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Risk, Uncertainty, and the Dimensions of Technological Rationality

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New Perspectives on Technology, Values, and Ethics

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 315))

Abstract

This paper show that risk and uncertainty are closely related to technological rationality due to importance of the time horizon over which the consequences of technology are felt, the collateral effects of actions result of technological rationality, and the irreversibility of the consequences of many of these actions. Rationality is no longer merely a question of efficacy and effectiveness, rational procedure in technology has to consider all the variables in play including those related to the dangerous effects of technology and the risks and uncertainty they generate.

Accordingly, it is argued that risk and uncertainty consequences place technology in the realm of public and social life, and hence in the field of politics and moral. Technological rationality cannot be merely reduced to a question of efficacy or effectiveness since its consequences insert technology in the sphere of responsibility. Therefore, technological rationality is not just a question of means: it is also a question of ends. Evaluative rationality and means-ends (instrumental) rationality are two dimensions of technological rationality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to Quintanilla, his strategy is to measure technical efficiency–on the basis more than economic efficiency, the thermodynamic efficiency–as: “a function of the level of adjustment between results and objectives of an action.” Quintanilla (2005), p. 220.

  2. 2.

    As is well known different theoreticians have characterized technological rationality in terms that go far beyond this conception taking into account external rationality and rationality of ends, see for instance, Gonzalez (1998); Mitcham (2005), p. 788; Rescher (1988); and Agazzi (2004).

  3. 3.

    This has been pointed out by Herbert Simon characterization of substantive rationality. He considers that this is the case because in conditions of certainty, one of the options always emerges as objectively preferable to the others, and this occurs almost deterministically; Simon (1976). See also Simon (1978).

  4. 4.

    Gonzalez (1998), p. 113. For an analysis of economic rationality in technology, see Gonzalez (1998), pp. 95–115. In this work, he states that “economic rationality may serve as a link between scientific rationality and technological rationality,” Gonzalez (1998), p. 97.

  5. 5.

    To technological determinism see Gonzalez (2005), p. 30. As argued Gonzalez (2005), pp. 31–32, Niiniluoto holds an interesting middle position between determinism and voluntarism. Also, see Niiniluoto (1994, 1997).

  6. 6.

    For moral judgement of science and technology, see Agazzi (2004), pp. 127–139.

  7. 7.

    Nuclear waste continues to be hazardous for a long time; the plutonium in nuclear power plants will always enable the construction of nuclear weapons; genetic defects and alterations may last until the end of time; the heating of the atmosphere seems to be irreversible, etc. For an analysis of scientific progress and technological innovation, see Gonzalez (1997).

  8. 8.

    The basic idea is that many events occur unintentionally, they are the by-products of actions. They may be positive (A. Smith’s invisible hand) or negative (perverse effects). For more on this subject, see Elster (1988). Also see, Gómez (2002).

  9. 9.

    See the interesting proposal for public risk assessment and its legal regulation by Jasanoff (2001). See also Agazzi (2004), pp. 204–205.

  10. 10.

    Mayo (1997), p. 227. Given that there is more than one scientifically acceptable response to these questions, there is more than one plausible choice.

  11. 11.

    In experiments with animals have been shown that formaldehyde causes cancer in concentrations greater than 6 ppm in the air breathed.

  12. 12.

    That is what Beck terms the “the hazardousness of a risk” the risk of the risk. See Beck (1992), p. 29.

  13. 13.

    Only USA, Japan and UK maintain preventive regulations.

  14. 14.

    According to Bradbury, risk management requires the development of institutional procedures for structuring between two different perspectives on risk, the scientific and the social views. Cf. Bradbury (1989), p. 394.

  15. 15.

    These points have been developed by Beck (1992, 1998).

  16. 16.

    Beck (1992); the author has developed these issues extensively.

  17. 17.

    See the interesting Gonzalez work on the role of values in the configuration of technology: Gonzalez (2008, 2016).

  18. 18.

    For these questions see Balmer (2013).

  19. 19.

    Rescher distinguishes between the two forms of rationality in relation to science; see Rescher (1988), pp. 2–3.

  20. 20.

    For the relationship between science, technology and politics see Gómez and Balmer (2013). Also at the cultural sphere, see Mitcham (1980).

  21. 21.

    According to Beck. See Beck (1992), pp. 36, 48–49, 52 (among others). See also Beck (1998).

  22. 22.

    This is a key idea in Beck’s analysis of risk society; see Beck (1992), passim, and Beck (1998).

  23. 23.

    According to Rescher, the three spheres of the technological rationality are: The cognitive, the practical and the evaluative ones. See Rescher (1988).

  24. 24.

    Both are forms of rational choice in contexts of uncertainty.

  25. 25.

    Elster (1983), p. 203. This author points out that an infinite number multiplied by any positive quantity (no matter how small), is still infinite.

  26. 26.

    Prudential recommendations are located within the framework of consequentialist ethics based on the principle of responsibility that is today fairly popular; for more on this subject, see Agazzi (1999).

  27. 27.

    In the US in the 1980s.

  28. 28.

    In relation to the precautionary principle, see Foster et al. (2000). See also Gómez (2003).

  29. 29.

    The solutions to these situations are of two types: Strengthening compliance of the international agreements with sanctions and/or rewards–which is not very feasible at certain levels since it would be required strong transnational organizations which carry out this task–or appeal to moral reasons about what should be done independently of what others do–which has obvious limitations.

  30. 30.

    We forget, for example, that the genetic manipulation of food often renders it cheaper, improves its quality and extends the areas in which it can be grown, which has important implications for the developing world, it also provides a solution to the problem of food security in the world and it renders plants more pest-resistant, thus lessening the need for pesticides; that nuclear power is the cheapest and least polluting energy source currently available; and that biotechnologies have important medical applications, etc.

  31. 31.

    The announcement appeared in the Spanish newspaper El País on 24 January 1999.

  32. 32.

    According to van de Poel, technologies are inherently normative and include instrumental and final values. The technical function of certain technologies is to prevent certain evils and dangers being instrumental regarding moral values. The example is a seawall for preventing flooding and to achieve security for people as part of its function. See van de Poel (2016).

  33. 33.

    Kitcher approach is inspired by the social choice theory related to social welfare functions, therefore, the final result, which is chosen, must be an expression of what everyone prefers and choose. For Longino decisions have to be taken in discursive interactive processes, egalitarian and plurals which produce a consensus as result. See, Kitcher (2002a), (b); and Longino (2002a, b).

  34. 34.

    See the characterization of internal and external values in technology in Gonzalez (2016).

  35. 35.

    As Simon has argued from an evolutionary approach to technological rationality. See Simon (1983), p. 72. For this topic, see Neira (2012), p. 345.

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Acknowledgments

This paper has been written thanks to the support of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Research Project FFI2012-33998. I am very grateful to Wenceslao J. Gonzalez for his insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks are extended to Brian Balmer for reading an earlier draft of this article.

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  1. Faculty of Philosophy, Campus of Guajara, University of La Laguna, La Laguna (Tenerife), 38296, Spain

    Amparo Gómez

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    Wenceslao J. Gonzalez

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Gómez, A. (2015). Risk, Uncertainty, and the Dimensions of Technological Rationality. In: Gonzalez, W. (eds) New Perspectives on Technology, Values, and Ethics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 315. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21870-0_6

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