Abstract
Maintaining the independence of the judiciary against the influence of the legislative and executive powers requires a constant alertness, even more so in our modern societies where the legislative and executive branch are often intimately connected. This article looks into the way this problem is being dealt with in Belgium. It does so from the angle of the Belgian High Council of Justice, created in 2000 to fulfil a key role in establishing and maintaining judicial independence, especially from the political sphere. Since judicial independence, and the way it is reached, cannot be seen in isolation from a broader background, the necessary attention is given to the specifics of the Belgian context that gave rise to the establishment of the High Council, before evaluating the creation of such an institution as a means to guarantee the independence of the judiciary. To evaluate the impact of the establishment of the High Council of Justice, the authors first distinguish four types of judicial independence: individual, internal, extra-institutional and institutional independence. The authors conclude that external monitoring of the judiciary can, in a modern welfare state, be a legitimate policy to be pursued by the legislative and executive powers. The judiciary, as an institution, can thus be held accountable for its performance by means of a High Council. This is partly a matter of checks and balances. At the same time, alertness is required to ensure that under the pretence of checks and balances no new unchecked positions are being taken up. Therefore, the Belgian High Council of Justice should not perform its duties in a vacuum; it should itself be monitored and be held accountable, for example, by the public, by a free press or even by the judiciary itself (e.g., the European Court of Human Rights).
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Notes
- 1.
T Koopmans, Courts and Political Institutions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 247–250. This is of course just one way of describing how constitutionally relevant institutions can be looked at. Today we might as well speak about multiple politica, where complexity is the watchword: there is an ‘increasingly interactive process … taking place in the area of constitutional development between the legislature and judiciary and between national, European and international actors amongst themselves, as well as between actors within the rule of law and those outside’, see A Meuwese and M Snel, ‘Constitutional dialogue: an overview’ (2013) Utrecht Law Review 135.
- 2.
Federalist Papers, no 78.
- 3.
ibid
- 4.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, in the famous Chapter 6 of Book XI (for an English translation, see http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch17s9.html). On this, see E Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) 129.
- 5.
Federalist Papers, no 78.
- 6.
This is a central concern of judicial independence, although not the only one. MacDonald and Kong define judicial independence more broadly as ‘judges are independent when they decide by taking into account all relevant considerations, by not considering irrelevant considerations, by not acting to achieve an improper purpose, and by not acting to achieve a purely personal objective’, R MacDonald and H Kong, ‘Judicial Independence as a Constitutional Virtue’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 832.
- 7.
This phrase was coined in a seminal paper published nearly 60 years ago by British philosopher WB Gallie. Essentially contested concepts are concepts ‘the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’, WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1956) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167–198.
- 8.
MacDonald and Kong, ‘Judicial Independence as a Constitutional Virtue’ 833 857.
- 9.
In Belgium a juge d’instruction has to prepare a case for both the defence and the prosecution. He leads the judicial investigation, and to that end instructs the police investigators. It is the duty of the investigating judge to gather evidence not only against (à charge) but also in favour (à décharge) of the suspect. The statutory position of an investigating judge is rather ambiguous, since he is at the same time an officer of the judicial police and a magistrate; he has, after all, to track down suspects and protect the victims against them, which makes it difficult for him to be impartial in this sense. On the other hand, an investigating judge does not have the powers of a judge on the bench; he does not adjudicate cases on their merits and is therefore not an ordinary judge in the regular sense of the word. He neither rules on the guilt of a suspect, nor on the punishment or degree of punishment, or on possible compensation for victims. He only rules on matters related to the investigation.
- 10.
In this article we shall understand these terms – independence and impartiality – not quite as synonyms, but as closely interrelated terms nevertheless. We do not see independence as an ultimate value in itself, but instrumental in safeguarding another more ultimate value: impartiality, in the sense of having a decision taken by a third person who cannot be considered to have an interest in the case. On this relation, see M Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) 70–71. A judge who cannot decide a case independently by definition cannot be impartial. The European Court of Human Rights seems to confirm this view, when it says that ‘the concepts of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked.’ See, eg, European Court of Human Rights, Kleyn et al v the Netherlands, ECHR, Nos 39 343/98, 2003-VI (6 May 2003), para 192.
- 11.
Cour de cassation, 14 October 1996, Arresten Cassatie 1996, 379 (the Court ratified its decision some months later, on 11 December 1996, in civil proceedings). Translations in this paper are by the authors.
- 12.
ibid.
- 13.
A survey of the legal aspects of the case can be found in W Van Gerven, ‘Creatieve rechtspraak’ (1997–1998) Rechtskundig Weekblad 214–217 and, more generally, in F Delpérée, ‘Quelques propos sur la justice et la politique’ (1997) Journal des Tribunaux 69. Both authors are rather critical of the decision by the Cour de cassation.
- 14.
An interesting sociological analysis of the White March can be found in S Walgrave and J Manssens, ‘The Making of the White March: The Mass Media as a Mobilizing Alternative to Movement Organizations’ (2000) Mobilization 217.
- 15.
Representative of the available political spectrum that is, i.e., not being fully cut loose from the political sentiments amongst the population. Such a judiciary had been an ardent wish since the establishment of the Belgian state in 1830. See J Gilissen, ‘L’ordre judiciaire en Belgique au début de l’indépendance (1830–1832)’ (1983) Journal de Tribunaux 596 and J-P Nandrin, ‘L’acte de fondation des nominations politiques de la magistrature. La Cour de cassation à l’aube de l’indépendance belge’ (1998) Revue belge d’Histoire contemporaine 153.
- 16.
Interestingly, the previously cited Montesquieu advocated judicial independence not only to protect the judiciary from political trespassing, but also to protect the public from judges with too much power! If the judicial power ‘were … joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression’, Montesquieu, Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, ch 6 Book XI (‘Of the Constitution of England’).
- 17.
Whether the shake-up was successful is an issue that will not be dealt with in this article. Even so, in recent years, popular confidence rate significantly improved. According to recent research, in 2010 61 % and in 2007 66 % of the Belgians said they had confidence in the justice system. Five years before, this was barely two out of five Belgians (41 %), see Conseil supérieur de la justice, Les Belges et la justice en 2010. Les résultats du deuxième baromètre de la justice en Belgique (Brussels, Bruylant, 2010) 83.
- 18.
K Malleson, The New Judiciary. The Effects of Expansion and Activism (Aldershot, Ashgate Press, 1999) 78.
- 19.
Parliamentary Proceedings, Senate 1998–99, no 1-1121/3, 7.
- 20.
Cour de cassation 13 January 1986, Arresten Cassatie 1985–86, 665; Cour d’Arbitrage 10 June 1998, Belgisch Staatsblad 12 September 1998, no 67/98. The Belgian Cour d’Arbitrage was renamed Cour Constitutionnelle in 2007.
- 21.
Act of 20 November 1998 amending the Constitution, Belgisch Staatsblad 24 November 1998.
- 22.
For an overview of these events (from a corporate and financial law perspective), see ‘De zaak Fortis’ (2009) 2 Tijdschrift voor Rechtspersoon en Vennootschap, 156–158 and 429–430.
- 23.
Commission of Inquiry, Parliamentary Documents: House of Representatives 2008–2009, No. 52 1711/007, available at www.dekamer.be; High Council for Justice, Report of the special investigation into the functioning of justice following the Fortis case, approved by the general assembly of the Council on 16 December 2009, available at www.hrj.be. For a first discussion of these reports, see M Rigaux, ‘Les illusions perdues. Réflexions à propos du rapport de la commission Fortis’ (2009) 6347 Journal des Tribunaux 221; M Rigaux, ‘Le rapport du Conseil supérieur de la justice sur l’enquête relative au fonctionnement de l’ordre judiciaire à l’occasion de l’affaire Fortis’ (2010) 6385 Journal des Tribunaux 137.
- 24.
For example, both reports recommend to limit the possibilities for magistrates in function to be hired as cabinet advisors by members of government, but whether this should lead to an absolute ban or not (including the cabinet of the Minister of Justice, where the input of magistrates could be very useful) is matter of dispute.
- 25.
Chamber of Representatives, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings 1997–98’, no 1675/4, 19.
- 26.
ibid, 29.
- 27.
Cour de cassation, 22 June 1998, Algemeen Juridisch Tijdschrift 1999–2000, p. 297. On this and other similar cases, see Van Orshoven, Verhey and Wagner, De onafhankelijkheid van de rechter.
