Abstract
Notoriously, Descartes does not have a concept of space. Or more precisely, he takes space as indistinguishable from matter or extension. Yet, to some of his contemporaries, his physics was successful at providing mechanical descriptions of the natural world. In this paper, I discuss the problem of “space” within a larger Cartesian framework, focusing on a case of an experimentally-minded Cartesian who took up the challenge provided by Descartes’s restrictive ontology and tried to accommodate it to experimental trials. One of the most famous debates of seventeenth-century natural philosophy concerns the existence of the vacuum. New instruments were built with the specific purpose of providing clear evidence to support this claim. While a large secondary literature has been devoted to this problem, we still lack a study of the Cartesians involved. Most of the time, Descartes’s followers are taken to merely repeat his words about the contradictory nature of the vacuum, hence their experiments are portrayed as rather misplaced practices. At most, one would find in the literature a discussion about the pedagogical value of these experiments. The consequence is that new experimental approaches provided by Cartesians after Descartes’s death in 1650 are, unfortunately, neglected. By building upon a recent volume, Cartesian Empiricisms, my aim in this paper is to explore the notion of space within Cartesian experimentalism. In doing so, I shall refer to the works of Burchard de Volder, Jacques Rohault, and Samuel Clarke’s annotations of Rohault’s text. Some of the questions I would like to address are as follows: why would a Cartesian natural philosopher perform experiments that are clearly connected to a concept of independent space? What would be the expected outcome? How does the theory (in this case, the Cartesian matter theory) relate to empirical evidence? And how would the latter influence the former? Such questions are relevant for the history of experiment in the early modern period. At the same time, they offer more insights into one of the most intricate problems of Cartesian philosophy, the relation between metaphysics and physics.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Even before Torricelli, there were prior experiments performed with water in a so-called weather-glass, which were quite similar to the one described here. See for example Borrelli (2008). For the French context of the reception of Torricelli’s experiment, which is relevant for the topic discussed in this chapter, see Taton (1963).
- 4.
A very nice multimedia description of Torricelli’s experiment is provided at the virtual exhibition of the Galileo Museum of Florence. See (Museo Galileo). For a thorough discussion of Torricelli’s experiment see Shank (2013).
- 5.
In a famous letter to Michelangelo Ricci, Torricelli draws two conjectures derived from this experiment: that nature does not abhor a vacuum and that air has weight. See Torricelli (1975).
- 6.
The literature is rather large and its focus ranges from the geographical contexts to particular early modern figures. For some examples connected with the topic of this chapter, see Adam (1887, 1888), Mouy (1934), Rochot (1963), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Gorman (1994). For a general overview, see Grant (1981).
- 7.
See Bennett (1999), Slowik (2002). Bennett and Slowik, as most of the scholarship on Descartes’s views concerning “space,” were interested in the articulation of the Frenchman’s metaphysical claims, thus in his metaphysics of space. I propose here a change of perspective, by reversing the area of inquiry; so, instead of trying to reduce Descartes’s (general) physics to its metaphysical foundations, I examine how the concept of “space” that is presented in Cartesian (general) physics works in particular (experimental) cases.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
By Descartes’s “general physics,” in this chapter, I understand the physics presented in the second part of the Principles of philosophy. Briefly put, general physics would be rooted in the metaphysics of the Principles I and will share some elements with Descartes’s metaphysics (most notably, his identification of body, matter, and space). At the same time, his general physics would allow the development of particular areas of natural philosophy, including the use of experiment and observation. In modern terms, this difference would be expressed by the terms theoretical and experimental physics.
- 11.
In order to refer to (Descartes 1964–1974), I shall use AT, followed by the volume number and the page. For the English translation, (Descartes 1984–1991), I shall use CSM followed by the volume number (for the first two volumes) and the page and CSMK for the third volume, followed by the page number.
- 12.
For a lengthier discussion of Descartes’s project in the Principles, see Gaukroger (2002).
- 13.
