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The Ancient World

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Pagan Ethics

Abstract

In classical ethical inquiry, the chief question is ‘what is arête?’ Each tradition, however, appears to appropriate the term for itself, and each formulates its own particular understanding of what it means by ‘excellence’. For some, the good is virtue; for others it is happiness. But again there are different understandings of happiness. For the Stoics, it is apathia ‘not suffering’, ‘complete tranquility’, ‘passionlessness’. For the Epicureans, it was rather ataraxia ‘not disturbed’, ‘serenity’, ‘peace of mind’, ‘freedom from passion’. Among the ‘Socratic Schools’, the Cynics went for virtue, while the Cyrenaics opted for hedone ‘pleasure’. Much contemporary Western paganism conforms with this last. This chapter will examine both the Hedonists (Cyrenaics, Epicureans, post-Classical Hedonists, Utilitarians, present-day pagans – both indigenous and Western) and the Stoics (and the related Cynics) to gauge how they understand arête and possibly contribute to an earth-centered, physically based and idolatrous comprehension of ethics. And as we are also concerned with the emergence of ethics as a global conversation, I will inspect Christianity, which develops out of the same milieu in which these pagan schools flourished, to assess both its contributions in general and its differences from paganism in particular. Although Christianity in practice reveals substantial historical diversity, the focus here will be both on the biblical texts that belong to the time of the classical world and which are seminal to the faith, and on the Church Father giants of Augustine and Aquinas.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    There are no extant writings of the Cyrenaics. Their ideas can only be discerned through brief mentions of them in the works of other writers, most of which are disparaging.

  2. 2.

    http://www.iep.utm.edu/aristip/ (accessed 13 October 2014): “He was probably the most scandalous of Socrates’ followers because of his advocacy of a life of sensual pleasure and his willingness to accept money for his instruction, as the sophists did.”

  3. 3.

    Other Cyrenaics include Bio and Euhemerus. In the third century bce, Hegesias argued that it is more important to avoid pain than to seek pleasure, but Anniceris, following more closely Aristippus and his emphasis on both bodily and intellectual pleasures, stressed the social pleasures of relationships: friendship, parents, fellow citizens, people in general. Anniceris even went so far as to suggest that one should be willing to suffer for the very pleasures of respect and gratitude. In this he represents a development away from the basic Cyrenaic attitude that seeks the cultivation and maximization of each momentary enjoyment. Anniceris’ reflections reveal in themselves that the Cyrenaic School was not bound to any narrow and inflexible remit in its understanding and pursuit of pleasure. In fact, the late thinker known as Theodorus the Atheist even suggested that, above and beyond momentary pleasure, life’s true goal is the achievement of persistent joy. To this end, he argued for the development of practical wisdom. He also denied the divine. Epicurus does not agree with Theodorus. He affirms the existence of the gods but claims that, as perfect beings, they have no concern with us and, consequently, we should have no concern or fear of them. We do not know what Aristippus’ own attitude toward the deities might have been, but Theodorus’ epithet of ‘atheist’ is suggestive that he was introducing an innovative position vis-à-vis the Cyrenaic School itself.

  4. 4.

    Plato Symposium 218c–219e, 222a-b (Waterfield 1994: 64–66, 69f).

  5. 5.

    Vide Waterfield (1994: xvif).

  6. 6.

    The surviving writings of Epicurus consist of three brief epitomes: Letter to Herodotus, Letter to Pythocles and Letter to Menoeceus, respectively, covering physics, astronomy and ethics. There are also a group of maxims plus fragments of De rerum natura. Beside Seneca (c.5 bce–65ce), Epicurus is frequently mentioned by Plutarch (c.46–c.120 ce). Fragmentary expositions of Epicurus have survived in the works of Philodemus of Gadara at Herculeaneum. Apart from Cicero and Lucian, Epicurean teachings appear on a second century ce colonnade at Oenoanda that was inscribed by Diogenes Flavianus. Another important source is Diogenes Laertius (second/third century ce) who considered Epicurus’ contribution as ‘the beginning of happiness’. By far, however, our greatest source for the ideas of Epicurus and Epicureanism in general is Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Lucretius’ dates are c.99–55 bce.

  7. 7.

    Epicurus Key Doctrines 2. See also Lucretius De rerum natura 3.31-93. For Epicurus, even the pain of death, or the pain involved with death, is of limited duration. With death, the pain can no longer occur; it is completely finished. In Epicurus’ Letter to Menoecueus, he states that ‘death is nothing to us. For all good and evil lies in sensation, and death is the end of all sensation’.

  8. 8.

    Abram (1966: 68).

  9. 9.

    Letter to Menoeceus: pleasure is ‘the primary and natural desire’.

  10. 10.

    Letter to Menoeceus: ‘all pain is an evil’, and yet not all pain is to be avoided since submission to some pains sometimes has the consequence of a greater pleasure.