- 28.
cf Ringeisen v Austria, European Court of Human Rights, Series A, no 13 (1971) 1 EHRR 455, para 95, and Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium, European Court of Human Rights, Series A, no 43 (1981) 4 EHRR 1, para 55.
- 29.
Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 80 (1985) 7 EHRR 165, para 78.
- 30.
Appointment by legislative power: Crociani and ors v Italy, European Commission on Human Rights, 18 December 1980, DR 22, 147 (App no. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79 and 8729/79), para 10. Appointment by executive power: Ringeisen v Austria, para 95 and Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, para 78. Dismissal by executive power: Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, para 80 and Bryan v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 335 (1995) 21 EHRR 342, para 36.
- 31.
cf H v Belgium, European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 127, para 51 (the tribunal in question was a disciplinary commission of a Bar authority, in a disbarment case).
- 32.
cf Ringeisen v Austria, para 95.
- 33.
See Van den Hurk v the Netherlands, European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 288 [1994] ECHR 14, para 45. On all this, see V Van Bogaert, De rechter beoordeeld. Over aansprakelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid in civiel- en staatsrechtelijk perspectief (Maklu, Apeldoorn/Antwerp, 2005) 363–365.
- 34.
Conseil d’Etat/Raad van State, full bench opinion of the Legislative Department, nr 53000/AV/3, Chamber of Representatives, Parliamentary Documents, DOC 53-2858/01, 100–105.
- 35.
This is illustrated by the fact that newly constructed court buildings are designed with work places for teams of judges, whereas older court buildings did not even offer office space for individual magistrates.
- 36.
Cour d’appel, Ghent, 14 September 2011, Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 2012, 354 (a motion to reverse – ‘voorziening in cassatie’ – was rejected by the Cour de cassation in its decision of 13 March 2012, nr AR P.11.1750.N, available at www.juridat.be).
- 37.
Cour d’appel Brussels, 21 January 2013, as yet unpublished.
- 38.
A hard case seems to be when a judge shows a draft judgment to a fellow judge of the same court (and not so much where the judge shows her draft judgment to someone who is effectively not a judge).
- 39.
Perhaps this is all the more so in Belgium which does not really have a tradition of aggressive press coverage in pending legal matters, even though media interest in trial coverage in recent years seems to have increased. Remarkably, in the past ten years, courts have taken a more open attitude towards the press. Most courts have assigned magistrates as press officers, dedicated to answer journalists’ questions on pending matters.
- 40.
Cour de cassation, 16 September 1998, (1998) Journal de Tribunaux 656.
- 41.
‘Quality of justice’ refers to the degree by which the justice system meets performance and efficiency criteria, such as the speed and cost of the judicial process, see European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (Council of Europe) (ed), Terms of reference of the Working Group on quality of justice, Extract from the 2014–2015 Activity Programme of the CEPEJ, www.coe.int/cepej.
- 42.
On this, P Van Orshoven, ‘De staatsrechtelijke positie van de Hoge Raad voor de Justitie’ in M Storme and J Laenens (eds), In de ban van Octopus – Dans l’encre d’octopus (Brussels, Bruylant, 2000) 7–8.
- 43.
Note by IE Liekendael and P Marchal, ‘Het grondwettelijk statuut van het Hof van Cassatie’ in Chamber of Representatives, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings 1997–98’, no 1675, 62.
- 44.
Statistics published by the Ministry of Justice show that the proportion of women amongst magistrates has increased significantly. In 2006, the Ministry counted approximately 1,050 female magistrates and 1,350 male magistrates. By 2011, the balance was approximately 1,200 women against 1,275 men (FOD Justitie, Justitie in cijfers 2012, 9, available at www.just.fgov.be). The Ministry does not publish records on the number of magistrates according to other criteria, such as disability, sexual orientation or ethnicity.
- 45.
This maximum is set relatively low, to ensure sufficient job openings for the younger, less experienced candidates entering the judicial career through the judicial traineeship programme.
- 46.
The Senate has full discretion of appointment but is bound by a number of criteria. The Senate appoints candidates who are not magistrates and there are quotas for language (50/50 Dutch- and French-speaking, with at least 1 magistrate with sufficient knowledge of German) and sex (at least four women in each language group), as well as professional qualification (e.g. at least four lawyers with min. 10 years of experience at the bar and at least three university professors).