A very good account of the second part of the Principles is in Buzon and Carraud (1994). For Descartes as the paradigmatic case of the metaphysically-minded natural philosopher of the early modern period and for a discussion of the articulation of physics and of the general principles of his physics in the metaphysics, see Hatfield (1985, 1990).
- 14.
- 15.
For Descartes’s “real,” “modal,” and “conceptual” distinctions, see Principles I 60–63, AT VIIIa 28-30; CSM I 213–215.
- 16.
See Garber (1992, 77–80). Similar conclusions are expressed in other studies. For example, Sophie Roux links Descartes’s argument with his rejection of void space, something that is particularly relevant for this chapter. Thus, Roux says, “the main claim of Cartesian physics, which was perhaps never proved, is that matter is something extended. And the impossibility of the void is nothing more than this claim, presented as a double negation—it is impossible that non-being exists” (“la thèse, fondamentale dans la physique cartésienne, et peut-être jamais démontrée, que la matière est chose étendue. Et l’impossibilité du vide n’est jamais que cette thèse, considérée sous la forme d’une double négation—il est impossible que le non-être soit”) (Roux 2000, 236).
- 17.
See Descartes’s discussion in the Principles II 12. He expands on the prior example of the stone that can be moved, so he claims that when one sees the stone removed from its place, “we think that the extension of the place where the stone used to be remains, and is the same as before, although the place is now occupied by wood or water or air or some other body, or is even supposed to be empty. For we are now considering extension as something general, which is thought of as being the same, whether it is the extension of a stone or of wood, or of water or of air or of any other body…” (AT VIIIa 46–47; CSM I 228).
- 18.
- 19.
Problems with the individuation of body in Descartes’s physics have been discussed starting from the seventeenth century. For example, Géraud de Cordemoy denounced Descartes for failing to provide a good criterion for individual bodies. See, Cordemoy (1666). A disturbing consequence is that a body at rest would lose its individuality. For some recent discussions of these problems, see Garber (1992), Roux (2000), Dobre (2011).
- 20.
See for example Descartes’s use of “body” and “motion,” which considered in the strong sense, reveals a circularity in Descartes’s definition. As I have pointed above in the footnote about individuation of bodies in Descartes’s philosophy, the two terms are clearly linked, such that if one aims to speak philosophically, one would be forced to abandon any claims that a system of physics can follow from these concepts. Only by speaking “as if,” one would be able to advance in the study of physics. For more about this, see the references provided above, especially Garber (1992), Grosholz (1994), Dobre (2011). Another interesting case is that of the tension between kinematic and dynamic in Descartes; see Slowik (2002).
- 21.
The debate between Descartes and Pascal has been covered in several studies. See for example the classic studies of Charles Adam, (Adam 1887, 1888) or the more recent accounts of Garber (1992, 136–143) and Roux (2000). In order to achieve my first aim for this section, it is sufficient to sketch the context and complement the seminal accounts of Adam and Garber with only a few details. Related to Roux’s account, there are other significant differences with respect to my main question (what would be the difference in the use of “space” in Cartesian general physics and in experimental reports?) that will receive a larger discussion in the chapter.
- 22.
For the concept of “trading zone,” see Galison (1997, 781–844). I would like to thank Koen Vermeir for suggesting this connection to me.
- 23.
For a discussion of the entire episode, see Adam (1887, 1888), Garber (1992), Palmer (1999), Roux (2000). For my purposes in this chapter, it is sufficient to point to Garber’s and Roux’s detailed analyses. However, at the end of this section, I add some details that were not discussed in the literature.
- 24.
See Roux (2000, 245–246): “Pourquoi cependant écrit-il que l’expérience du Puy-de-Dôme ‘pourrait grandement servir à vérifier’ sa physique, ou, pour reprendre certaines ses formulations ultérieures, qu’il l’‘accorde fort facilement avec [s]es principes’, ou qu’elle est ‘entièrement conforme à [s]es principes’?…L’expérience de Pascal est conforme aux principes de la physique cartésienne parce qu’elle conduit à attribuer certains effets non à la pesanteur de l’air, mais à l’horreur du vide.”