  11. 11.

    See further http://philosophy2.ucsd.edu/~brink/courses/161/Handout-12.html (accessed 19 March 2006). Epicurus recognized two types of pleasure: the kinematic – volatile, sensory pleasures that amount to compensating a deficiency, and katastematic – a stable freedom from all pain or disturbance, i.e., those pleasures that are capable of prolonged duration. For Epicurus, ataraxia depends on the latter – the kind of pleasures that may be varied but not increased.

  12. 12.

    Hegesias modifies Aristippus because of the inevitability of pain in life. He advocates the development of an excess of pleasures over the number of pains in the individual’s life. Anniceris, however, stresses instead merely the sum of pleasures. He claims that the wise person can be happy even with few enjoyments. Anniceris also places a high value on such non-sensual pleasures as friendship. While Theodorus holds that the foolish are those who possess friends for their utilitarian purpose only and that the wise do not need friends at all, Anniceris like Aristotle recognizes the necessity for friendship if an intelligent person is to be pleasurably happy. In this he continues the line of thought of Epicurus himself who describes ataraxia as not only freedom from fear and falsity but also the cultivation of friendship, peace and aesthetic contemplation.

  13. 13.

    In the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus advises simple and inexpensive foods as well as the avoidance of profligate and sensual pleasures. These last include extravagance as well as any pursuit that ultimately produces pain and disturbance, such as continuous drinking, dancing and sex. Instead, prudence, honesty and justice are important for overall balance and well-being since the virtues are intimately connected with the pleasant life.

  14. 14.

    In the post-classical importance of hedonism, we find a Christian form of Epicureanism in the Renaissance humanistic thought of both Lorenzo Valla (1405–1457) and Desiderius Erasmus (1467–1536). In his 1431 work On Pleasure, Valla accepts the hedonic principle but places it as more appropriate for the next world rather than this one. In his works, The Contempt of the World (1490) and The Epicurean (1533), Erasmus, too, moderates Epicurus’ this-worldly values with the Christian virtue of faith and belief in immortality – thereby undercutting the foundations of Epicurus’ own philosophy based on the totally ephemeral condition of life and the necessary disregard of the gods. Christian Epicureanism also appears in the 1516 Utopia by Sir Thomas Moore (1478–1535). Influenced by both Valla and Erasmus but also by Plato’s communistic political philosophy in the Republic and Laws, Moore conceives of the ideal society as focused on equality and pleasure. Like Aristotle, he recognizes the necessity of goods for the individual, but, like Epicurus, he stresses simple pleasures and the avoidance of pursuing such things as wealth, fame or status. But in his Christian perspective, he places ultimate pleasure as something belonging to the next world rather than this one.

  15. 15.

    Hobbes (1651: Chap. 13).

  16. 16.

    In his 1725 work entitled Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.

  17. 17.

    Hume’s prefiguring of Utilitarianism rests with his consideration that our natural propensities are aspirations toward pleasure coupled with sympathy for others – making value a social matter.

  18. 18.

    Among Bentham’s publications, two works of particular significance are Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) and Deontology or the Science of Morality (1834). For Mill the father, his 1820 essay “On Government” for the Encyclopedia Britannica is relevant, and for John Stuart Mill, the son, On Liberty and Utilitarianism were published, respectively, in 1859 and 1861. Bentham stresses the consequences of behavior in terms of pleasure’s intensity, duration, certainty, immediateness, productiveness, purity and extent. It is this last that specifically refers to the number of people affected. Individual and social decisions alike are based on producing either the largest sum of pleasure or the smallest sum of pain. Bentham also rejected the concepts of natural law and the social contract as fictions – being non-reducible to real entities. Mackie (1977: 128) makes the dismissive claim that Bentham’s assertion, that everyone should count for one but nobody for more than one, offers no clear principle of distribution.

  19. 19.

    See http://fergusmurray.members.beeb.net/utilit.htm (accessed 19 March 2006). “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Utilitarianism, Chap. 2).

  20. 20.

    Note J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1973).

  21. 21.

    For instance, William Paley (1743–1805) developed a Christian Utilitarianism that seeks general happiness by incorporating theological authorization within the ethics of Christian Scripture, while Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) abandoned hedonism for an Intuitive Utilitarianism based on the self-evident principles of intuitionism, egoism and utilitarianism. Other kinds of Utilitarianism have been advocated: Herbert Spencer’s Evolutionary form and Hastings Rashdall’s Ideal Utilitarianism.

