Abstract
As the following discussion will point out, the FDCPA has not only indicated which practices will be deemed abusive and banned from the collection process but also stated how they are to be sanctioned. Its uniqueness and greatest accomplishment were to provide aggrieved consumers with diverse causes of action and efficient enforcement mechanisms. Although its primary target was the abusive independent debt collector, the FDCPA has “crystallized tort theories applicable to debt collection abuses” … [and has] “extended broad authority to sue for unfair and deceptive collection practices.” This chapter will detail the abovementioned remedies and their efficiency and will compare them with their counterparts in the other chosen jurisdictions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Akina (2012), p. 160. The US Congress put at consumers’ disposal several causes of action in order to protect their own rights against unfair debt collection practices. By granting the consumers the possibility to act as “private attorneys general,” the FDCPA promoted several interests: it rewarded citizens for educating themselves about their rights, forced debt collectors to act more cautiously during the collection procedures and reduced the burden on the FTC (and recently on the BFCP) to monitor minor debt collectors by allowing them to focus on large-scale violations from big debt collectors.
- 2.
Potach (1978), p. 908.
- 3.
- 4.
The remedies offered by the federal FDCPA were twofold. On the one side, the FDCPA provided for administrative enforcement, which basically allows the consumer to address the FTC with respect to debt collector’s noncompliance with the FDCPA’s required conduct, while on the other side, the law provided for civil penalties and attorney fees awards, in the attempt to encourage consumers to act on their own. Akina (2012), p. 160. However, since the application of the FDCPA does not affect the application of state laws, the remedies can also arise under criminal law, where the abuse amounts to criminal offense, or under administrative law, where the action of the debt collector would justify the suspension of his activity or the withdrawal of his license.
- 5.
Despite the benefits given to debtors in order to determine them to act on their own by private action, there has been criticism that these benefits were not enough and that still private actions were not nearly as many as they should have been.
- 6.
The FDCPA reads: “[…] any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this title with respect to any person is liable to such person.” As the statute does not distinguish between the types of liability, there is no strict liability. See FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813)(a). Also Hector (2011), p. 1607.
- 7.
Initially, such construction was determined by the analogous court decisions regarding the interpretation of the Truth in Landing Act. “Construing the model language of 15 USC 1640 (a), which imposes liability for violations of any requirement of the statute, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “once a court finds a violation, no matter how technical, it has no discretion with respect to the imposition of liability” 539 F.2d at 510. The virtually identical language of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC 1692 k (a), likewise, would compel the automatic imposition of liability for even technical violations of the Act.” See Potach (1978), p. 909, footnote 92. Also in the recent case of Bicking, the court held that the failure of the defendant to include the “in writing” requirement could easily deceive the least sophisticated debtor into believing that oral notice is statutorily sufficient, thus violating Section 1692g (a)(4) and (5). In the case at hand, the defendant attempted to collect debt sending demand letters to the plaintiffs. Each letter stated that if the account was not in dispute, the payment was expected. The included verification notice informed the plaintiffs that any notice of dispute or request for information “must be received within thirty days.” Plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that the verification notice failed to inform the consumer that such disputes and requests must be received in writing according to the FDCPA. Defendants tried to argue that the notice was sufficient because “it clearly informed of their right to notify” and in their interpretation a violation of Section 1692g required a more egregious conduct. The court dismissed this interpretation and held that Section 1692g should be read to mean that debtors can trigger the right awarded to them under subsection (a)(4) and (a)(5) only through written dispute. Thus, failure to notify them of this requirement, though merely technical, represented a violation of the statute.
- 8.
The conclusion stems from the corroborated provisions of Section 813 (a), (c) and (e). Letter (a) reads: “except as otherwise provided by this section […],” while letters (c) and (e) state: “A debt collector may not be held liable in any action […] if [he] […] shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from bona fide error […]” and “No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Commission […].” See FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (a) (c) and (e).
- 9.
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/faq/businesses/answers/handle_cases_a3.html, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 10.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (a) (1) and (2).
- 11.
At first glance, a civil penalty of five hundred dollars might not have a strong deterrent effect. However, cases in which only one abusive practice occurred are very rare and since the penalty is imposed for each violation, the amount increases considerably. In addition, one should consider the fact of the likelihood that more debtors were subjected to the same abusive practices. Besides the fact that they also have the possibility of constituting a class action and seek punitive damages, each and every one of them will be entitled to seek and receive the civil penalty. In such case, the magnitude of the amounts paid by the debt collector will have the strong deterrent effect sought by the legislator.
- 12.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (a) (2) (A) and (B) (ii).
- 13.
Potach (1978), p. 910. In footnote 96, the author offers yet another comparison with the Truth in Lending Act and cites a Supreme Court Decision rendered in Mourning v. Family Publications Serv Inc. where, with respect to imposing civil penalties, it was stated: “We cannot conclude that the Congress intended those who failed to comply with regulations to be subject to no penalty or to criminal penalties alone…” 411 US. At 376.
- 14.
These factors are specifically mentioned by the law. See FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (b) (1).
- 15.
Potach (1978), p. 910. The author mentions that the Act addresses also the redress of injuries resulting from the invasion of debtor’s privacy, which are normally of a nonmonetary value (footnote 99).
- 16.
Such banned practices were (and still are) harassment by constant telephone calls, threats of physical violence, threats to arrest or seize property. Despite this, the Senate committee seemed to have feared that if they expanded the definition of actual damages to include damages for emotional distress or anguish, a rash of nuisance suits might have overburdened the federal dockets. For more details, see Potach (1978), p. 911, footnotes 100–102.
- 17.
Such conclusion was based on FDCPA’s inception on the analogous interpretation and application of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Cases were cited in which the courts awarded actual damages for loss of sleep, nervousness, frustration, mental anguish, loss of reputation, embarrassment and humiliation. Potach (1978), pp. 911–912, footnote 103.
- 18.
See FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (2) (B).
- 19.
Potach (1978), p. 912, footnote 105.
- 20.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (b) (2).
- 21.
Infra, Sect. 7.2.
- 22.
Garner (2009), p. 609.
- 23.
Garner (2009), p. 98.
- 24.
See FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (a) (3) 1st thesis.
- 25.
The opinion was at inception based on the analogy with the Truth in Landing Act related case law. For example was mentioned Seller v. Wollman, 510, F. 2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975), in which it was held that “in case of success the plaintiffs would not be denied the attorney’s fees simply because they were represented by a legal aid society.” For details: Potach (1978), p. 914, footnotes 115–116.
