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Deception for the Electrical Power Industry

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Introduction to Cyberdeception
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Abstract

“Industrial Mirage” is a defensive deception approach to disrupt and investigate cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and industrial control systems in particular. The main thrust is to create a decoy (“mirage”) system that cyberattacks can target harmlessly. The idea is to adapt the concept of decoy data (honeytokens) to an industrial-control context. The honeytokens represent dynamics, configuration, operation, and location of systems that attackers want to manipulate. The decoy data resides in phantom I/O devices like those in Chap. 14 and on computers that perform control-systems tasks.

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Rowe, N.C., Rrushi, J. (2016). Deception for the Electrical Power Industry. In: Introduction to Cyberdeception. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41187-3_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41187-3_15

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-41185-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-41187-3

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