    One distinction within the doctrinal reflection that the principle of greatest utility ought to be the decisive factor in ethics is the differentiation between Act Utilitarianism (such as that of Bentham) and Rule Utilitarianism (as understood in Richard Brandt’s advocacy of utility based on an ideal moral code). Brandt allows that the ideal moral code is modified by any given society, but this relativity is itself reduced by his affirmation of what he calls the universal obligations of humanity and fairness. One concerns the responsibility to ease the suffering of others; the other relates to the necessity of fulfilling one’s associational duties equitably. J.S. Mill is considered to be an intermediate combination of the two forms of Utilitarianism. For example, Mill accepts the utilitarian use of general rules and social principles in decision-making through the assumption that these have been derived from or designed for the benefit of society as a whole. In Act Utilitarianism, the utility criterion is applied to individual acts; in Rule Utilitarianism, it concerns not utility per se but the action’s conformity to a set of ideal rules.

    For a brief discussion on act and rule utilitarianism, see Mackie (1977: 125–9 & 136–140). Mackie refers to himself as a rule-right-duty-disposition utilitarian (199f). He considers act utilitarianism as ‘extreme utilitarianism’ – advocating simply for a balance of hedonistic pleasure over pain (125) – and is in general critical of the “fantasy moralities of utilitarianism and neighbourly love” (134). In his stress on specific rules as the core of morality rather than any general utilitarian principle, Mackie prefers the two-stage procedure of rule utilitarianism in which, following J. Austin, rules for right action are fashioned on the notion of general happiness or utility, but conduct is fashioned on the rules (136). Examples of the rules that Mackie allows include those of justice (within a particular society), against invading someone’s recognized rights, of keeping agreements, of not punishing the innocent and of making impartial judicial judgments. These rules are for Mackie neither innate principles nor laws of nature to be discovered by reason but rather only principles of equity and the contractual ways of making and keeping agreements (239).

  22. 22.

    In The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963), R.M. Hare argues that moral judgments are imperatives rather than descriptions. He opposes ethical naturalism by which value terms are defined as neutral statements of fact.

  23. 23.

    Personal communication (7 March 2014).

  24. 24.

    The “gods … pass their unruffled lives, their placid aeon, in calm and peace” (Lucretius, De rerum natura 2.1093-4 [Latham 1994: 64]). According to John Godwin (Latham 1994: xvi), the argument is that “The gods by definition live a life of serenity. If they bother about our lives they cannot be serene.”

  25. 25.

    Vide Plutarch, De poetis audiendis 15d, and Diogenes Laertius 10.13.

  26. 26.

    Boyer (2001: 35, 74, 84 & 346).

  27. 27.

    Thrower (1999: 94).

  28. 28.

    Latham (1994: xv).

  29. 29.

    Lucretius 3.322 (Latham 1994: 75).

  30. 30.

    Godwin apud Latham (1994: xvi).

  31. 31.

    Vide York (2003a).

  32. 32.

    See also Thomas Carlyle’s Heroes and Hero Worship (1841).

  33. 33.

    Goodman (1988: 171).

  34. 34.

    Stokes (2003: 31).

  35. 35.

    Another possibility for the origin of the Cynics’ name is that it derives from ‘Cynosrages’, the name of an Athenian building where the Cynics first taught.

  36. 36.

    Beside Zeno of Citium, the key names associated with Stoicism include Cleanthes of Assos (331–232 bce), Chrysippus of Soli (c.280–206), Panaetius of Rhodes (185–c.110), Posidonius of Apamea (c.135–51), and, among the Romans, Lucius Annaeus Seneca the dramatist (c.5 bce–65 ce), the former slave Epictetus (c.55–c.135 ce) and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121–180).

  37. 37.

    Frost (1962: 58).

  38. 38.

    In fact, for the Stoics, the human soul is itself a spark of the divine fire or logos that informs the entire cosmos. See http://www.novaroma.org/via_romana/stoicism.html (accessed 9 July 2014).

  39. 39.

    Grayling (2003: 52). Also http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~sbriggs/Britannica/stoics.htm (accessed 13 October 2014).

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    http://www.geocities.com/westhollywood/heights/4617/stoic/marcus9.html (accessed 20 March 2006).

  42. 42.

    http://www.myspot.org/stoic/ (accessed 20 March 2006). In fact, the Stoic Panaetius stresses an ethical cosmopolitanism of varying grades of accomplishment. Conformity to the logos need not be an accomplished fact for someone to be judged virtuous, but rather some demonstration of progressive development is considered sufficient. Epictetus also emphasizes the notion of progress – understanding this in terms of withdrawing from externals, cultivating modesty and fidelity, and developing an indifference to events through the strengthening of individual will.

  43. 43.

    In reference to its objective of creating or developing a ‘rational cosmopolis’ as the human extension of an ordered and beneficent universe, Grayling (2003: 53) refers to Stoicism as “humanitarian cosmopolitanism.”

  44. 44.

    Frost (1962: 185).

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    Grayling (2003: 55) mentions such Stoic guidelines as honoring parents, friends, education, health and diet. As head of the Stoa, Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes who defined virtue as living reasonably in accord with nature. His ideas were recorded in his hymn to Zeus as an expression of universal providence, a fragment of which remains (http://www.geocities.com/westhollywood/heights/4617/stoic/zeus.html – accessed 20 March 2006). Cleanthes promotes the pantheistic notion of the universe as a living body – with destiny designing the role and function of each part. The third head of the Stoic School was Chrysippus, known for his work in logic. He likewise adopts a materialistic understanding of the cosmos but infuses it with active spirit. In his notion of the eternal return, the universe re-plays itself over and over again through periodic destruction and regeneration. He identifies happiness with virtue and sees this last as rational wisdom. Evil is whatever is in opposition to the world reason. Both Cleanthes and Chryssipus understand the vivifying agent (God) of the universe as fire, the central element – for the former concentrated in the sun as the place where Zeus resides; for the latter as reason and extending throughout the cosmos.

  47. 47.

    Following Panaetius, Posidonius retracted Panaetius by reconsidering the argument that the cosmos will dissolve and then be reborn. He also reintroduced the practice of astrology and divination that had been abandoned by Panaetius. In general Posidonius holds the view that the human being, a microcosm of the universe, is a world citizen.

  48. 48.

    E.g., Cicero’s De finibus, De officiis and De natura deorum. Another source of Stoic ideas is the work of Philo of Alexandria (c.25 bce–c.45 ce). For Stoic fragments, see Arnim (1903–1924). Marcus Cicero Tullius (106–43 bce) adopted a Stoic ethic but modified some of the harshness of its original asceticism.

  49. 49.

    E.g., Letters to Lucilius (especially De Constantia sapientis); Physical Problems.

  50. 50.

    Discourses and Enchiridion.

  51. 51.

    Grayling (2003: 56).

  52. 52.

    While MacIntyre (1998: ixf) laments in the Preface to his second edition to his history of ethics that he ‘sandwiched’ a mere ten pages on “the distinctive moral outlook of the Christian religion” into his “overnumerous intentions,” the brevity of the present section in this book stems from the author’s focus upon pagan ethics rather than the Christian theological virtues based on “obedience to God’s law.” MacIntyre considers that he did not pose the right questions, but from a pagan this-worldly perspective in particular, MacIntyre’s original contention that the “paradox of Christian ethics … [having] always tried to devise a code for society as a whole from pronouncements which were addressed to individuals or small communities to separate themselves off from the rest of society” is still valid. Even if the Pauline doctrines combine the expectation of a Second Coming with this-worldly activity as a development of natural virtues, a pagan will most likely insist that ethical behavior cannot be predicated on obedience to a non-empirical let alone nonfinite object.

  53. 53.

    Following Kierkegaard, Grayling (2003: 69f) refers to the non-rational basis of faith. He also considers the argument that one must love God because God allegedly loves him or her a non sequitor (71).

  54. 54.

    MacIntyre (1998: 119).

  55. 55.

    For Grayling’s secular humanist perspective on Christianity, see especially the first sections of his Chap. 4 (“The Ordinances of God”) in Grayling (2003: 63–86).

  56. 56.

    Exodus 20: 1–17. Note also the ten charges of the Qur’an (6.151-53) which include prohibitions against taking of life, the taking what is not given, being unchaste, and committing falsehood. Also condemned is the consumption of liquor and intoxicants; the eating of ‘unseasonable meals’; dancing, singing, playing music and seeing shows; using flowers, scents, unguents, ornaments and decorations; sleeping in raised or wide beds; and the accepting of gold and silver.

  57. 57.

    Matthew 5: 1–13.

  58. 58.

    Grayling (2003: 78f). Grayling considers Christian ethics, if not religious morality in general, as irrelevant, anti-moral (not engaging with the central questions concerning human rights: oppression, war, poverty and excess wealth) and immoral (sponsoring fundamentalism, oppression of women, genital mutilation and terrorism).

  59. 59.

    I Corinthians 13: 13.

  60. 60.

    Fowler (1899: 341); York (1986: 251).

  61. 61.

    As Spinoza argues, “hope is nothing but an inconstant joy which has arisen from the image of a future or past thing whose outcome we doubt” (Ethics III Proposition 18 Scholium 2 [II/155] – Curley 1996: 81). Wendell Berry (Kimbrell 2002: 373) likewise states that “Hope, of course, is always accompanied by the fear of hopelessness, which is a legitimate fear.”

  62. 62.

    MacIntyre (1998: 117).

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    Note, by contrast, Mahatma Gandhi’s list of seven deadly sins: wealth without work, pleasure without conscience, science without humanity, knowledge without character, politics without principle, commerce without morality, and worship without sacrifice.

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York, M. (2016). The Ancient World. In: Pagan Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18923-9_4

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