Abstract
This chapter discusses the rules for the selection of Hungarian judges and constitutional court justices. Besides providing an in-depth analysis of the relevant legal provisions, it also aims to shed light on their broader socio-political context. In conclusion, this paper argues that the selection of constitutional court justices qualitatively differs from that of ordinary judges. In the case of judges, mostly professional requirements prevail, while the appointment of constitutional court justices is deeply pervaded by political motives. Therefore, it can be argued that the political preferences of the government could certainly distort the selection of the members of the constitutional court, whilst professionalism is certainly a value of the ordinary judiciary. Lastly, it should also be mentioned that the representation of social and political diversity is definitely not a main criterion of judicial selection in general.
I am especially grateful to Dr Ildikó Hörcherné Marosi and Dr András Osztovits, judges of the Supreme Court of Hungary (Curia), who provided me with many useful insights.
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Notes
- 1.
For a discussion of the politico-social transition see RL Tőkés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996); for a comprehensive analysis of post-transitory legal developments see A Jakab, P Takács and AF Tatham (eds), The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985–2005 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007).
- 2.
Retrospectively, the year 2010 may only be compared to 1989 in this sense. 1989, the year of the political transition, also seriously affected the Hungarian judiciary in many ways. Although a comprehensive reform had not happened in this period, many important steps were taken to establish an independent judiciary able to function in a pluralist democracy based on the rule of law. For instance, the judiciary gradually acquired institutional autonomy via a decentralization process and the political activity of judges became strictly prohibited. However, since there was no institutional ‘purge’ in order to clear the judiciary from those who were involved in the former regime, the judiciary continued its work almost with the same personnel, see Z Fleck, ‘A bírói függetlenség állapota’ (2002) 6 28, 30–31; Z Fleck, ‘Jogintézmények átépítése (Bevezetés a közép-európai új demokráciák bírói jogalkalmazásának szociológiájába)’ (2003) 1 Kontroll 28, 34–38.
- 3.
For instance: the Eötvös Károly Intézet (Eötvös Károly Institute), a liberal think-tank, carried out a comprehensive research project on the problems of the judiciary and argued for substantial reforms in 2008. The accountability of the courts has to be enhanced and, furthermore, general transparency has also to be improved, argued the institute’s experts. For details, see the final report in Hungarian, P Hack, L Majtényi and J Szoboszlai, Bírói függetlenség, számonkérhetőség, igazságszolgáltatási reformok’ (2008), available at http://www.ekint.org/ekint_files/File/tanulmanyok/biroi_fuggetlenseg.pdf.
- 4.
A two-thirds, or qualified, majority has a particular importance in the Hungarian constitutional system. Firstly, modifications of the Constitution can only be passed by a qualified majority, that is, the pouvoir constituant is linked to two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Furthermore, the renewal of the most important Acts setting forth the basic constitutional institutions also need qualified majority voting. Cooperation amongst the various coalition parties within the government is necessary and – if the coalition parties behind the government fail to obtain a two-third majority – the parliamentary opposition will also be involved in the decision-making process. That is, the qualified majority requirement to pass a bill of constitutional importance guarantees a minimal cooperation between the government and opposition and it efficiently paves the way for compromises.
- 5.
For a general introduction on the post-2010 political and constitutional developments see: J Kiss, ‘From the 1989 Constitution to the 2011 Fundamental Law’ in GA Tóth (ed), Constitution for a Disunited Nation, 1 (Budapest-New York, CEU Press, 2011) and P Smuk, ‘In the Beginning there was a Constitution…’, in P Smuk (ed), The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal System 2010–2013, 11 (Budapest, Complex, 2013).
- 6.
For an in-depth and critical analysis see the Opinion of the Venice Commission (Opinion 663/2012 European Commission for Democracy through Law), spec 7–16 (the President of the NOJ and its competences); 16–18 (appointment of judges), European Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts of Hungary, Opinion 663/2012.
The legislator changed some of the criticized points following the delivery of this opinion, for example the strong privileges of the President of the NOJ in the selection process were redesigned in order to make it more balanced.
- 7.
As for the judiciary see: A Osztovits, ‘The New Organizational System of the Hungarian Courts’, in P Smuk (ed), The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal System 2010–2013, 131 (Budapest, Complex, 2013). On the Constitutional Court see: L Csink and B Schanda, ‘The Constitutional Court’, in L Csink, B Schanda and AZs Varga (eds), The Basic Law of Hungary. A First Commentary, 293 (Dublin, Clarus Press, 2012), F Gárdos-Orosz, ‘The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Transition from Actio Popularis to Constitutional Complaint’ (2012) 53 Acta Juridica Hungarica 302; F Gárdos-Orosz, Fruzsina, ‘Citizens’ Rights to Constitutional Adjudication’, in P Smuk (ed), The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal System 2010–2013, 117 (Budapest: Complex, 2013).
- 8.
The President of the Supreme Court (Curia), Péter Darák, summarized the actual status of judge-made law in the Hungarian law. He argued that due to the principle of separation of powers the judiciary cannot act as legislator, so judge-made law cannot have general relevance as a binding precedent (P Darák, ‘A belső bírói fórumok, az oktatás és az informális csatornák szerepe az ítélkezési gyakorlat egységesítésében (előadás)’ (2012), available at http://www.lb.hu/sites/default/files/sajto/darakp_eloadas.pdf.)
