R. G. (1998). The past and future of commercial banking viewed through an incomplete contract lens. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30, 524–550.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. The American Economic Review, 88(3), 559–589.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ratnovski, L. (2013). Competition policy for modern banks. IMF working paper, WP/13/126, Washington, DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K., (2010), From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis, NBER Working Paper 15795.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salas, V., & Saurina, J. (2002). Credit risk in two institutional regimes: Spanish commercial and savings banks. Journal of Financial Services Research, 22, 203–224.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schaeck, K., & Čihák, M. (2008). How does competition affect efficiency and soundness in banking? ECB working paper, no. 932.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaeck, K., Čihák, M., & Wolfe, S. (2006). Are more competitive banking systems more stable. IMF working paper, WP/06/143, Washington, DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smirlock M., (1985), Relationship between Concentration and Profitability in Banking, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 69–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, I. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American Economic Review, 71(3), 393–410.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Hoose, D. (2010). The industrial organization of banking, bank behavior, market structure, and regulation. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vickers, J. (2012). Some economics of banking reform. Discussion paper series, 632, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vives, X. (2010). Competition and stability in banking. Policy insight no. 50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Von Thadden, E. L. (2004). Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: The winner’s curse. Finance Research Letters, 1(1), 11–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weill, L. (2013). Bank competition in the EU: How has it evolved? Journal of International Financial Markets, 26(c), 100–101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wood, J. (1975). Commercial bank loan and investment behavior. London: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • World Bank. (2013). Rethinking the role of the state in finance. Global financial development report 2013, Washington, DC. www.knf.gov.pl

  • Yildirim, H. P., & Philippatos, G. C. (2007). Competition and contestability in central and Eastern European banking markets. Managerial Finance, 33(3), 195–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Małgorzata Pawłowska .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Pawłowska, M. (2017). The Role of Competitive Framework for Sound Banking Sector in the EU-15 and the EU-12. In: Miklaszewska, E. (eds) Institutional Diversity in Banking. Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42073-8_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42073-8_8

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-42072-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-42073-8

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics