Turing, Functionalism, and Emergence

Abstract

This chapter addresses the relevance of the ground breaking work of Alan Turing to justify our functionalism stance regarding the modeling of morality. Turing first defined the algorithmic limits of computability, via an effective well-specified mechanism, and showed the generality of his definition by proving its equivalence to other general, but less algorithmic and non-mechanical, more abstract formulations of computability. Interestingly, Turing raised the issue of whether human beings are a measure for his “machines”, and, in mechanizing human cognition, Turing implicitly introduced the modern perspective since known as “functionalism”. According to this paradigm, what counts is the realization of function, independently of the hardware embodying it. Functionalism is employed to scaffold a philosophical perspective on programming machine ethics . Building intelligent machines seeks a partial understanding of the emergence of higher-level properties, like morality. Functionalism holds that the material substrate is not of the essence, and that it suffices to realize equivalent functionality albeit by way of a different material vehicle. The most fruitful inquires into the nature of “mind” or “general intelligence” shall include the use of Artificial Intelligence to simulate complex mental operations.