- 9.
Fundamental Law Art 25 (3).
- 10.
From 1954, the various chambers of Supreme Court started to prepare their positions (later: opinions) on questions which couldn’t be decided either by relying on the existing legal provisions or when an apparently divergent case-law existed at the lower levels of the judiciary. These ‘chamber opinions’ have gradually become reference points for the lower level courts (Z Ződi, ‘Búcsú a kollégiumi véleménytől?’ 2014 (manuscript with the author).
- 11.
See: Z Ződi, ‘A korábbi esetekre történő hivatkozások mintázatai a Magyar bíróságok ítéleteiben’, MTA Law Working Papers 2014/01, available at http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_01_Zodi_Zsolt.pdf ; Z Ződi,‘Analysis of Citations Patterns of Hungarian Judicial Decisions. Is Hungarian Legal System Really Converging to Case Laws?’ (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2410070.
- 12.
The main rule: assessors have to be involved in the trial if the crime committed can be punished by a prison sentence longer than 8 years. See: Act XIX of 1998 on the criminal procedure. 14. § (1) a.
- 13.
ibid, 14 § (6).
- 14.
For a historical introduction and a critical discussion see: a Badó and M Bencze, ‘Reforming the Hungarian Lay Justice System, in P Cserne, I H Szilágyi, K Miklós, M Paksy, P Takács and S Tattay (eds), Theatrum Legale Mundi Symbola Cs. Varga Oblata, 1 (Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2007). Interestingly, Badó and Bencze stress the possible civil expertise of lay assessors as an ‘added value’ to adjudication, but they do not mention their role in the representation of social diversity or minority interests.
- 15.
Act CLXII of 2011 on the status and the payment of judges 215. § (1).
- 16.
Act LXVII of 1997 on the status and the payment of judges 8. § (2).
- 17.
ibid, 8. § (3).
- 18.
Fleck,‘A bírói függetlenség állapota’, 33.
- 19.
ibid.
- 20.
Cf Fleck,‘A bírói függetlenség lángja és füstje’ (2006) BUKSZ 18: 256 at 260.
- 21.
For instance, in the early 90s a Romani man was sentenced because he – allegedly – committed homicide in his village. The criminal process was unfounded and the local court also made manifest legal mistakes when establishing the homicide. In the end, the man committed suicide; his lawyer appealed against the sentence, but the appeal was unsuccessful. The lawyer then wrote a drama on this case and following its online publication the regional court held a press conference to explain its position to the public. Beforehand, it had nothing to say about the case (the Pusoma case). See: I H Szilágyi, ‘Nincs kegyelem – senkinek’, in H Szilágyi, T Nagy and B Fekete (eds), Iustitia mesél’, 89 (Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2013).
- 22.
The act uses the term ‘magasabb bírói álláshely’ (literally translated: higher judicial position) to indicate the appointment specificities of the position on the Appellate or the Supreme Court.
- 23.
Act CLXII of 2011 on the status and the payment of judges 4 § (1).
- 24.
This entry exam in Hungarian is called ‘pályaalkalmassági vizsga’: this term means an exam where the eligibility of a candidate to fulfill a position is to be measured. A common decree of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Public Health sets forth the detailed rules (1/1999 (I 18) IM-EüM együttes rendelet). Professional experts (doctors, psychologists and psychiatrist) affiliated to the Research Institutes of Justice Affairs (Igazságügyi Szakértői és Kutató Intézetek) are entitled to manage this exam. The candidate has to succeed in front of a committee composed of three experts. The committee decides unanimously on the eligibility, and it has to prepare a reasoned professional opinion. Appeal against the decision is possible. In this case a so-called Appellate Committee composed of five experts has to make the final decision. The main components of the exam are a general physical examination, neuropsychiatry examination and general psychological examination, incl. exploration and tests (Rorschach etc.)
- 25.
Act CLXII of 2011 on the status and the payment of judges 4. § (2).
- 26.
ibid, 6. §.
- 27.
ibid, Appendix 5.
- 28.
ibid. 39 § (1)–(2)
- 29.
ibid.
- 30.
ibid. 40 § (1).
- 31.
ibid. 40 § (2) and (5).
- 32.
Act CLXI of 2011 on the organization and administration of courts, 66 §.
- 33.
ibid. 76 § (1) b.
- 34.
ibid. 76 § (1) c.
- 35.
ibid. 76 § (1) e.
- 36.
ibid. 76 § (3) a-b.
- 37.
ibid. 76 § (3) e.
- 38.
ibid. 76 § (5) b.
- 39.
ibid. 76 § (8) a-f.
- 40.
ibid. 103 § (1) a-c.
- 41.
ibid. 147 § and 148. § (1).
- 42.
Act CLXII of 2011 on the status and the payment of judges, 7 § (1)–(2).
- 43.
ibid. 8 § (2).
- 44.
ibid. 9 § (2).
- 45.
ibid. 10 § (1)–(3).
