Abstract
This chapter discusses how order ethics relates to the theory of justice. We focus on John Rawls’s influential conception “Justice as Fairness” (JF) and compare its components with relevant aspects of the order-ethical approach. The two theories, we argue, are surprisingly compatible in various respects. We also analyse how far order ethicists disagree with Rawls and why. The main source of disagreement that we identify lies in a thesis that is central to the order ethical system, viz. the requirement of incentive-compatible implementability. It purports that an ethical norm can be normatively valid only if individuals have a self-interested motive to support it. This idea conflicts with the Rawlsian view because there are cases where it is not clear, from the standpoint of self-interest, why everybody should support its moral demands. If the thesis of incentive-compatible implementability is, in fact, correct, a proponent of JF would have to reform her views. We suggest how she could do that while salvaging the heart of her normative system as a “regulative idea”. The conception that would result from this reformation may be seen as a new variant of order ethics, which we propose to call “Rawlsian Order Ethics.”
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Notes
- 1.
We do not wish to go into the various criticisms of Rawls’s theory, however. For a critique from the perspective of Amartya Sen’s theory, see the contribution by Mike Festl (Chap. “Boost up and Merge with. Order Ethics in the Light of Recent Developments in Justice Theory”, this volume).
- 2.
This is a simplified statement of the order-ethical view. Order ethicists do not hold the view that all DS should be resolved. For further elaboration on this point, see the contribution by Nikil Mukerji and Christoph Schumacher on order-ethical methodology (Chap. “Order Ethics, Economics, and Game Theory”, this volume).
- 3.
The German verbiage is “der systematische Ort der Moral”.
- 4.
Conceivably though, natural goods may at some stage turn into social goods since it may become possible to affect the distribution of these goods through modern technologies that are currently discussed under the label human enhancement. For a discussion, see Mukerji and Nida-Rümelin (2014).
- 5.
As it stands, this formulation is rather imprecise because it does not tell us which liberties Rawls regards as “basic”. He clarifies this by giving us the following list:
political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the per- son); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law. (TJ, 53).
- 6.
Opportunities, in other words, are “positional goods” (Hirsch 1977), as economists call them.
- 7.
There are various notions of equal opportunity. For an overview, see Arneson (2008).
- 8.
Order ethicists commonly draw on the argument proposed by Sinn (1986). He argues that the social welfare state can be seen as an insurance which enables individuals to take risks. Some of the risk takers are actually successful and the wealth they create for everyone in society outweighs the costs of the social insurance.
- 9.
- 10.
As Rawls says, the arrangements that the OP-curve represents are in that sense efficient.
- 11.
For an overview of the exchange on income redistribution between conservatives, libertarians, and egalitarians, see Barry (2011).
- 12.
Order ethicists follow the economist James M. Buchanan in his pragmatic observation that “[a]ny proposal for change involves the status quo as the necessary starting point.” (Buchanan 1975/2000, 101)
- 13.
Perhaps some order ethicists would also accept a stronger version of incentivism:
Strong Incentivism (SI)
Members of society will cooperate in the implementation of an ethical norm if and only if it is in their rational self-interest to support it.
- 14.
Rawls devotes a lot of attention to the “problem of stability” and seeks to show that his conception of justice could, in fact, be implemented and stabilized in a well-ordered society. See, in particular, TJ (Book III) and JF (Chap. 5).
- 15.
We owe this point to Karl Homann.
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Heider, L., Mukerji, N. (2016). Rawls, Order Ethics, and Rawlsian Order Ethics. In: Luetge, C., Mukerji, N. (eds) Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33151-5_10
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