- 25.
See Roux (2000, 247): “Descartes n’a pas été convaincu par les expériences que le haut du tube était vide, mais il les jugeait d’importance pour établir que la pesanteur de l’air est un agent physique….la fonction et le degré de certitude qui sont attribués aux principes dépassant la pure expérience sensible….Pour Descartes…, ces principes sont des vérités premières que Dieu a inscrites dans nos âmes, et nous ne pourrons établir de physique solide si nous ne les prenons pas pour fondement; en ce sens, mais en ce sens seulement, Descartes peut être dit métaphysicien et dogmatique.”
- 26.
See Roux (2000, 244): “Pour les savants qui s’occupent du vide dans les années 1647–1648, la question de la nature du vide relève des principes de la physique générale; savoir quelle est la cause qui explique certains effets, cela relève aussi de la physique, mais d’une physique expérimentale: et ces deux aspects de la physique peuvent coexister sans être nécessairement articulés l’un à l’autre.”
- 27.
This activity is connected with instrument, on the one hand (“I have not yet been able to adjust the tube and the bottle”) and with weather conditions, on the other hand, as Descartes denounces the difficulties of performing the required experiment in Dutch conditions (“the sun is not hot enough”).
- 28.
See Roux (2000, 245–246): “les grandes lignes de l’interprétation que propose Descartes des expériences du vide sont claires: la hauteur du mercure est déterminée par la pesanteur de l’air, le haut du tube est plein de matière subtile; il revient au physicien de se demander quelle est la nature de ce qu’il y a dans le haut du tube, mais il n’y a là rien que les expériences puissent nous apprendre—elles ne concernent par définition pas l’existence d’un vide pur ou absolu.”
- 29.
Eric Palmer explained Descartes’s multi-layered strategy, by drawing a distinction between the arguments for the so-called “philosophical vacuists” (to which he would respond with conceptual analysis) and the physical arguments that he employed in cases such as his discussion with Pascal. In the latter case, at stake is matter’s mechanical behavior. See Palmer (1999, 38). This reading is consistent with my argument from the first section that Descartes operates with two different sets of concepts, philosophical and physical.
- 30.
For de Volder, see Nyden (2013), Bunge (2013). For a general discussion of the historiographical tensions between Cartesianism and experimentalism, with an attempt at correcting it, see Dobre and Nyden (2013). I start this section with de Volder—who was active at a later time than Rohault—because his case offers a nice introduction to the issues raised by experimental activity. At the same time, de Volder provides a good case for the pedagogical value of Cartesian experimentalism and, since I am not going to focus on that aspect, I prefer to leave more space for discussing Rohault.
- 31.
Both Tammy Nyden and Wiep van Bunge make this point to reject the rather traditional narrative held by Gerhardt Wiesenfeldt that de Volder abandoned his early Cartesian convictions in order to pursue the experimental program that he learned from the other side of the channel. See Nyden (2013), Bunge (2013).
- 32.
For de Volder’s switch from Boyle to Rohault, see Nyden (2013, 228n3). This is a point worth stressing, because de Volder makes an unexpected move, at least from the perspective of a modern reader familiar with the traditional history of the scientific revolution. Thus, his change in teaching from Boyle (an acclaimed experimental philosopher and one of the prominent members of the Royal Society) to Rohault (a Cartesian) does not fit well with our histories about the decay of Cartesian Rationalism and the emergence of British Empiricism in the late seventeenth century. As I argue further, Sophie Roux would also consider this as a move in the opposite direction, although she examines a different context—that of Parisian salons of the 1660s; see Roux (2013).
- 33.
E.g., see the discussion about the leakage of the pump in Shapin and Schaffer (1985). The evolution of the instrument is, however, not that important for the current paper. As I argue next, Rohault’s original experimental work is at the end of the 1650s and early 1660s.
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
I have discussed this point at length in Dobre (2013). I need to reassess it here, because it sheds more light on the type of experimentation that Rohault was doing. It also explains a possible objection derived from Roux (2013), that especially after 1664, the experiments performed in other Parisian academies were of a different type (“radical experimentalism”) than what one can find in Rohault.
- 37.
For the correspondence between the Huygens brothers, see Huygens (1890–1891). Particularly important are letters no. 823 (December 18, 1660), 924 (December 7, 1661), and 952 (January 4, 1662). In this correspondence, Rohault’s name is spelled “Rohaut.” I shall return shortly to Christiaan Huygens’s correspondence.
- 38.
This is a brief note in the Journal des Sçavans about the pneumatic experiments, with an emphasis on the seventeenth-century French tradition of experimentation for finding the properties and nature of air (G.P. 1666): “Ce que le Journal d’Angleterre appelle Baroscope ou Barometre, n’est pas une chose nouvelle en France, où elle est presque aussi ancienne que la suspension du Mercure pour l’experience du vuide, qui ayant esté inventée en Italie par Galilée & Toricelli, fut faite pour la premiere fois en France en 1646 par M. Petit Intendant des Fortifications, comme il paroist par le discours qu’il en fit imprimer chez Seb. Cramoisy en 1647. En suitte elle fut augmentée par M. Pascal & par plusieurs autres, qui laisserent le Mercure suspendu dans le tuyau en experience, comme ils appelloient, continuelle, pour voir le changement qui arriveroit à la hauteur du Mercure selon la diversité des temps & des saisons. Il y a plus de 19 ans que le P. Mersenne en avoit une, & par le recit qui est dans le traité de M. Pascal de l’Equilibre des liqueurs, on voit qu’en 1649. on a fait la mesme experience en plusieurs endroits, qui a esté continuée icy en divers temps & l’est encore presentement par Mess. Auzout & Roho. Mais n’ayant jusqu’icy pû trouver aucune regle certaine de la difference qui arrive à la hauteur du vif-argent suivant les changemens de l’air, ils n’avoient pas jugé à propos d’en rien publier.” See Gallica, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k581215/f212.highres.
- 39.
For a comparison between the three devices, see Mouy (1934, 126–132). This would reflect an evolution in the instrumental apparatus. It is unimportant that Rohault did not use an air-pump, as he was still using and improving other devices.
- 40.
This would be the metaphysical concept of space discussed above. I move next to discuss how “space” fits into Rohault’s experimental practice. The point is to see if the above distinction between metaphysical vs common (physical) concepts of space can be found in Rohault’s experiments.
- 41.
- 42.
Samuel Clarke produced a Latin translation of Rohault’s Traité, which he appended with comments. These comments changed with new editions and eventually reached a final version in 1723, when the first English translation of the text (provided by John Clarke) was printed. For Samuel Clarke’s annotations, see Hoskin (1961), Schüler (2001). Interestingly, Clarke would agree with Rohault’s conclusion about the motion of the piston as a valid deduction, but would deny the truth of the main premise (that the world is a plenum).
- 43.
Rohault does not mention the air-pump, although he refers in passing to an “experiment from England” that he could not replicate. It is important, however, that Rohault tries to address the problem in an experimental setting, including by using some recent devices, such as the double-chambered instrument he designed.
- 44.
See Huygens (1890–1891, vol. 22, 536): “Chez M. Rohaut veu faire les experiences du vif argent qui verifient tout a fait le poids de l’air, et comment celuy qui noys environne fait toujours ressort. vessie de carpe platte s’enfle dans le vuide pour cette raison. Il est aisè de faire un grand vuide dans un vase au haut d’une maison, auquel seroit attachè un canal estroit de fer blanc de 36 pieds ou environ, car toute l’eau s’ecoulera hors du vase. Chez Rohaut estoyent Carcavy et Auzout et quantitè d’autres. Sa chambre estoit fort bien meublée et ses vases et tuyaux pour les experiences fort propres.” One should note the timeline here. As I have remarked earlier, Rohault’s experiments were almost the same through the 1660s, so he was not taking advantage of the new devices (e.g., the air pump). However, he built instruments, as is the case with the chambre de Rohault, which improved earlier devices of Pascal and Roberval. Moreover, in his discussion of the properties of air, Rohault uses a number of instruments, ranging from the syringe and the Rohault’s chamber that I mentioned in the text, up to mercury tubes of various lengths, cupping glasses, bladders, etc. In this respect, Rohault’s experiments are a clear departure from Descartes’s limited trials with mercury tubes described in the previous section.
- 45.
- 46.
This would be the weaker sense of “container-space” that was mentioned by Edward Slowik when he discussed the views presented by Jonathan Bennett. Slowik refers to “some primitive notion of space as a ‘container’” (Slowik 2002, 139). For Bennett’s views and his rejection of a metaphysics of space as a container, see Bennett (1999). Both Slowik and Bennett reject the “container” view for Descartes’s metaphysics of space. However, neither of them was concerned with the way “container-space” might have worked in the experimental context and this chapter aimed to fill in that gap.
- 47.
See Galison (1997).
- 48.
References
Adam, Charles. 1887. Pascal et Descartes, les experiences du vide (1646-1651). Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 24 (June–December): 612–624.
Adam, Charles. 1888. Pascal et Descartes, les experiences du vide (1646-1651). Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 25 (January–June): 65–90.
Anstey, Peter. 2005. Experimental versus speculative natural philosophy. In The science of nature in the seventeenth century: patterns of change in early modern natural philosophy, eds. Peter Anstey and John Schuster, 215–242. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer.
Anstey, Peter, and Alberto Vanzo. 2012. The origins of early modern experimental philosophy. Intellectual History Review 22(4): 499–518.
Balz, Albert G.A. 1930. Clerselier (1614-1684) and Rohault (1620-1675). The Philosophical Review 39(3): 445–458.
Bennett, Jonathan. 1999. Space and subtle matter in Descartes’s metaphysics. In New essays on the rationalists, ed. Rocco J. Gennaro, and Charles Huenemann, 1–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Borrelli, Arianna. 2008. The weatherglass and its observers in the early seventeenth century. In Philosophies of technology. Francis Bacon and his contemporaries, eds. Claus Zittel, Gisela Engel, Romano Nanni, and Nicole C. Karafyllis, 67–130. Intersections. Yearbook for Early Modern Studies, vol. 11. Leiden: Brill.
Boyle, Robert. 1772. The works of the honourable Robert Boyle. In six volumes. To which is prefixed the life of the author. A new edition. London: J. and F. Rivington.
Bunge, Wiep. 2013. Dutch Cartesian empiricism and the advent of Newtonianism. In Cartesian empiricisms, eds. Mihnea Dobre, and Tammy Nyden, 89–104. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Clair, Pierre. 1978. Jacques Rohault (1618-1672). Bio-Bibliographie. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique: Paris.
Cordemoy, Géraud de. 1666. Le discernement du corps et de l’âme en six discours: pour servir à l’éclaircissement de la physique. Paris: F. Lambert.
de Buzon, Frédéric, and Vincent Carraud. 1994. Descartes et les ‘Principia’ II. Corps et mouvement. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Des Chene, Dennis. 1996. Physiologia. Natural philosophy in late Aristotelian and Cartesian thought. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Des Chene, Dennis. 2002. Cartesian science: Régis and Rohault. In Blackwell companions to philosophy: a companion to early modern philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler, 183–196. Malden: Blackwell.
Descartes, René. 1964–1974. Œuvres de Descartes. Paris: J. Vrin.
Descartes, René. 1984–1991. The philosophical writings. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dobre, Mihnea. 2010. Metaphysics and physics in Cartesian natural philosophy: Descartes and early French Cartesians on the foundation of natural philosophy. S.l.: s.n.