- 46.
ibid. 11 § (1).
- 47.
This assessment is based on a decree of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice (7/2011 (III 4) KIM rendelelt). This decree provides a very detailed list of the points that may be given for a certain requirements. For instance, having a PhD is worth 15 points, law school teaching 5, while the impressions of the personal hearing can be assessed from 0 to 20 points at the discretion of the given judicial council (see Appendix 1) The whole system of points looks to be proportionate and fair, the only surprising component is the discretional 20 points for the personal hearing that might seem to be slightly disproportionate as compared to the other professional activities and results.
- 48.
Act CLXII of 2011 on the status and the payment of judges. 14 § (1).
- 49.
ibid. 15 § (2).
- 50.
ibid. 16 § (1)–(2).
- 51.
Or, in a very special case if the candidate applied for a position at the Curia the President of the Curia has to decide, ibid. 17 §.
- 52.
ibid. 3 § (1)–(2).
- 53.
ibid. 18 § (1)–(2).
- 54.
ibid. 18 § (3).
- 55.
ibid. 20 §.
- 56.
ibid. 21 §.
- 57.
ibid. 14 (4) §.
- 58.
See: ibid. 68 §. This Article requires that the work of judges in a permanent post has to be assessed in the third year following the appointment, then in each subsequent 8 years this assessment is to be repeated. This periodic assessment is ordered by the president of the given court, while it is carried out by the head of the competent chamber or a judge nominated by her or him (70–71 §)
- 59.
Perhaps the most famous examples of this kind of CC decisions are: 23/1990 (X 31) AB határozat (annulling the death penalty on the basis of the value of human life and human dignity); 43/1995 (VI 30) AB határozat (annulling some parts of the Act on economic stability [Act XLVIII of 1995] and introducing serious restrictions in the field of maternity and family allowances in order to improve the budgetary balance).
- 60.
Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court 6. § (1).
- 61.
ibid. 6 § (1) c.
- 62.
ibid. 6 § (4).
- 63.
ibid. 10 § (1).
- 64.
ibid.
- 65.
For a comparative and prospective analysis see K Kelemen, ‘Appointment of Constitutional Judges in a Comparative Perspective – with a Proposal for a New Model for Hungary’ (2013) 54 Acta Juridica Hungarica 5.
- 66.
Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court 5 § and 7 § (1).
- 67.
ibid, 7 § (2).
- 68.
For a detailed analysis see: Z Boda and G Medve-Bálint, ‘Institutional trust in Hungary in a comparative perspective: an empirical analysis’in L Füstös and I I Szalma (eds), European Social Register 2010: Values, Norms and Attitudes in Europe, 184 (Budapest, MTA PTI – MTA SZI, 2010); Z Boda and G Medve-Bálint, ‘Does Institutional Trust in East Central Europe Differ from Western Europe?’ (2014) 3 European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities 1.
- 69.
For a detailed analysis see: Z Szente, ‘The Decline of Constitutional Review in Hungary –Towards a Partisan Constitutional Court?’ in Z Szente, F Mandák, and Z Fejes (eds), Challenges and Pitfalls in the Recent Hungarian Constitutional Development – Discussing the New Fundamental Law of Hungary (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2015), 183.
- 70.
Cf B Fekete, ‘Practice Elements in the Hungarian Legal Education System’ (2010) 51 Acta Juridica Hungarica 67.
- 71.
Interestingly, Mátyás Bencze, an expert in judicial studies, suggests that the potential judge candidates should spend a certain period in other fields of expertise (for instance: solicitor or prosecutor) since it could improve their sensitivity and understanding toward other standpoints (M Bencze, ‘A bírósági rendszer átalakításának értékelése’ MTA Law Working Papers, 2014/41, available at http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_41_Bencze.pdf).
- 72.
Cf E Jovánovics and A Pap, ‘Kollektív bűnösség a 21. század Magyarországán: Magyarellenesség vádja cigányokkal szemben két emblematikus perben’ (2013) 17 Fundamentum 153. The authors argue that the Hungarian courts are absolutely inconsistent when applying those rules that were introduced in order to protect minority groups from hate crimes.
Reference List
Books
Jakab, A, Takács, P and Tatham, AF (eds) (2007) The Transformation of the Hungarian Legal Order 1985–2005 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International).
Tőkés, RL (1996) Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
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Badó, A and Bencze, M (2007) ‘Reforming the Hungarian Lay Justice System’ in P Cserne, IH Szilágyi, K Miklós, M Paksy, P Takács and S Tattay (eds), Theatrum Legale Mundi Symbola Cs. Varga Oblata (Budapest, Szent István Társulat) 1.
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Jovánovics, E and Pap, A (2013) ‘Kollektív bűnösség a 21. század Magyarországán: Magyarellenesség vádja cigányokkal szemben két emblematikus perben’ 17 Fundamentum 153.
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Fekete, B. (2015). How to Become a Judge in Hungary? From the Professionalism of the Judiciary to the Political Ties of the Constitutional Court. In: Turenne, S. (eds) Fair Reflection of Society in Judicial Systems - A Comparative Study. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18485-2_9
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