Abstract
This chapter offers solutions to key problems of how to apply argumentation tools to analyze and evaluate arguments from expert opinion. It is shown (1) how to structure the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion, (2) how to apply it to real cases of argument from expert opinion, (3) how to set up the matching set of critical questions that go along with the scheme, (4) how to find the place of trust in configuring the schemes and critical questions, (5) how to use these tools to construct an argument diagram to represent pro and con arguments in a given argument from expert opinion, (6) how to evaluate the arguments and critical questions shown in the diagram, and (7) how to use this structure within a formal computational model to determine whether what the expert says is acceptable or not. One of the critical questions raises the issue of trust, and a central problem is to determine how the other critical questions fit with this one. The chapter studies how trust is related to argument from expert opinion in formal computational argumentation models.
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Notes
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Michael Kimmelman, Absolutely Real? Absolutely Fake?, New York Times, August 4, 1991, accessed 29/8/2008.
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Walton, D. (2016). Evaluating Expert Opinion Evidence. In: Argument Evaluation and Evidence. Law, Governance and Technology Series, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19626-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19626-8_4
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