Abstract
In this chapter, I wish to look again at idolatry as well as to a few additional and more recent contributions to the ongoing ethical debate (e.g., Habermas, Levinas, Santayana and humanism). A brief reexamination and re-appreciation of Spinoza, Hume, Kant and Nietzsche along with Grayling, Mackie and MacIntyre will also be included to summarize their importance to ethical study, while the framework of the chapter will center on the pivotal ethical issues of arête ‘excellence’ and eudaimonia ‘happiness’. I am not interested here in social policy in connection with something like blasphemy but rather in the freedoms of expression – including idolatrous worship – in which a pagan may wish to engage. Any such expression, however, for it to be in accord with heptatheonic virtue-values, will still require a sensitivity to the feelings and practices of others.
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Notes
- 1.
Burggraeve et al. (2003). “…violence from one religion towards the other is actually not far off [when one] considers ‘his’ god as the only one, the best, the greatest and the strongest, [and] all to [sic.] readily claims the ‘right’ not only to ignore the other gods, but also to reject and ridicule them as if they were ‘nothing’” (p. 18). The editors call for “a suspicion towards an absolutizing of the prohibition against images and thus towards an absolute, all-destroying, violent iconoclasm” (p. 28). In Ellenbogen and Tugendhaft (2011: 60), William John Thomas Mitchell claims that iconoclasm “betrays a kind of fearful symmetry, mirroring its own stereotype of idolatry in its emphasis on human sacrifice and terrorism, the latter understood as violence against the innocent, and the staging of spectacular acts of symbolic violence and cruelty.”
- 2.
Ibid. 19 (Burggraeve). For pagans, early Christians were terrorists.
- 3.
Burggraeve et al. (2003: 42).
- 4.
Ibid. 266.
- 5.
Burggraeve et al. (2003: 22).
- 6.
Ibid. 77 f. Indeed, thanks to Gertrude Stein, for the pagan, an icon is an idol is an icon. For the Roman Catholic Church, however, due to the ubiquitous veneration of saints, often in three-dimensional form, it is imperative to differentiate veneration from adoration – with this last being allowed only to be directed toward God.
- 7.
Burggraeve et al. (2003: 265). Elsewhere, Poorthuis considers that idolatry is a form of adultery (43), while Burggraeve recalls Jean-Luc Marion’s understanding of idolatry as “an absolutizing way of looking at the visible” (86f). Jürgen Manemann holds that the misconceptive nature of idolatry links it to ideology, and, whereas an idol is a fetish, idolatry is understood as “a form of mimesis which makes itself like the environment” (97).
- 8.
Ibid. 31.
- 9.
Burggraeve et al. (2003: 25). The authors contend that “Something only becomes something absolute when it not only is utterly dominating but also demanding, in the sense that it claims everything exclusively for itself” (31). For a pagan, this last is ironic because it is applicable to the Judeo-Christian or Abrahamic God above all. Drawing on Emmanuel Levinas, the dangers of idolatry for Burggraeve’s position apply more to the fundamentalist than to the pagan per se, namely, to the absolutizing and idolizing of Scripture (67).
- 10.
From the theological position of Poorthuis, Burggraeve and friends, idolatry comprises the root of all moral deviance. Like pride, the idol is an abomination (Prov. 16:5; Deut. 7:26). In being completely humble before God – which for liberation theology translates into serving the humble, the poor, the stressed and the wounded, the Christian forsakes idolatry through the performance of self-giving deeds. In other words, the Christian is being ethical when she/he substantiates the Decalogue. The irony in all this for a pagan is that liberation theology translates the opposition to idolatry into an active concern for the ‘small people’, those who are persecuted – “the vulnerable, the wounded, the outcast and the forgotten” (ibid. 82).
- 11.
In Burggraeve’s take, transcendence is understood only as the further, invisible, different or distant, and the idol is seen to preclude any access to these. The visible and the immediate are rejected as idolatrous (Burggraeve et al. 2003: 87). From the Christian perspective, any identification of humanity with divinity is idolatry – “meaning to say humanity would be reduced to divinity, at the cost of humanity” (89, my italics). Nevertheless, a pagan might wonder whether the elevation of the persecuted ‘small people’ that occurs with liberation theology is not itself an illustration of the very idolatry that is otherwise condemned. The poor and outcaste become in themselves idée fixes.
- 12.
For Burggraeve (loc. cit. 92), the image of God does not coincide “with the majesty of nature that overwhelms us and befalls us” – a much different understanding than the non-biblical faith of a pagan. Curiously, while Manemann perceives idolatry as occurring when a “man sets a work of his own hands in the place of God” (96f), he inadvertently allows the pagan veneration of the tree, rock or spring not to be an instance of idolatrous behavior. He also suggests that “An idol wants us to make ourselves in its image” (ibid., my italics).