- 26.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (a) (3) 2nd thesis.
- 27.
Potach (1978), pp. 915–916.
- 28.
West v. Costen, cited supra footnotes 886 and 1182.
- 29.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (d).
- 30.
Another form of abuse that the FDCPA is trying to prevent is related to judicial forums in which the debt collector may bring action. Therefore, in accordance with the legal provisions, the debtor collector is required to use only those venues that are logical or convenient to the debtor, meaning either those in which the real property upon which an interest is secured is located or, in any other cases, those in the judicial district having a very strong connection with the debt (place of signature) or residence of the debtor at the time of the beginning of the action. The purpose was to avoid the situations in which collectors obtain default judgments in distant and inconvenient forums, though such provisions were not able to put a stop to abusive practices involving default judgments in debt collection cases, as mentioned in the previous chapter. A legal disclaimer specifies the fact that the provisions precluding forum abuse are not to be construed in any way as constituting a cause for any legal actions taken by debt collectors against consumers.
- 31.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 813) (d).
- 32.
For a more detailed discussion on the possibility of bankruptcy courts or state courts to hear debt collection related cases without remanding them to federal courts: Potach (1978), p. 920, footnotes 146–147.
- 33.
The case law confirmed that damages can be awarded cumulatively under both federal and state laws. In Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 660 F 3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2011), the court reasoned as follows: “The FDCPA explicitly states that it “does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of any State”… a State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this subchapter.” The court found this language, coupled with the FDCPA’s express purpose to “promote consistent State action,” as well as deter violations, established that Congress did not intend the FDCPA to preempt consistent state consumer protection laws. Next the court showed that the Rosenthal Act also contemplated dual enforcement: its language states that it should be “cumulative and…in addition to any other… remedies under any other provisions of the law.” For details see Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law, Spring, 2012, *71 Debt Collection, 15 JCCOML 71.
- 34.
One author mentions though that some state courts could retain cases against out-of-state debt collectors on the basis of “minimum contacts” doctrine. See footnote 148 in Potach (1978), p. 920.
- 35.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 817).
- 36.
For Potach (1978), p. 921.
- 37.
None of the UK regulations or statutes related to consumer protection against unfair debt-collecting practices offers the possibility for a civil action or private enforcement system (with incentives and statutory damages) like their American counterparts. Aggrieved debtors can bring action in court based on tort law, but as the latter would go beyond the purposes of this work, it will not go into any details thereof. The current FCA regulation concerning disputes related to abusive debt collection practices is “Dispute Resolution: Complaints” (DISP), which was enacted in September 2014 and covers the powers and responsibilities of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS).
- 38.
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/consumer-leaflet.htm, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 39.
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/consumer/complaints.htm, last 23.01.2015.
- 40.
Project Law, Chapter V, Art 12.
- 41.
Project Law, Chapter VI, Art 14.
- 42.
“Because certain practices that violate the FDCPA also violate the FTC Act, the FTC also uses the FTC Act to halt unfair or deceptive debt collection practices.” See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/finance/debtcollection.shtml, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 43.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 814) (a).
- 44.
https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 45.
https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 46.
http://www.consumidor.ftc.gov/, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 47.
https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/FTC_Wizard.aspx?Lang=en, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 48.
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/finance/debtcollection.shtml, last visited 23.01.2015. According to another source, in 2010 complaints jumped over 140,036, the number representing 11 % of all complaints in the commission’s database. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/business/ftc-fines-a-collector-of-debt-2-5-million.html?_r=0, last visited 23.01.2015. Similar information at Hector (2011), p. 1609 and Akina (2012), p. 150. The latter notices a large range of categories but underlines the absence of one to focus explicitly on misrepresentations made to consumers.
- 49.
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/consumer-finance/debt-collection, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 50.
For a list of recent cases solved in the recent year: http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/02/cfpb.shtm, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 51.
The complaint referred to alleged misleading practices, which included leading consumers into paying unnecessary fees and falsely threatening them with lawsuits. For details: http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/03/securitycredit.shtm, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 52.
The complaint referred to an operation that allegedly used insults, lies and false threats to collect on payday loans. For details: http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/goldman.shtm, last visited on 23.01.2015.
- 53.
The complaint regarded the harassment of consumers and alleged illegal debt collection calls. Basically, the debt collector engaged in calling consumers multiple times per day, calling even after they were asked to stop, at inappropriate times, either early in the morning or late at night, or at consumers’ workplaces knowing the employer prohibited such calls. In addition, phone messages were left, disclosing the debtor’s name and the existence of the debt to third parties. Last but not least, the company continued collection efforts without verifying the debt, even after consumers disputed the existence of the debt. http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/07/worlds-largest-debt-collection-operation-settles-ftc-charges-will last visited 20.09.2014.
- 54.
The complaint referred to harassment of consumers for money they were not even legally obligated to pay. For details: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/business/ftc-fines-a-collector-of-debt-2-5-million.html?_r=0, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 55.
FDCPA, 15 USC 1692 (Section 814) (d).
- 56.
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, available online at: http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 57.
Hector (2011). For a list of regulations adopted by the BCFP, including debt collection, see: http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/, last visited 23.01.2015. Also Akina (2012), pp. 163–164. “[t]he Dodd-Frank Act transferred enforcement and regulatory powers over the FDCPA from the FTC to the BFCP. […] The significance is two-fold. First, the BCFP is a specialized office that represents a consolidation of consumer financial protection authorities that had been originally scattered across several federal agencies. Second, the BFCP has rulemaking authority over federal consumer financial laws, which must be given deferential treatment by the courts.”
- 58.
In 2011, the FTC and CFPB signed a Memorandum of Understanding aiming to prevent duplication of efforts, provide consistency and ensure a vibrant marketplace for financial products or services. In March 2012, the CFPB made a public announcement regarding the sharing of the complaints it received with the FTC’s own database. For details, see: Dempsey (2013), p. 34.
- 59.
http://protectyourfuture.com/consumer-financial-protection-bureau/, last visited 23.01.2015. The reasons for the need of such additional monitoring are the following: “As the economy soured, more people fell behind in paying bills and confronted a diminished ability to repay once the debts moved to collection. That left companies more desperate to recoup losses and led some collectors to be more aggressive in pushing consumers to pay up on a range of debts, including student loan, credit cards, and medical bills. The CFPB said 30 million Americans are currently pursued by debt collectors, for an average debt of 1500 dollars. The bureau estimates that 63 % of the market will fall under its watch.” For details, see: Karen Weise—Debt Collectors Face a New Watchdog, BusinessWeek.com, 10/25/2012, available online at: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-10-24/debt-collectors-have-a-new-watchdog, last visited 23.01.2015.
- 60.
- 61.
Section 4.8 of the Guidance.
- 62.
Adopted at 1st of April 2014, available online at: http://media.fshandbook.info/Handbook/EG_FCA_20140401.pdf, last visited 19.12.2014.
- 63.
EG, Section 2.2.
- 64.
EG, Section 2.5 (2).
- 65.
EG, Section 2.10.
- 66.
EG, Sections 1.1. and 2.35.
- 67.
EG, Chapter 7 and Chapter 6 of the Procedure (Section 6.5 especially on Determining the Appropriate Level of Financial Penalty).
- 68.
Section 6.5A.2. (3) of the Procedure.
- 69.
Section 4.10 of the Guidance. Also: Burridge (2010).
- 70.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/14/section/59, last visited 09.09.2014. The text reads as follows: 226A (1) “A complaint which relates to an act or omission of a person (“the respondent” is to be dealt with under the ombudsman scheme if the conditions mentioned in subsection (2) are satisfied.” Among the conditions specified in subsection (2) of relevance is the one at letter d) “the act or omission occurred in the course of a business being carried on by the respondent which was of a type mentioned in subsection (3).” In its turn, the relevant provision of subsection 3, mentions at letter f) “a business so far as it comprises or relates to debt collecting.”
- 71.
http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/DISP.pdf, last visited, 09.09.2014.
- 72.
Section 1.4.1 of the FCA’s Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP), available online at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/DISP.pdf, last visited 09.09.2014.
- 73.
DISP, Section 1.6.2 (1) and (2).
- 74.
DISP, Section 1.6.2 (1) (a)–(e).
- 75.
DISP, Section 1.6.2 corroborated with 2.8.1 and 2.8.2.
- 76.
DISP, Section 2.1.1 (2) corroborated with 2.4.1 (1) and (2).
- 77.
DISP, Section 2.6.3.
- 78.
DISP, Sections 2.7.1–2.7.3.
- 79.
DISP, Section 2.7.6 (12) a), which is relevant to debt collection, reads as follows: “the complainant is a person from whom the respondent has sought to recover payment under a regulated consumer credit agreement or regulated hire agreement (whether or not the respondent is a party to the agreement.” Any other collection attempts related to bills, rents, trade debts or council taxes will not be covered by the FOS scheme.
- 80.
DISP, Section 2.8.2. According to the legal provision, the complaint must be referred to the FOS “within 6 months after the date on which the respondent sent the complainant its final response or redress determination or, within either 6 years after the event complained of, or, if later, 3 years from the date on which the complainant became aware (or should have become aware) the he had cause for complaint.” The text establishes 3 exceptional situations from the abovementioned rules: in case the delay was the result of exceptional circumstances; the FOS is required to look at the complaint according to its own Transitional Order; or the respondent has not objected on grounds of time limits.
- 81.
DISP, Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
- 82.
DISP, Section 3.3.4. (1)–(4), (9) and (10).
- 83.
DISP, Section 3.6.1.
- 84.
DISP, Section 3.6.4 (1) and (2).
- 85.
DISP, Section 3.6.6 (1)–(3).
- 86.
DISP, Section 3.7.1.
- 87.
DISP, Section 3.7.2. For what is meant by “distress,” “inconvenience” or “pain and suffering” in the FOS’s view, see FOS, Technical Notes: Distress and Inconvenience, available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/distress-and-inconvenience.htm.
- 88.
DISP, Section 3.7.9.
- 89.
DISP, Section 3.7.11. Also: FOS) “For example, we will sometimes tell the financial business to make an apology or to provide the consumer with an appropriate service which relates to the original problem.”
- 90.
DISP, Section 3.7.4. If the fair compensation exceeds the statutory maximum amount allowed, the FOS may “recommend” the business to pay the difference as well, but judging from the language used, such recommendation might not be enforceable. See FOS, Technical Note: Compensation, available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/compensation.html.
- 91.
For a detailed list of compensations awarded based on real-life cases, see FOS) Also: FOS (2011). “Where the degree of distress, inconvenience or other non-financial loss is sufficient to warrant compensation, the amount is generally likely to be modest. Most compensation is for less than 300£ and in only a small number of exceptional cases does it exceed 1000 £. Cases involving pain and suffering are likely to lead to higher compensation than those involving distress and inconvenience.”
- 92.
Extracting from a list of cases that were decided in 2014, the plaintiffs received the following amounts as “fair and reasonable” for their inconveniences: in case DRN 8005761, concerning the collection attempt of a debt without providing the statutory information on the debt’s validation, the complainant received “50 pounds for her distress and inconvenience”; in case DRN 9452119, concerning the sale of a debt to two different debt collectors, which resulted in overpayment of the debt, the complainant received “199,12 pounds reimbursement, plus interest of 10, 57 pounds, and a compensation of 300 pounds, together with a written apology”; in a similar case, DRN 5382333, where a bank sold a debt that it previously agreed to write off, which resulted in collection attempts, the complainant received “50 pounds compensation”; in case DRN 9172974, concerning the sale of a debt to a third party, resulting in overstated amounts without proper explanation or documentation, the complainant was “100 pounds compensation”; in case DRN 7783037, where the debt collector wrongfully pursued a consumer for a debt that was not his, the amount of the compensation was 325 pounds; in case DRN 5919254, where the complainant who filed for bankruptcy was still being harassed by the debt collector, the interest and charges to the debt were removed, while the compensation for “distress and inconvenience” was 50 pounds; and in case DRN 7975535, where excessive interest and charges were applied to the account of the consumer, without proper explanation or documentation, the only “compensation” was the removal of the excessive charges.
- 93.
See case DRN 2396014, where a consumer was pursued for a debt that was not his and the debt collector placed a charging order on his property. The FOS decided to award the complainant 1,000 pounds, plus 8 % interest per year, for the costs he incurred and 250 pounds for the “distress and inconvenience.”
- 94.
783 (2012), Art. R. 124-7. In French original: “Est puni de l’amende prévue par le 5° de l’article 131-13 du code pénal pour les contraventions de la cinquième classe le fait pour toute personne exerçant l’activité mentionnée à l’article R. 124-1 de: 1° Ne pas se conformer aux obligations prévues à l’article R. 124-2 ; 2° Omettre l’une des mentions prévues à l’article R. 124-4 dans la lettre adressée au débiteur. En cas de récidive, la peine d’amende prévue au même alinéa pour la récidive des contraventions de la cinquième classe est applicable.”
- 95.
783 (2012), Art. R. 124-7.
- 96.
783 (2012), See Art. R. 124-2. In French original: “La justification des conditions requises aux alinéas précédents est assurée par déclaration écrite des intéressés, remise ou adressée, avant tout exercice de l’activité, au procureur de la République près le tribunal de grande instance dans le ressort duquel ils ont le siège de leurs activités. A tout moment, le procureur de la République peut vérifier que les intéressés se conforment aux obligations prescrites par le présent article.”
- 97.
Project Law, Chapter V, Art 12.
- 98.
Project Law, Chapter VI, Art 14.
- 99.
Goldberg (2006), p. 718.
- 100.
Mike Vorhees, cited by Goldberg (2006), p. 723.
- 101.
Goldberg (2006), p. 723.
- 102.
For details, see: Goldberg (2006), p. 723.
- 103.
“Much of the problem lies in the failure to update the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Despite the dramatic transformation of the debt collection industry over the last thirty years, the statute has remained largely backward looking […].” See Hector (2011), p. 1601.
- 104.
Goldberg (2006), p. 724.
- 105.
The need was recognized by the FTC as well, which concluded in its 2009 report that “[t]o provide more certainty to the industry and to protect consumers from harm … debt collection law needs to be modernized to take account of today’s new communication technologies.” See FTC (2009), pt. 1–72; FTC (2009), p. 36.
- 106.
See Goldberg (2006), p. 731.
- 107.
Goldberg (2006), pp. 731–732.
- 108.
Goldberg (2006), p. 732. Usually, these databases include names, addresses, social security numbers and sometimes complete credit histories, which entails that third parties in third countries gain full access to personal information while at the same time escape fully the protective requirements of federal or state laws, which obviously places consumers at huge risk.
- 109.
Goldberg (2006), p. 732.
- 110.
Goldberg (2006), pp. 733–734.
- 111.
For a more detailed discussion of solutions to be employed against outsourcing, see: Goldberg (2006), pp. 734–736.
- 112.
Such solutions do not resolve the issue of jurisdiction over foreign operators. See Goldberg (2006), p. 735.
- 113.
Such solution presents itself with multiple advantages: debtors would have an adequate recourse in the US, American companies would be forced to act more cautiously when outsourcing information or when picking up an overseas companies and they would shift the burden of suing overseas to the debt collector. Of course, such a solution would require that the American companies would be held strictly liable, through penalties, for all misconduct related to the use of private data. See Goldberg (2006), p. 736. In practice, it seems to be the solution adopted by the FTC as well. In a case settled in 2012, in which a California citizen was charged of having worked with bogus debt collectors in India, he was charged, among others, for harassing and threatening consumers who, as a result, paid the alleged debts out of fear of being sued or arrested. Consumers have received millions of collection calls from India in a 2-year period, in an operation that made more than 5 million dollars from the victims and resulted in no less than 4,000 complaints to the FTC and the state attorneys general. See: www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/10/us-defendats/who/allegedly-abetted-fake-debt-collector-calls last visited 23.01.2015.
- 114.
CONC, Section 7.1.3.
- 115.
For details: Goldberg (2006), pp. 737–739.
- 116.
Women are also targeted in the case of payday loan borrowers. The typical target is a female, who makes around 25,000 dollars a year, is a renter and is more likely a member of a minority than the general population. See Consumer Federation of America (2007), p. 3.
- 117.
Goldberg (2006), pp. 738–739. See: Strike Debt (2014), p. 147. “Between January 2006 and July 2008 alone, the top twenty-six debt buyers won more than 1 billion in judgments against New York City residents – mostly from low-income communities and communities of color – and only about 1 % of those sued by creditors had legal counsel.”
- 118.
Goldberg (2006), p. 739.
- 119.
This solution was criticized in its turn due to the fact that in order to sue, consumers should first know that they are victims of discrimination and targeting, which they have no way of knowing. See Goldberg (2006), p. 740.
- 120.
Under this proposed solution, only the FTC and not the consumer themselves would be able to file suit against debt collection companies for discrimination. See Goldberg (2006), p. 741.
- 121.
It is deemed that such disclosures would reveal and expose discriminatory patterns, which would enable the FTC to act upon its administrative enforcement powers. Despite that unscrupulous debt collectors could still manipulate the data they would provide, it is believed that increased transparency can only improve the system. See Goldberg (2006), p. 741.
- 122.
“The growth of the debt buying industry has led to myriad problems, including increased use of the court system to collect the debts in these purchased portfolios. Using automated software, some debt collection agencies have become debt-collection-lawsuit mills, filing thousands of cookie-cutter lawsuits against consumers each month.” See Terp (2011), p. 3.
- 123.
Fox (2012), p. 364 “Unfortunately the FDCPA was written at a time when most collection activity was non-judicial. It has not kept up with the changes in the practice of debt collection and is largely silent when it comes to litigation abuse.” Also: The Commercial Law League of America (2007), pp. 21–22.
- 124.
- 125.
Terp (2011), p. 5.
- 126.
According to some reports, the vast majority of consumers—80–95 %—do not respond to collection lawsuits, many due to the fact that they receive no notice. See Terp (2011), p. 4.
- 127.
- 128.
Fox (2012), p. 384. “A summary judgment granted in error on, for example, a debt that is beyond the statute of limitation, has the effect of laundering the defect from that debt. The debt is now a judgment that can be collected for the next twenty years.”
- 129.
Terp (2011), p. 5.
- 130.
Consumers alleged attempts to collect impermissible fees, interests or expenses not allowed under the FDCPA. See Terp (2011), p. 5.
- 131.
Fox (2012), p. 7.
- 132.
Akina (2012), pp. 152–153. The author mentions two recent cases—Hartman v. Great Seneca Financial Group (569 F. 3d606, 613 (6th Cir. 2009) and O’Rourke v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, (LLC, 635 F. 3d938, 943 (7th Cir. 2011)—in which the courts took different approaches in interpreting Section 1692e (Section 807) of the FDCPA.
- 133.
Akina (2012), p. 152.
- 134.
Akina (2012), p. 153.
- 135.
For a larger discussion on why a broader approach should be adopted by the legislator, see Akina (2012), pp. 154–159. The author rightfully notices that the 6th Circuit took a logical step in recognizing that a consumer’s decisions may be affected even after litigation was started. “A consumer is constantly evaluating what decisions to make once a debt collector begins collection attempts. [..] After litigation commences, the consumer must then consider whether she should continue fighting the case or whether she should settle. These later considerations are affected by the perceived strength of the debt collector’s case, and if a misleading document that resembles the consumer’s outstanding credit card statement attached to the debt collector’s complaint, then that may indirectly cause the debt collector’s case to appear stronger than in reality.” It results that despite the fact that the misleading representation was reaching the debtor only indirectly, it affected him nonetheless.
- 136.
Akina (2012), p. 159.
- 137.
The purpose of such amendment is to increase knowledge and awareness, though it is doubtful that such measures would suffice.
- 138.
Goldberg (2006), pp. 747–748. With respect to the solution adopted by the states, the author takes the view that it would be too harsh to impose a similar ban at federal level because it would infringe the states’ autonomy in choosing whether they want to follow this approach or not. Also: Fox (2012), p. 6.
- 139.
Terp (2011), p. 15.
- 140.
“State law, federal law or rules, and court rules should be changed to require a person seeking to collect a debt in court submit basic validation information as part of the complaint. Providing this information up front should increase the likelihood that the amount sued for is the amount owed […].” See Terp (2011), p. 13. Also see Akina (2012), p. 166. “The BFCP should make debt collection suits simpler by requiring that third party debt collectors procure and maintain all documents necessary to successfully bring a debt collection suit when purchasing debt from an original creditor.”
- 141.
Goldberg (2006), p. 748.
- 142.
Terp (2011), p. 15.
- 143.
- 144.
- 145.
See Huertas v. Galaxy, in which, as a matter of first impression, the court decided that an FDCPA claim in this regard would require the defendant to have made, explicitly or implicitly, threats of litigation in order to qualify as a violation of the act. In the case at hand, the plaintiff brought action alleging violations of the FDCPA as the defendants sent him a letter regarding a time-barred debt. In deciding the case, the court explained that under New Jersey law, the plaintiff’s debt obligation was not extinguished by the expiration of the statute of limitations, as he contended. Thus, although he had a complete legal defense against paying the debt, he still owed it as the statute of limitations merely made the debt unenforceable, without invalidating it. The court took the position though that the FDCPA only allows a debt collector to seek voluntary repayment, without initiating or threatening to initiate a legal suit in connection with the time-barred debt.
- 146.
Goldberg (2006), p. 750. Also see Huertas v. Galaxy, supra, footnote 1561.
- 147.
The rebirth of the debt allows debt collectors to pursue it in full, including through litigation. Also, a resurrected debt may be reported in the consumer’s credit report, causing even more significant consequences. For details: Goldberg (2006), pp. 750–751. Also: The 2013 FTC leaflet on time-barred debt, urging consumers to defend themselves in court: www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0117-time-barred-debts, last visited 19.12.2014.
- 148.
Wisconsin and Mississippi have actually adopted this solution and considered extinguished any debt that has passed the statute of limitations. Terp (2011), p. 10.
- 149.
The flaw of the proposal stems from the fact that such complete bar would obliterate the entire industry, thus damaging the economy. Additionally, it was rightfully emphasized that the purpose of the FDCPA is not to erase consumers’ debts but to make sure they are protected against unscrupulous collection practices. The case law took a similar position when in Walker v. Cash Flow Consultants the judge held that “a state law that only bars a specific remedy, rather than extinguishing the entire debt, is consistent with the FDCPA.” Goldberg (2006), p. 751.
- 150.
- 151.
State is not uniform in this regard. While most of the state have not yet addressed the issue, New York requires debt collectors to notify in writing if a debt has passed the statute of limitations, while New Mexico requires debt collectors to first make a “good faith” determination of whether a debt is “time-barred” or otherwise unrecoverable by law and, in case the answer is positive, to refrain from collection attempts unless it notifies the consumer about the character of the debt, that there is no legal obligation to pay or to do anything that would waive his legal rights and that any action or partial payment would result in reviving the debt and making it recoverable again. See Terp (2011), pp. 10–11.
- 152.
Terp (2011), p. 17.
- 153.
For more such proposals and details Terp (2011), p. 16.
- 154.
CONC, Section 7.15. The text also mentions that the recommendations with respect to barred debt take into consideration the differences between the laws of the countries forming the UK.
- 155.
CONC, Sections 7.15.2 and 7.15.3.
- 156.
CONC, Sections 7.15.4–7.15.8, restating the former Section 3.15.b of the Guidance. The last thesis is interesting and takes a stronger approach than the one adopted by courts in the US. There, the view was that as long as the debt is not extinguished, debt collectors may pursue the debt, by complying with the rest of the FDCPA’s requirements (including request for cease of communication from the debtor). Here the FCA decided to clearly provide that in such cases, a stated refusal of the debtor that he will not pay a barred debt must result in the cessation of all future collection effort, a solution deemed by this work to be proper and fair and a good example to follow.
- 157.
Hector (2011), p. 1612. Also: see Zortman, in which the court found that because the FDCPA is a strict liability statute reading in an intent requirement would defeat the purpose of the statute. In the case at hand, the defendant left multiple messages on the plaintiff’s home and cellular voicemail systems. The outgoing messages on the voicemail systems did not identify occupants or potential listeners. Plaintiff brought suit alleging violations of Section 1692c (b) given the fact that the messages left on the voicemail systems were heard by her children. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had no claim for the sole reason that it did not purposefully or deliberately disclose the debt information to a third party. In the analysis of the case, the court determined that the plain language of Section 1692 (c)(b) did not require a purposeful or deliberate intent to make the disclosure of the debt. As the systems used to leave messages did not identify who might actually listen to the messages, the court appreciated that the defendant had a reasonable expectation that someone other than the debtor plaintiff would hear the voicemail messages. In the view of the court, that sufficed in attracting liability, due to the fact that FDCPA is a strict liability statute that explicitly includes an intent element when required.
