Skip to main content

Enhancing Dimensionality Reduction Methods for Side-Channel Attacks

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9514))

Abstract

Advanced Side-Channel Analyses make use of dimensionality reduction techniques to reduce both the memory and timing complexity of the attacks. The most popular methods to effectuate such a reduction are the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). They indeed lead to remarkable efficiency gains but their use in side-channel context also raised some issues. The PCA provides a set of vectors (the principal components) onto which project the data. The open question is which of these principal components are the most suitable for side-channel attacks. The LDA has been valorized for its theoretical leaning toward the class-distinguishability, but discouraged for its constraining greed of data. In this paper we present an in-depth study of these two methods, and, to automatize and to ameliorate the principal components selection, we propose a new technique named cumulative Explained Local Variance (ELV) selection. Moreover we present some extensions of the LDA, available in less constrained situations than the classical version. We equip our study with a comprehensive comparison of the existing and new methods in real cases. It allows us to verify the soundness of the ELV selection, and the effectiveness of the methods proposed to extend the use of the LDA to side-channel contexts where the existing approaches are inapplicable.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    It can happen for example when attacking an RSA implementation, where the acquisitions are often huge (of the order of 1,000,000 points) and the number of measurements may be small when the SNR is good, implying that a good GE can be achieved with a small N.

  2. 2.

    The name is due to the fact that it was proposed and tested for face recognition scopes.

  3. 3.

    This study is let open for an extended version of this paper.

  4. 4.

    This choice has been done to allow for reproducibility of the experiments.

  5. 5.

    It consists in keeping the \(C\) first LDCs (the C last for the Direct LDA).

References

  1. Archambeau, C., Peeters, E., Standaert, F.-X., Quisquater, J.-J.: Template attacks in principal subspaces. In: Goubin, L., Matsui, M. (eds.) CHES 2006. LNCS, vol. 4249, pp. 1–14. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Batina, L., Hogenboom, J., van Woudenberg, J.G.J.: Getting more from PCA: first results of using principal component analysis for extensive power analysis. In: Dunkelman, O. (ed.) CT-RSA 2012. LNCS, vol. 7178, pp. 383–397. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Belhumeur, P.N., Hespanha, J.P., Kriegman, D.J.: Eigenfaces vs. fisherfaces: recognition using class specific linear projection. IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell. 19(7), 711–720 (1997)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Bruneau, N., Guilley, S., Heuser, A., Marion, D., Rioul, O.: Less is more. In: Güneysu, T., Handschuh, H. (eds.) CHES 2015. LNCS, vol. 9293, pp. 22–41. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Chari, S., Rao, J.R., Rohatgi, P.: Template attacks. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 13–28. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Chen, L.-F., Liao, H.-Y.M., Ko, M.-T., Lin, J.-C., Yu, G.-J.: A new LDA-based face recognition system which can solve the small sample size problem. Pattern Recogn. 33(10), 1713–1726 (2000)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Choudary, O., Kuhn, M.G.: Efficient stochastic methods: profiled attacks beyond 8 bits. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Choudary, O., Kuhn, M.G.: Efficient template attacks. In: Francillon, A., Rohatgi, P. (eds.) CARDIS 2013. LNCS, vol. 8419, pp. 253–270. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Eisenbarth, T., Paar, C., Weghenkel, B.: Building a side channel based disassembler. In: Gavrilova, M.L., Tan, C.J.K., Moreno, E.D. (eds.) Transactions on Computational Science X. LNCS, vol. 6340, pp. 78–99. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Fisher, R.A.: The statistical utilization of multiple measurements. Ann. Eugenics 8(4), 376–386 (1938)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Fukunaga, K.: Introduction to Statistical Pattern Recognition, 2nd edn. Academic Press Professional Inc, San Diego (1990)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Guhr, T., Müller-Groeling, A., Weidenmüller, H.A.: Random-matrix theories in quantum physics: common concepts. Phys. Rep. 299(4), 189–425 (1998)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  13. Huang, R., Liu, Q., Lu, H., Ma, S.: Solving the small sample size problem of LDA. Pattern Recogn. 3, 29–32 (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Karsmakers, P., Gierlichs, B., Pelckmans, K., De Cock, K., Suykens, J., Preneel, B., De Moor, B.: Side channel attacks on cryptographic devices as a classification problem. Technical report, COSIC technical report (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Liu, K., Cheng, Y.-Q., Yang, J.-Y.: A generalized optimal set of discriminant vectors. Pattern Recogn. 25(7), 731–739 (1992)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Massey, J.L.: Guessing and entropy. In: 1994 Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, p. 204. IEEE (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Mavroeidis, D., Batina, L., van Laarhoven, T., Marchiori, E.: PCA, Eigenvector localization and clustering for side-channel attacks on cryptographic hardware devices. In: Flach, P.A., De Bie, T., Cristianini, N. (eds.) ECML PKDD 2012, Part I. LNCS, vol. 7523, pp. 253–268. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Nisan, N., Zuckerman, D.: Randomness is linear in space. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 52(1), 43–52 (1996)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. O’Flynn, C., Chen, Z.D.: ChipWhisperer: an open-source platform for hardware embedded security research. In: Prouff, E. (ed.) COSADE 2014. LNCS, vol. 8622, pp. 243–260. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  20. TELECOM ParisTech. DPA contest 4. http://www.DPAcontest.org/v4/

  21. Specht, R., Heyszl, J., Kleinsteuber, M., Sigl, G.: Improving non-profiled attacks on exponentiations based on clustering and extracting leakage from multi-channel high-resolution EM measurements. In: Mangard, S., Poschmann, A.Y. (eds.) COSADE 2015. LNCS, vol. 9064, pp. 3–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Standaert, F.-X., Archambeau, C.: Using subspace-based template attacks to compare and combine power and electromagnetic information leakages. In: Oswald, E., Rohatgi, P. (eds.) CHES 2008. LNCS, vol. 5154, pp. 411–425. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Standaert, F.-X., Malkin, T.G., Yung, M.: A unified framework for the analysis of side-channel key recovery attacks. In: Joux, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 443–461. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Yu, H., Yang, J.: A direct LDA algorithm for high-dimensional data with application to face recognition. Pattern Recogn. 34, 2067–2070 (2001)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Eleonora Cagli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Cagli, E., Dumas, C., Prouff, E. (2016). Enhancing Dimensionality Reduction Methods for Side-Channel Attacks. In: Homma, N., Medwed, M. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9514. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31271-2_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31270-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31271-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics