Abstract
Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. It accounts for what things are and what they can do. The hylomorphic notion of structure provides resources for understanding the place of mind in the natural world. The activities of living things like us are not random physiological occurrences; they are physiological occurrences with a certain organization or structure. We engage in them by imposing an order on the ways our parts manifest their powers. According to the hylomorphic view I defend, thought, feeling, perception, and intentional action are structured activities of this sort. The result is a theory of mental phenomena that rejects physicalism but that is nevertheless naturalistic. It is also antireductive: it denies that psychological discourse is reducible to physical theory. Finally, it provides an unmysterious account of how mental phenomena fit within the natural world.
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Notes
- 1.
Other accounts of hylomorphic structure that have appeared in the literature include Fine’s (1999), Johnston’s (2006), Oderberg’s (2007), Koslicki’s (2008), and Rea’s (2011). The account of hylomorphic structured I’ll be developing here differs from theirs in ways that I trust will become evident as I proceed.
- 2.
Brian Ellis states the basic idea as follows: “[W]hich predicates designate properties[?]… I answer: first decide what properties and structure s you must postulate if you wish to give an adequate account of the phenomena, and then decide which expressions of the language refer to these properties or structure s” (2002, pp. 44–45). Consider likewise Armstrong, Molnar, and Swoyer respectively: “[H]ow do we determine what the true universals are? My suggestion is that they are best postulated on the basis of total science (2010, p. 19); “[W]hat properties there are is… determined… on a posteriori grounds, most likely by current best science” (2003, p. 27). “the claim that there are such things as properties is a philosophical one, but determining just what properties there are is – like questions about existence generally – an empirical matter” (1982, p. 205).
- 3.
Martin (1996a) defends this idea with an example: it seems possible that there might be fundamental physical particles in the universe that have the power to interact in various ways with particles around here, and yet that are so far away that they reside outside the light cone of the particles around here. The two groups of particles never actually interact, yet it seems obvious that the distant particles still have the power to interact with the local ones.
- 4.
Harré and Madden’s (1975) examples of radioactive decay and ammonium tri-iodide seem initially to provide counterexamples to the general rule that powers are manifested or exercised in pairs, or triples, or n-tuples. But even here it might be possible to understand the cases in a way that conforms to the general reciprocity model. At the very least the environment surrounding the radioactive nuclei or the ammonium tri-iodide cannot include any agents that inhibit the exercise of their powers to decay or explode, respectively. Environments that are free of inhibitory factors might then be viewed as reciprocal disposition partners for the decaying nuclei and the explosive compound.
- 5.
- 6.
The term ‘functional analysis ’ is due to Cummins (1975). Becthel (2008) calls it ‘mechanistic decomposition’ or ‘functional decomposition’. Craver (2007) subsumes it under the heading of ‘mechanistic explanation ’. He takes Cummins’s notion of functional analysis to be the exemplar of what he calls the ‘systems tradition’, but argues that Cummins fails to provide an adequate account of mechanistic explanation. He thus distances himself from the term ‘functional analysis ’.
- 7.
Elsewhere I’ve discussed functional analysis in greater detail. I’ve argued among other things that it does not correspond to the notion of function that is operative in discussions of functionalism in the philosophy of mind (including teleological functionalism), and that it does not imply a commitment to reductionism (Jaworski 2011, 2012, 2016).
- 8.
Many hylomorphists of the past have denied the embodiment thesis. Aristotle himself appears to deny it in De Anima III.4. There he appears to argue that understanding or nous, the power to grasp the essences of things, has no organ and is in general unmixed (amigēs) with a body (429a 10–27). There are several things to say in response. First, a commitment to the essential embodiment of our capacities is the default position for a hylomorphist. In fact Aristotle treats embodiment as the default position as well (403a 16–19, 24–27; 403b 17–18). We cannot do most of the things we do (walking, breathing, perceiving, eating, and so on) without some of our parts manifesting their powers in coordinated ways. Against this background of embodied activity the claim that nous is not essentially embodied stands out as anomalous. Commentators like Shields suggest that the claim stretches Aristotle’s hylomorphic framework “almost beyond the limits of recognition” (2014, pp. 354–355). Given the foregoing, a hylomorphist should look to reject the embodiment thesis only if there is a powerful argument against it. Most of the arguments that have been advanced against the thesis are descendants of the argument in De Anima III.4. I argue elsewhere in detail that that argument is flawed in a variety of ways (Jaworski 2016).
- 9.
A version of this paper was presented at the Fordham-Rutgers Metaphysics of Mind Conference held at Fordham University in March 2015. I discuss the hylomorphic view it outlines in greater detail in Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem (Oxford University Press, 2016). Some of the materials that appears in this chapter was originally published in that book, and has been reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press https://global.oup.com/academic/product/structure-and-the-metaphysics-of-mind-9780198749561.
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Jaworski, W. (2016). Hylomorphism: Emergent Properties without Emergentism. In: García-Valdecasas, M., Murillo, J., Barrett, N. (eds) Biology and Subjectivity. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30502-8_4
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