- 158.
- 159.
Sartip (2012) 8th recommendation, p. 3. The author mentions the federal case Foti v. NCO Fin Sys. Inc, 424 F Supp. 2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), in which it was concluded that a voicemail is a “communication” under the FDCPA and thus had to provide meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity and include the Mini-Miranda disclosure.
- 160.
Hector (2011), p. 1612.
- 161.
Despite differences between reasoning, three elements seem to be most important in determining if a voicemail is or not a communication in the eyes of the law: the content of the voicemail message, the practical implications of exempting certain voicemails from the ambit of the FDCPA and, finally, the context in which the voicemail was made. For example, in Hosseinzadeh v. MRS Associates (387 F Supp. 2d 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2005), the plaintiff brought suit against the debt collector based on a series of voicemails referring to a “very important matter,” which requested the consumer to call back a certain toll-free number and advised him about the consequences of failure to comply with such request. The court held that although the messages did not mention specific information “about a debt or the nature of the call,” the indirect references to the debt did suffice in bringing the messages under the communication’s definition provided by the FDCPA. In analyzing the practical implications of voicemail communications, courts have noted that exempting voicemails from the FDCPA would in fact allow debt collectors to circumvent statutory requirements. For instance, in Ramirez v. Apex Financial Management, LLC (567 F.Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (N.D. III. 2008), the debt collector kept leaving voice messages on the consumer’s answering machine, despite the fact that it already received a letter asking to cease and desist all communication, arguing that the messages could not be construed as communication given that they did not clearly convey information regarding the debt. The court dismissed such interpretation holding that it is in grave conflict with the legislative purpose of the act of protecting consumers from harassing conduct. Similarly with respect to the context in which voicemails were addressed, the courts have held that they will constitute communication under the law, as long as their purpose “was to induce the plaintiff to call the defendant to discuss her outstanding debt.” Such was the holding in Hutton v. C.B. Accounts, Inc. (No. 10-3052, 2010 WL 3021904 at *2 (N.D. III. Aug. 3, 2010). For details, see: Hector (2011), pp. 1612–1614.
- 162.
In the cases in which the courts took the position that the voicemails were not communication, the focus was also on the content of the messages, which contained only a name and a request to return the call but did not address the other elements. For instance, in Biggs v. Credit Collections, Inc, (No. CIV-07-0053-F, 2007 WL 4034997, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 2007), it was held that a voicemail that merely identified the name of the caller and asked the debtor to call a provided number was not a communication under the FDCPA. For more details and similar decisions, see: Hector (2011), p. 1615, footnotes 87–89.
- 163.
Sartip (2012), 8th recommendation, p. 3.
- 164.
Hector (2011), p. 1615.
- 165.
One argument raised by the debt collectors was that by applying the FDCPA’s provisions to voicemails, it would force those to either not use voicemails as a form of communication or pay burdensome litigation costs. This argument has been generally rejected by courts. For details, see Hector (2011), p. 1616, footnotes 91–93.
- 166.
Hector (2011), pp. 1616–1617.
- 167.
Hector (2011), p. 1626.
- 168.
Hector (2011), p. 1627. “Redefining “communication” as “any contact with a debt collector that relates to the collection of the debt or seeks to induce future action” would better ensure consumer protection in a manner that does not unduly burden debt collection.”
- 169.
Hector (2011), pp. 1617 and 1620.
- 170.
Tsotsis (2010). Also: Hector (2011), pp. 1627–1628. “With a social networking website, for example, a consumer would probably not expect a “friend request” from a debt collector. Hence, even if a debt collector used his or her real name, if that name did not adequately represent that the request is from a debt collector, it should be considered a deception.”
- 171.
- 172.
Hector (2011), pp. 1622–1623. It was emphasized that unlike residential phone lines and home addresses, the mobile technology means that people might receive communications in a totally different context than the one considered by the FDCPA. Mobile calls can be received at any place and any time (including those deemed unusual by the law) or even on their own expense if called outside their residential state. For a detailed discussion of such issues, see: America (2007), pp. 13–16.
- 173.
Hector (2011), p. 1622. Also: America (2007), pp. 19–20. The League took the position that emails sent to consumers should not be treated differently than snail mail given the fact that there is a reasonable expectation that they would receive such communications. The League also emphasized that they are free to delete such communication. Thus, it was suggested to amend the FDCPA in the sense of including emails among the permitted ways of communication, provided that such emails are sent with a read receipt request.
- 174.
Hector (2011), p. 1626. “Consumers have a reasonable expectation to be free from anonymous debt collection contacts that intrude areas they regard as intimate, regardless of whether the contact conveys content regarding a debt.”
- 175.
Hector (2011), p. 1624.
- 176.
Hector (2011), p. 1623. “Without clearer guidance, courts, consumer, and debt collectors will be left in the unenviable position of drawing imperfect analogies between voicemails and newer communication platforms. This will encourage firms to push the boundaries of the law, disadvantage ethical debt collectors and jeopardize the FDCPA’s overreaching goal to safeguard consumers from abuse and harassment.”
- 177.
Hector (2011), pp. 1628–1629. “Notably, although debt collectors are permitted to call consumers in order to request payment of an outstanding debt, in order to dispute the validity of the debt […] consumer must send debt collectors a written notice. New technologies could make it easier for a consumer to dispute a debt, request verification, workout a payment solution, or demand that collectors cease contact.” “By ensuring that consumers and collectors alike can take advantage of new technologies, these updates would deter collectors from abusing new communication platforms.”
- 178.
Hector (2011), p. 1629.
- 179.
America (2007), p. 11. Payday loans are defined as small cash advances for less than 1,000 dollars, typically in the 300–500 dollar range, based on the borrower’s personal check or electronic access for an amount of the loan and the finance charge. To get a payday loan, a borrower should have an open account with a bank, an income source and a valid ID. Loans are due and payable in full on the borrower’s next payday and cost 390–780 percent APR for 2-week terms. In theory, on the next payday the borrower could bring in cash and “buy-back” the check or the check can be deposited for payment, but practice shows that most checks are never deposited and are brought back by customers who are encouraged to take another loan. The Federation argues that the essential features of the payday loan described above make them a trap for borrowers and susceptive for collection abuses. America (2007), pp. 3–4.
- 180.
America (2007), p. 11.
- 181.
America (2007), p. 12.
- 182.
FTC (2010), p. i.
- 183.
Alderman (2012), pp. 589–590 and 603.
- 184.
- 185.
See the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T LLC v. Conception, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts even state unconscionably rules that preclude arbitration provisions that prohibit collective redress or class actions.
- 186.
Alderman (2012), pp. 587–588.
- 187.
Alderman (2012), pp. 600–609. Starting from the policies behind the FDCPA, Alderman showed how enforcing arbitration clauses in debt collection cases would actually affect the enforcement and efficiency of the FDCPA: arbitration would deprive the consumer of his substantial enforcement mechanism—the private action through private litigation resulting in binding, public and consistent decisions of courts; would remove availability of class actions in debt collection cases, thus removing one of the powerful deterrent mechanisms of the Act; removes the procedural and financial incentives given to the consumer in order to encourage him to take action. For a contrary opinion, asserting that arbitration of consumer cases respects all standards of fairness (however not addressing the issue of FDCPA cases directly), see: Kaplinsky and Levin (2008), pp. 910–919.
- 188.
Alderman (2012), pp. 611–612.
- 189.
Tajti (2013b), p. 107.
- 190.
Art 3(1) and Article 1 (q) of Annex to Art 3(1) of Directive 93/13 ECC, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.
- 191.
Section 91(1) of Arbitration Act 1996 corroborated with the provisions of Order SI 1999/2167.
- 192.
CIArb), p. 4.
- 193.
Tajti (2013b), p. 107.
- 194.
FCC, Article 2061.
- 195.
ZPO, Art 103(5). German case law also contains instances in which courts have denied enforcement of arbitration clauses where one party was incapable to present its case due to the high costs involved. See the decision III ZR 33/00 from 9 April 2000 of the Bundesgerichtshof.
- 196.
Annex, Paragraph (1), letter l) of Law 193/2000, republished in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part 1, no 543/03.08.2012.
- 197.
Media in the UK abounds in news about unfair debt collection practices. See for example: Call Off the Debt Hounds, The Mirror (2011), “It is scandalous that ordinary people are being hounded for a few hundred euro. It is also outrageous that hospital are hiring these agencies to go after patients, some who are still recovering from treatment. They have enough worries without getting letters from debt collection agencies threatening court action.” Related to intimidating tactics employed by Talk Talk, the broadband and phone company, to chase former customers for debts that they do not owe, see Budworth (2011). Also, referring to a collection agency accused of adding extra costs to debits, cutting corners and aggressively chasing people for money they say they do not owe, see Atherton (2011), Whateley (2012) and Whateley (2011). On the unlawful usage of private data, see: Tighe (2011). Last but not least, with respect to the dubious character of debt collectors in Ireland and calls for reform and legal enforcement, see: Connolly (2010). With respect to complaints received and handled by the FOS, see: FOS (2009), mentioning similar issues like those that reached the media: oppressive and unreasonable collection tactics, attempts to recover from nondebtors, disputed debts or lack of evidence originating from the initial creditor.
- 198.
FOS (2013), pt. 1-176, p. 62.
- 199.
FOS (2013), p. 62.
- 200.
FOS (2013), p. 62.
- 201.
FOS (2013), p. 62.
- 202.
FOS (2013), p. 62.
- 203.
Also: OFT (2013), p. 22: “CPA’s have been the subject of a substantial number of consumer complaints such as: the consumer was not aware that they have signed up a CPA or how it would work; lenders taking frequent part payments over several days or weeks, often leaving the consumer facing significant hardship.”
- 204.
FOS (2013), p. 62. Also: OFT (2013), pp. 22–23. “Consumers were being called on their mobile and work phones up to 16 times per day”; “[S]ome lenders were using aggressive collection practices by subjecting customers to repeated and intensive contact over short periods, often in conjunction with the use of CPA”; “Of the 686 complaints received during a 6 month monitoring period, 61 % related to aggressive or unsatisfactory debt collection practices.”
- 205.
Trading (2003), p. 5 and Section 3.9.m., pp. 33–41. Also see OFT’s press release addressed to payday lenders: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2012/110-12, last visited 19.12.2014.
- 206.
- 207.
Tajti (2013b), pp. 110–111 and 113 (footnote 330).
- 208.
Tajti (2013b), pp. 111 (footnote 322) and 113 (footnote 330).
- 209.
Rutledge (2010), p. 38: “Consumers should be protected from abusive debt collection practices by credit institutions or third-party debt collectors. This means that rules are required regarding the type of debt that can be collected, the person who can collect debts and the manner in which any debt can be collected. And these rules must then be indicated to the consumer at the time his or her transaction is entered into. There ought to be laws prohibiting debt-collectors from using false statements when collecting a debt, using unfair practices, as well as giving false credit information to others, including a credit bureau.”
- 210.
Rutledge (2010), p. 42. A very telling example is the one of Finland, one of the European countries with a well-developed sector-specific consumer-debtor protection regulation. A collection agency wanted to sell to credit institutions information on customers’ credit situation that it had gathered during its debt collection. Since debt collectors need to be licensed, they cannot collect more information than the one essential to their operations, not even with the debtor’s consent. Hence, any personal data gathered cannot be used for a different purpose. Given also that the debt collection law stresses the need to protect privacy, the Data Protection Ombudsman denied the right of the debt collector to sell the information gathered on the consumer-debtors. Micklitz et al. (2010), p. 380.
- 211.
Rutledge (2010), p. 43. “Consumers need to be informed about data processing, such as the exact purpose for which their data is processed” […] “Consumers should have the right to contest erroneous data or provide explanations on causes of arrears.” “It is recommended that procedures be in place to reduce the risk of identity theft and ensure that technical security of the database prevents unauthorized access.” In fact, the European Commission has already launched a proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) amending the former Directive in place and acknowledging among others that “rapid technological developments have brought new challenges for the protection of personal data. […] technology allows […] private companies […] to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale in order to pursue their activities.” Hence, the Commission concludes: “it is time to build a stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU, backed by a strong enforcement […]” See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf, pp. 1–2, last visited 19.12.2014.
- 212.
Urban (2007). Also: Tudoriu (2011), at http://www.juridice.ro/168991/probleme-legale-privind-activitatea-de-phone-collection.html.
- 213.
Rutledge (2010), p. 42.
- 214.