- 13.
In respect of the Danish cartoon controversy, Zizek (2006) puts the following perspective forward: “While a true atheist has no need to boost his own stance by provoking believers with blasphemy, he also refuses to reduce the problem of the Muhammad caricatures to one of respect for other’s beliefs. Respect for other’s beliefs as the highest value can mean only one of two things: either we treat the other in a patronizing way and avoid hurting him in order not to ruin his illusions, or we adopt the relativist stance of multiple ‘regimes of truth’, disqualifying as violent imposition any clear insistence on truth.”
- 14.
In this context, we might note that a Christian, Jew and pagan arrive at the pearly gates of heaven. St. Peter interrogates each in turn. “Have you been good?” he asks of the Christian. “Yes, I have been good,” the Christian replies. “O.K.,” St. Peter answers, “you may enter.” The Jew is asked the same question next to which he also replies “Yes.” Once again, the Jew is permitted to enter. Finally, the pagan is asked, “Have you been a good person?” The pagan replies, “I’ve been mostly good, but sometimes I have been bad.” St. Peter reflects on this and finally says, “O.K., you may enter as well; everyone gets into heaven anyway.” “You mean, I have been good for nothing?” the pagan questions. “You said it; not me,” St. Peter replies.
- 15.
Vide Manemann apud Burggraeve et al. (2003: 95–118).
- 16.
MacIntyre (1998: 118).
- 17.
Volumes one and two of Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason have been translated by Thomas McCarthy in 1984 and 1989, respectively.
- 18.
As Antje Gimmler states, “Discourse ethics is a normative ethics for pluralistic societies which no longer have a single, overarching moral authority”: http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/Forum/meta/background/agimmler.html (accessed 13 March 2006).
- 19.
http://home.wxs.nl/~brouw724/Levinas.html – dated 8 December 2005, but no longer available. See also Gehrke (2006: 433 et passim).
- 20.
Barb Davy (personal communication 13 March 2006).
- 21.
Levinas (1994: 59).
- 22.
Davy – personal communication (13 March 2006).
- 23.
Ibid. Davy admits that Levinas’ work is “not essentially compatible with paganism or contemporary Paganism, but I find his understanding of ethics and justice compelling and have adapted his work to fit my worldview.” See further Davy (2005) for her fuller argument on ‘lateral transcendence’ of both ego and the limitation involved with one’s personal view of the world. In this way, she argues, the development of interpersonal environmental ethics that are compatible with a contemporary pagan worldview becomes possible.
- 24.
For the ‘other-than-human’ person as an additional terminology for the ‘nonhuman others beyond the strictly interhuman’, see Hallowell (1960), Harvey (2005) and Harvey (2013). While Harvey does not mention ‘gods’ or ‘deities’, he considers that ‘persons’ “communicate intentionally and act toward others relationally … [and] are expected to give and receive gifts. … [Consequently,] animism refers to … efforts to live well in a world that is a community of persons, most of whom are ‘other-than-human’” (Johnston and Bauman, 2014: 207).
- 25.
- 26.
Santayana was a prolific writer – extending his output into poetry and the literary novel beyond philosophical treatises themselves. Among his chief works are Sense of Beauty (1896), Life of Reason: or, The Phases of Human Progress (1905–1906), Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923), Realms of Being (Essence 1927; Matter 1930; Truth 1937–38; Spirit 1940), The Idea of Christ in the Gospels (1946) and Dominations and Powers (1949). His ethics are found in The Life of Reason and Dominations and Powers.
- 27.
Santayana (1944: 427).
- 28.
Davis (1996–2014) – from Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies at 215 (“The Progress of Philosophy.”)
- 29.
Santayana’s realms of being begin with essences and proceed with matter, then spirit and finally truth. Essences are concepts and/or meanings rather than material forces. They may be thought of as non-existent reality – the forms or qualities that constitute the ‘logical loci’ of matter. Matter is an emanation of essence (its chief characteristic is its potentiality), but it alone has causal power and comprises the origin of existence. Material animal psyches (consciousness – capable of being conscious of essences, concepts, meanings), in turn, emanate spirit which, like essence, is non-existent and, in this case, wholly ideal. For matter itself, Santayana defines it as “Specific potentialities existing at specific places and times” (Schilpp 1951: 586 Apologia Pro Mente Sua).
- 30.
Saatkamp (2002/2010) – Naturalism.
- 31.
Robert Kirk in Honderich (1995: 790).
- 32.