- 47.
J Nolf, ‘Vertrouwen: het sleutelwoord verdwijnt’, De Juristenkrant (26 September 2012), 11.
- 48.
B Aerts and R Boone, ‘Hoge Raad voor de Justitie na 10 jaar. “95 procent objectieve benoemingen is het hoogst haalbare”’ (2010) 207 De Juristenkrant, 8–9.
- 49.
Usually, one professional judge presides the chambers, with two lay judges as deputies. The lay judges have equal saying in the decision-making process, although most often the professional judge is likely to be the most influential.
- 50.
For lay judges in the labour courts, the appointments are made on the basis of endorsements made by the representative organisations of employers on the one hand and of the trade unions on the other (Art 199, Judicial Code). For lay judges in the commercial courts, applications are open to every candidate who is minimum 30 years old and has at least 5 years of business experience.
- 51.
D De Bruyn, as quoted by Velaers. ‘De onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht na de recente herziening van de Grondwet’.
- 52.
This was also stressed in the parliamentary proceedings. See Chamber of Representatives, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings 1997–98’, no 1675/1, p. 8–9, and Senate, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings 1998–99’, no 1-1121/3, p. 8. See also Velaers, ‘De onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht na de recente herziening van de Grondwet’.
- 53.
Nolf, ‘Vertrouwen: het sleutelwoord verdwijnt’.
- 54.
ibid.
- 55.
K Malleson, The New Judiciary, 78.
- 56.
ibid.
- 57.
ibid.
- 58.
EMH Hirsch Ballin, ‘Onafhankelijke rechtsvorming’ in Rechtsstaat & Beleid (Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1991) 296.
- 59.
John Locke (1632–1705) of course defined an earlier version of the idea of Trias Politica, in which the judicial power was part of the executive.
- 60.
C Eisenmann, ‘La pensée constitutionnelle de Montesquieu’ in B Mirkine-Guetzévitch and H Puget, La pensée politique et constitutionnelle de Montesquieu: bicentenaire de L’esprit des lois 1748–1948 (Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1952) 133.
- 61.
W Witteveen, Evenwicht van machten (Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1991). To avoid misunderstanding: Montesquieu can be interpreted in different ways here. Also critically on the idea of Trias Politica as separation of powers, see I Stewart ‘Montesquieu in England: His ‘Notes on England’, with Commentary and Translation’ (2002), available at: http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/montesquieu.shtml
- 62.
AFM Brenninkmeier, ‘De reorganisatie van de rechtspleging en de onafhankelijkheid van de rechter’ (2002) NJCM-Bulletin 24.
- 63.
Malleson, The New Judiciary, 78.
- 64.
Supervision by the Belgian Constitutional Court or the Conseil d’Etat is of course also necessary, although this will not necessarily take away all concerns, as both of these institutions are composed of members appointed by either the Parliament or the executive. This only confirms the importance of supervision by the European Court of Human Rights.
Reference List
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Case Law
Domestic Case Law
Cour d’Arbitrage, 10 June 1998, Belgisch Staatsblad 12 September 1998, no 67/98
Cour de cassation, 22 June 1998, Algemeen Juridisch Tijdschrift 1999–2000, 297
Cour de cassation, 14 October 1996, Arresten Cassatie 1996, 379
Cour de cassation, 13 January 1986, Arresten Cassatie 1985–86, 665
European Court of Human Rights
Bryan v United Kingdom, Series A no 335 (1995) 21 EHRR 342
Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, Series A no 80 (1985) 7 EHRR 165
Kleyn et al v the Netherlands, ECHR, Nos 39 343/98, 2003-VI (6 May 2003)
Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium, Series A, no 43 (1981) 4 EHRR 1
Ringeisen v Austria, Series A, no 13 (1971) 1 EHRR 455
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Adams, M., Allemeersch, B. (2015). Re-forming a Meritorious Elite. Judicial Independence, Selection of Judges and the High Council of Justice in Belgium. In: Turenne, S. (eds) Fair Reflection of Society in Judicial Systems - A Comparative Study. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18485-2_4
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