Alternative explanations for the rejection of the project could be found in its pro-debt collector’s approach, given the fact that the proposal came from a senator owing one of the biggest collection agencies in Romania, while another explanation could be political. In 2010, when the Senate approved the project, the majority belonged to the Liberal Democratic Party and the abovementioned senator was a member of that party. In 2012, the majority switched to the opposition, namely the Liberal-Socialist Union, so the project lost its parliamentary support.
- 215.
Initially, the proponent, Senator Iulian Urban, has advertised the idea by translating and commenting the FDCPA for the Romanian public, arguing the implementation of a law similar to the US model. That proposal included even the reference to civil penalties for each breach of law and the right to private enforcement. Unfortunately, the project that was submitted to the Parliament’s approval lost many of the initial ideas. Urban (2008), available at http://www.urbaniulian.ro/2008/07/01/legea-privind-colectarea-amiabila-a-debitelor-propunere-legislativa-facuta-de-urban-iulian/.
- 216.
Senate’s Legislative Council (2010), available in Romanian only.
- 217.
Project Law, Art 3, a).
- 218.
Project Law, Art 5, a) and b).
- 219.
Legislative Council (2010), point 5, p. 3.
- 220.
Project Law, Art 3. f).
- 221.
Legislative Council (2010), point 5, p. 3.
- 222.
Legislative Council (2010), point 13, p. 5.
- 223.
Urban (2008).
- 224.
Urban (2007).
- 225.
Tajti (2013a), p. 13.
- 226.
Urban (2007), p. 1.
- 227.
For answers to criticism that such an act would only increase debt delinquency, see Potach (1978), pp. 922–923, footnote 156.
- 228.
Potach (1978), p. 923.
- 229.
America (2007), pp. 26–27. The League’s call for reformation consisting in providing FTC with the power to write and enforce regulations implementing the FDCPA was answered positively by the Dodd–Frank Act, which granted such powers to the newly created Bureau for Financial Consumer Protection.
- 230.
Tajti (2013b), p. 113, footnote 330.
References
Akina WK (2012) Note: A Lie Is A Lie: the need to define Section 1692e of the FDCPA. Brooklyn J Corp Financ Commer Law 7:145
Alderman RM (2012) The fair debt collection practices act meets arbitration: non-parties and arbitration. Loyola Consum Law Rev 24:586
Atherton M (2011) Debt collector’s tactics exposed. The Times, London
Budworth D (2011) Anger grows over talk talk ‘bully’ calls. The Times, London
Burridge N (2010) Debt collectors pursued wrong people. The Independent
Call off the debt hounds. In: The mirror, 2011
Connolly P (2010) Fear and owing. The Sunday Times, London
Consumer Federation of America (2007) Collecting consumer debts: the challenges of change. In: Comments to the federal trade commission regarding the fair debt collection practices act
Décret n° 2012-783 du 30 mai 2012 relatif à la partie réglementaire du code des procédures civiles d'exécution. France, 2012
De Boer S (2013) Fair debt collection practices act. Overview, analyses, and administration. Novinka, New York
Dempsey L (2013) The FTC and FDCPA. Collector (0010082X) 78
FOS (2009) Recent complaints involving debt collection businesses. Financial Ombudsman Service, UK
FOS (2011) Ombudsman News
FOS (2013) Annual review of consumer complaints about: insurance, credit, banking, savings and investments. Financial Ombudsman Service, UK
FOS, Technical note: compensation. Available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/compensation.html
FOS, Technical notes: distress and inconvenience. Available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/distress-and-inconvenience.htm
Fox JL (2012) Do we have a debt collection crisis? Some cautionary tales of debt collection in Indiana. Loyola Consum Law Rev
FTC (2009) Collecting consumer debts: the challenges of change. Federal Trade Commission
FTC (2010) Repairing a broken system. Protecting consumers in debt collection litigation and arbitration. Federal Trade Commission
Garner BA (2009) Black’s law dictionary. WEST, US
Goldberg L (2006) Dealing in debt: the high-stakes world of debt collection after FDCPA. South Calif Law Rev 79:711
Hector C (2011) Debt collection in the information age: new technologies and the fair debt collection practices act. Calif Law Rev 99:1601
Kaplinsky AS, Levin MJ (2008) Consumer arbitration: if the FAA “Ain’t Broke”, don’t fix it. Bus Lawyer 63:907
Micklitz H-W, Stuyck J, Terryn E (2010) Cases, materials and text on consumer law. Hart Publishing, North America
Office for Fair Trading (2003) OFT guidance for businesses engaged in the recovery of consumer credit debts
OFT (2013) Payday Lending. Compliance Review Final Report. Office for Fair Trading
Potach SG (1978) New protection against the unethical bill collector: debtor’s remedies under the fair debt collection practices act. Creighton Law Rev
Rutledge SL (2010) Consumer protection and financial literacy: lessons from nine country studies. The World Bank
Sartip MH (2012) Be a confident collection lawyer. South Carolina Lawyer
Senate’s Legislative Council (2010) Approval of the legislative proposal concerning the procedure for debt collection
Strike Debt (2014) The debt resisters’ operations manual. PM Press, Oakland
Tajti T (2013a) Post-1990 secured transaction law reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Szegedi Közjegyzői Közlöny
Tajti T (2013b) Systemic and topical mapping of the relationship of the draft common frame of reference and arbitration. Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Vilnius
Terp R (2011) PAST DUE: why debt collection practices and the debt buying industry need reform now. Consumer Union of United States, Inc
The Commercial Law League of America (2007) Fair debt collection practices act. White Paper
Tighe M (2011) Data leak companies may face prosecution. The Sunday Times, London
Tsotsis A (2010) Facebook debt collection case is definitely a first. TECHCRUNCH, Nov. 19, 2010
Tudoriu F (2011) Probleme legale privind activitatea de Phone Collection (English translation: “Legal issues concerning the phone collection activity”)
Urban I (2007) De ce avem nevoie de o lege destinata colectarii debitelor (English translation: “Why do we need a law on debt collection”)
Urban I (2008) Legea privind colectarea amiabila a debitelor – propunere legislativa facuta de Urban Iulian
Whateley L (2011) Unreasonable demands. The Times, London
Whateley L (2012) Troubleshooter. The Times, London
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stӑnescu, C.G. (2015). Remedies Against Abusive Practices and Calls for Reform. In: Self-Help, Private Debt Collection and the Concomitant Risks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21503-7_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21503-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-21502-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-21503-7
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)