Dobre, Mihnea. 2011. The vanishing nature of body in Descartes’s natural philosophy. In Vanishing matter and the laws of motion. Descartes and beyond, eds. Peter Anstey, and Dana Jalobeanu, 11–30. London: Routledge.
Dobre, Mihnea. 2013. Rohault’s Cartesian physics. In Cartesian empiricisms, eds. Mihnea Dobre, and Tammy Nyden, 203–226. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Dobre, Mihnea, and Tammy Nyden. 2013. Introduction. In Cartesian empiricisms, eds. Mihnea Dobre, and Tammy Nyden, 1–21. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
G.P. [abbé Jean Galloys] 1666. Extrait du Journal d’Angleterre, contenant quelques observations faites par Monsieur Boyle, & tirées d’une de ses lettres touchant le Baroscope & le moyen de peser l’air, Journal des Sçavans 2 (Monday 26 April): 205–208.
Galison, Peter. 1987. How experiments end. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Galison, Peter. 1997. Image and logic: A material culture of microphysics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Galloys, P. 1671. Traité de physique de Jacques Rohault. Journal des Sçavans: 25–30.
Garber, Daniel. 1992. Descartes’ metaphysical physics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Gaukroger, Stephen. 2002. Descartes’ system of natural philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gorman, Michael J. 1994. Jesuit explorations of the Torricellian space: Carp-bladders and sulphurous fumes. Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée 106(1): 7–32.
Grant, Edward. 1981. Much ado about nothing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grosholz, Emily. 1994. Descartes and the individuation of the physical objects. In Individuation and identity in early modern philosophy: Descartes to Kant, eds. Kenneth Barber, and Jorge J.E. Gracia, 41–58. New York: State University of New York Press.
Hacking, Ian. 1983. Representing and intervening. Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hatfield, Gary. 1985. First philosophy and natural philosophy in Descartes. In Philosophy, its history and historiography, ed. A.J. Holland, 149–164. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Hatfield, Gary. 1990. Metaphysics and the new science. In Reapprisals of the scientific revolution, ed. David C. Lindberg, and Robert S. Westman, 93–165. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoskin, Michael. 1961. ‘Mining all within’: Clarke’s notes to Rohault’s Traité de physique. The Tomist 24: 353–363.
Huygens, Christiaan. 1890–1891. Oeuvres complètes. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Lennon, Thomas. 1993. The battle of the gods and giants: The legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655-1715. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
McClaughlin, Trevor. 1976. Quelques mots sur Rohault et Molière. Europe 54(569): 178–183.
McClaughlin, Trevor. 1996. Was there an empirical movement in mid-seventeenth century France? Experiments in Jacques Rohault’s Traité de physique. Revue d’histoire des sciences 49(4): 459–481.
McClaughlin, Trevor. 2000. Descartes, experiments, and a first generation Cartesian, Jacques Rohault. In Descartes’ natural philosophy, ed. Stephen Gaukroger, John Schuster, and John Sutton, 330–346. London: Routledge.
McClaughlin, Trevor, and Guy Picolet. 1976. Un exemple d’utilisation du minutier central de Paris: la bibliothèque et les instruments scientifiques du physicien Jacques Rohault selon son inventaire après décès. Revue d’histoire des sciences 29(1): 3–20.
Milhaud, Gérard. 1972. Rohault et Molière. Europe 50(523–524): 37–49.
Mouy, Paul. 1934. Le Développement de la Physique Cartésienne: 1646-1712. Paris: J. Vrin.
Museo Galileo. Torricelli’s barometric experiment. http://catalogue.museogalileo.it/multimedia/TorricellisBarometricExperiment.html.
Newton, Isaac. 2004. Philosophical writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nyden, Tammy. 2013. De Volder’s Cartesian physics and experimental pedagogy. In Cartesian empiricisms, eds. Mihnea Dobre, and Tammy Nyden, 227–249. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Palmer, Eric. 1999. Descartes on nothing in particular. In New essays on the rationalists, ed. Rocco J. Gennaro, and Charles Huenemann, 26–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pascal, Blaise. 1663. Traitez de l’équilibre des liqueurs, et de la pesanteur de la masse de l’air. Paris: Guillaume Desprez.
