Abstract
In this chapter, I delineate some of the problems of classical approaches to parenthood. It will become clear how moral adultism has seeped into much of what has been written about childhood ethics. I examine different approaches, including child rights and welfare rights approaches, that attempt to realize the equal moral consideration of the child and show why, in a significant aspect, they fail to achieve this goal. A moral-equality approach should avoid developmentalism and moral adultism, and focus on the child’s agency and moral self-respect.
It’s time, according to both clinicians and researchers, to change how we relate to children—to move from a subject-object relationship to a subject-subject relationship.
Jesper Juul 2011, p. 6
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
For a thorough criticism of this perspective, see Dwyer (2006).
- 4.
Likewise, Onora O’Neill classifies parental obligations as “atypical” (O’Neill 1979, p. 27).
- 5.
They do not explain why they consider only the right not to be harmed decisive for limiting parents’ stewardship. Other rights of the child, like the right to privacy or to own property, can also be seriously violated.
- 6.
Yet, Thomas Murray rightly criticizes that the stewardship model wrongly implies detached, selfless care and discounts parents’ interests and welfare in the parent-child relationship (Murray 1996, p. 61): “The child is more than property, and the parent is more than a caretaker. We need a model of the parent-child relationship that acknowledges the immense stake parents and children have in each other’s flourishing. We need a model that emphasizes the central importance of the relationship, without losing sight of the individuality of the parties”.
- 7.
In the past, cruelty to children was often justified this way (Miller 1983). The prominent saying “Spare the rod and spoil the child” served as justification for spanking the child in order to benefit the future person. For a more recent justification of privileging the interests of the future person see Anderson’s and Claassen’s discussion of the case of 14-year-old Laura Dekker who endeavoured a round-the-world sailing tour (Anderson and Claassen 2012, p. 519). Youf (2002, p. 132), also prioritizes the future interests of the child in medical treatment.
- 8.
For a critical discussion of present versus life-time autonomy see Vaught (2008). Christoph Schickhardt , too, dismisses the idea that a benefit for the future adult is an acceptable trade-off for ignoring the child’s well-being right now (Schickhardt 2012, p. 184); for a critical discussion of “subsequent consent” to paternalistic acts in educations see pp. 202–204.
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For an instructive account of the philosophical preoccupation with the future adult and its critique since Rousseau, see Giesinger (2007, pp. 81–144).
- 10.
For a critical examination of the philosophical underpinnings of Piaget’s developmental theory, see Gareth Matthews (1994, pp. 30–53), Carnevale (2004). For a critical perspective from a sociologist’s point of view on adultism in Piaget’s work, see Jenks (2005, p. 22f); James (2009). On philosophical conceptions of childhood and adulthood see Kennedy (2006).
- 11.
See also Arneil (2002).
- 12.
However, in a critical analysis of the empirical research on early moral development, Augusto Blasi would deny this for children younger than three or four (Blasi 2000, p. 135).
- 13.
See Flasher (1978) and Guessous (2012). Chris Jenks uses the term “ethnocentrism”, instead, to denote the fact that “socialization theories present the normative structure of the adult/parent world as their independent variable. Even though all sociologists are aware that such a notion of normative structure is itself a highly problematic belief from which to begin, it is nevertheless treated as yardstick in relation to the child. Against this yardstick of an assumed consensus of reality the child is judged to be more of less competent and consequently the continuous lived social practice of being a child with a specific and coherent meaning structure is wholly ignored” (Jenks 2005, p. 9).
- 14.
A notable counter example is James Dwyer’s recent argument for the moral superiority of children (Dwyer 2011). Dwyer presents strong arguments to undermine the common conviction that adults are naturally superior to children and shows why one should base moral status on more than just one criterion. I thoroughly sympathize with Dwyer’s mission, yet, unlike him, I am less interested in, and less equipped for, a philosophical analysis of moral status and more interested in the moral agency of children.
- 15.
See, e.g., Robert Noggle’s characterization of infants and very young children: “Infants and very young children begin in an ‘egocentric predicament’. Their concern is focused on their own immediate interests. From this initial stage of straightforward, naïve, and immediate egoism, the child progresses to a stage of more enlightened—though still quite direct—egoism. In this stage, punishment, reward, and the desire to please and imitate the parent operate to make morally decent behaviour pay off in a purely short-term, self-serving way” (Noggle 2002, p. 110).
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The last is the only one not to be conceived of as a clear-cut right.
- 18.
Archard, David William, “Children’s Rights”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/rights-children/, accessed February. 22, 2016.
- 19.
Freeman (2009, p. 386f). Usually, the CRC’s rights are divided into provision, protection and participation rights. However, provision and participation rights both aim at the welfare of the child. For this ethical analysis, then, I deal with both under the category of welfare rights.
- 20.
J. Giesinger: “Dignity and Education”, Presentation at the Conference “Encountering Children—Dignity, Autonomy, and Care”, June 9, 2011, University of Zurich, Switzerland.
- 21.
Anderson and Honneth (2005) distinguish between self-respect as related to one’s competency and personal authority and self-esteem as related to one’s worth, but since both pertain to the dignity or moral core of one’s personality, I will use them indiscriminately. For a philosophical discussion of the notion ‘self-respect’, see also the book edited by Dillon (1995). Unfortunately, none of the authors of this book discusses the self-respect of children.
- 22.
Cf. Peter Schaber’s interpretation of human dignity as being based on self-respect (Schaber 2004).
- 23.
- 24.
Tim Bayne and Avery Kolers sketch a pluralistic picture of the nature of parenthood rooted in gestation, genetic derivation and intentions (Bayne and Kolers 2003). Yet, they do not account for the perspective of the child. Michael W. Austin in his book “Conceptions of Parenthood” combines the two approaches and also arrives at a pluralistic account including “a consideration of the interest of current parents, potential parents, children, and society as a whole” (Austin 2007, p. 58). Bonnie Steinbock argues that the concept of parenthood should be based on the standard of the child’s best interest (Steinbock 2006). For a concept based on rights and responsibilities see (Archard 2010).
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Wiesemann, C. (2016). The Debate About Moral Equality. In: Moral Equality, Bioethics, and the Child. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 67. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32402-9_2
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