Santayana (1972: 215f The Ravages of War). Santayana defines religion as the harmonious recognition and devout propitiation of the powers upon which we are actually dependent as opposed to imaginary powers. “A religion worth having must recognise true Powers, however poetical the form may be which that religion lends them; and it must tend to establish peace and sanity in the mind, not fanatical madness. … Asceticism … becomes a vice when carried too far… And the same may be said of the riot of fancy and superstition in some religions. Without killing the imagination that bred religious ideas, theology may interpret them philosophically; and in this the materialist may consistently join” (ibid. 19f Whether Naturalism is Irreligious). Nevertheless, Santayana admits that “Religions are the great fairy-tales of the conscience” (Schilpp 1951: 8 A General Confession).
- 33.
Santayana (1946: 207 Moralism).
- 34.
For Santayana, the creation of objects of art belong as much to the world as does religion. In fact, “[a]rt proper is that organic or external rearrangement of matter by which a monument or maxim is established in the world and an element of traditional form is added to culture” (Schilpp 1951: 501 Apologia Pro Mente Sua).
- 35.
Santayana (1944: xxxiv).
- 36.
Reese (1999: 677). “The goal [of life] … is the celebration of life in its festivities … Aristotle’s practical wisdom: structuring individual life as it is, living it joyfully, and assuring that one’s commitments are conducive to the delights of the intellect and consistent with the demands of the time and tradition” – Saatkamp (2002/2010) – Bibliography.
- 37.
Santayana has been described as an anti-foundationalist, non-reductive materialist and pragmatic naturalist as well as “an extreme moral relativist.” His position has been contrasted to “the more humanistic naturalisms of John Dewey and other American naturalists,” and his “inattentiveness to social inequality” stems from his “basic contention that individual suffering is the worse feature of human life, not social inequality … [This] causes him to focus more on the natural dilemmas of the individual rather than [as Levinas] on social action.” Ibid. (Saatkamp – Plato). He is also identified as an atheist (Butler 1986) and as a self-described ‘aesthetic Catholic’ (Answers 2014).
- 38.
On humanism, vide supra Chap. 5 under “Kant, pagan critique and idolatry.”
- 39.
Zizek (2006).
- 40.
The traditional foundational relationships of Confucian ethics are superior/subordinate, father/son, older brother/younger brother, husband/wife and friend/friend, or, to phrase these in more contemporary understandings: superior/subordinate, parent/child, older sibling/younger sibling, spouse/spouse (partner/partner) and friend/friend. Each of these is to be ideally characterized by the virtues of proper behavior, i.e., good taste (li), humanity/goodness/benevolence (ren/jen), performance of requisite duties (yi), knowledge of the proper right (shi), mutual care of others (shu) and respect or filial piety (xiao): Cheah and Razak (2006).
- 41.
“According to Laozi [Lao-Tzu], language and conventions are social forms of control that undermine people’s natural spontaneity”: http://www.hku.hk/philodep/courses/EWEthics/laozi.htm (accessed 16 March 2006 but no longer available). See instead Hansen (2007).
- 42.
http://www.hku.hk/philodep/courses/EWEthics/me3.htm (accessed 16 March 2006 but no longer available). See instead Van Norden and Shun (2014).
- 43.
Ibid.
- 44.
McIntyre (2009).
- 45.
Wang Hui (1995).
- 46.
Ibid.
- 47.
Davy (2005: 160).
- 48.
Ibid. p. 161.
- 49.
Davy (2005: 162).
- 50.
Mackie (1977: 190).
- 51.
See Chap. 7 pp. 242f.
- 52.
Davy (2005: 163). Davy is careful to point out that her “views do not necessarily represent a majority of Pagans, but they are valuable, I hope, as an example of Pagan theology in dialogue and development” (p. 159 n. 4).
- 53.
See, in this connection, York (2003: 163f). The völkish ideas and Völkstumbewegung derive from theosophical notions rather than pagan forms of humanism.
- 54.
Davy (2005: 165).
- 55.
Nozick (2002: 118f).
- 56.
Kant’s transcendentalism often simply goes to show how complicated the transcendental can get or, by default, needs to be. I am well aware that the explanation of Kant as well as Spinoza and Hume in this book may appear more dense and complex than the original corpus of the ‘hermeneutisand’ himself. A shamanic flight of imagination may be a consideration in the final understanding of Spinoza, Hume and Kant, but this could be most optimally pursued only after a critical examination into the conceptual foundations of their particular perspectives, insights and explanations.
- 57.
Vide York (1995).
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York, M. (2016). Pagan Ethics vis-à-vis the Western Ethical Tradition. In: Pagan Ethics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18923-9_14
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