Rochot, Bernard. 1963. Comment Gassendi interprétait l’expérience du Puy de Dôme. Revue d’histoire des sciences et de leurs applications 16(1): 53–76.
Rohault, Jacques. 1660–1661. Ms 2225, Conférences sur la physique, faites en 1660-1661, par Jacques Rohault, et recueillies par un de ses auditeurs qui, dit-il, y a ajouté du sien: Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève.
Rohault, Jacques. 1671. Traité de physique. Paris: Denys Thierry and Charles Savreux.
Rohault, Jacques. 1987. System of natural philosophy, illustrated with Dr. Samuel Clarke’s notes, taken mostly out of Sir Isaac Newton’s philosophy. New York and London: Garland Publishing.
Rohault, Jacques. 2009. Physique nouvelle (1667). Paris, Milan: Séha and Archè.
Roux, Sophie. 2000. Descartes atomiste?. In Atomismo e continuo nel 17. secolo: atti del Convegno internazionale Atomisme et continuum au 17. siècle, Napoli, 28-29-30 aprile 1997, eds. Egidio Festa, and Romano Gatto, 211–273. Naples: Vivarium.
Roux, Sophie. 2013. Was there a Cartesian experimentalism in 1660 s France? In Cartesian Empiricisms, eds. Mihnea Dobre, and Tammy Nyden, 47-88. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Schmaltz, Tad. 2009. Descartes on the extensions of space and time. Analytica 13(2): 113–147.
Schüler, Volkmar. 2001. Samuel Clarke’s annotations in Jacques Rohault’s Traité de physique, and how they contributed to popularising Newton’s physics. In Between Leibniz, Newton, and Kant: philosophy and science in the 18th century, ed. Wolfgang Lefèvre, 95–110. Dordrecht: Springer.
Shank, J.B. 2013. What exactly was Torricelli’s “barometer?”. In Science in the age of Baroque, eds. Ofer Gal, and Raz Chen-Morris, 161–195. Archives of the History of Ideas, vol. 208. Dordrecht: Springer.
Shapin, Steven, and Simon Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the air-pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Slowik, Edward. 2002. Cartesian spacetime. Descartes’ physics and the relational theory of space and motion. International Archives for the History of Ideas, vol. 181. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Slowik, Edward. 2013. Newton’s neo-platonic ontology of space. Foundations of Science 18(3): 419–448.
Taton, Rene. 1963. L’annonce de l’expérience barométrique en France. Revue d’histoire des sciences et de leurs applications 16(1): 77–83.
Torricelli, Evangelista. 1975. Torricelli a Ricci, 11 giugno 1644. In Opere dei discipoli di Galileo, eds. Paolo Galluzzi, and M. Torrini, 122–123. Florence: Giunti-Barbera.
van Helden, Anne C. 1991. The age of the air-pump. Tractrix 3: 149–172.
Vanpaemel, Geert. 1984. Rohault’s Traité de physique and the teaching of the Cartesian physics. Janus: Revue Internationale de l’Histoire des Sciences, de la Médecine et de la Technique 71: 31–40.
Zepeda, Joseph Raphael. 2009. Descartes and his critics on space and vacuum. Ph.D., Notre Dame, Indiana.
Acknowledgments
This work has been supported by the grant PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0719 of the Romanian National Research Agency. I would like to thank Koen Vermeir, Jonathan Regier, Peter Anstey, Daniel Garber, Dana Jalobeanu, Edward Slowik, Eric Palmer, and the anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions on the previous drafts.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dobre, M. (2016). Experimental Cartesianism and the Problem of Space. In: Vermeir, K., Regier, J. (eds) Boundaries, Extents and Circulations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 41. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41075-3_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41075-3_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-41074-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-41075-3
eBook Packages: HistoryHistory (R0)