Abstract
The Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) sets the tariff that determines the revenue requirements of the Turkish natural gas distribution companies by using a popular type of an incentive regulation, the price cap method. Generally, incentive regulation improves efficiency and reduces costs; on the other hand the companies may not be willing to increase the service quality in this kind of regulation. This chapter analyzes the efficiency and service quality of the Turkish natural gas distribution companies. The findings should also be of interest to regulators in other developing countries that are at the early stage of their natural gas market regulation. The companies’ efficiency scores are evaluated both by non-parametric and parametric methods, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) respectively. The same distribution companies are ranked by the service quality scores that are obtained from service quality data. The results are used to determine the relationship between efficiency and service quality of the companies, to decide on the effectiveness of the regulation and to suggest a reward/penalty scheme for the tariff design.
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Notes
- 1.
Storage activity has to be regulated if there is no or limited competition especially due to insufficient storage capacity.
- 2.
BOTAŞ is the state-owned wholesale company that imports around 75 % of the natural gas consumption and also the operator of the transmission system.
- 3.
Operating less than 5–6 years.
- 4.
In the rest of the chapter these seven companies will be referred as “old companies”.
- 5.
In the rest of the chapter, these 57 companies will be referred as “new companies”.
- 6.
The Natural Gas Market Law states that in case the distribution company, whose licence term has been expired, requests from the Authority to renew its city distribution licence 1 year before the expiry of the licence term, the Board may grant a second distribution licence by taking into consideration technical and economic power, service quality of the company, its subscribers’ satisfaction and other issues to be determined by the regulations to be issued by the Authority. By the Natural Gas Market Tariffs Regulation, provision of adequate amount of natural gas of good quality to consumers, at low cost, and in a safe and reliable manner, and principles of non-discrimination and transparency shall be taken as a basis in preparation of the tariffs. The Natural Gas Distribution and Customer Services Regulation states that a distribution company in the event of an emergency intervention should arrive at the scene within 15 min at the latest, should keep a high level of service quality and should contain at least two maintenance—repair vehicles up to 50,000 subscribers. The company should provide a vehicle for each additional 50,000 subscribers.
- 7.
A consumer is counted as an “extraordinary consumer” if the yearly consumption exceeds 10,000,000 m3. In the rest of the chapter, a consumer who consumes below 10,000,000 m3 will be referred as an “ordinary consumer”.
Abbreviations
- AE:
-
Allocative Efficiency
- BOTAŞ:
-
Boru Hatları ve Petrol Taşıma A.Ş.
- CAPEX:
-
Capital Expenditures
- CE:
-
Cost Efficiency
- CRS:
-
Constant Returns to Scale
- crste:
-
Technical Efficiency from Constant Returns to Scale
- DEA:
-
Data Envelopment Analysis
- EMRA:
-
Energy Market Regulatory Authority
- HDD:
-
Heating Degree Day
- NGML:
-
Natural Gas Market Law
- OPEX:
-
Operational Expenditures
- ROR:
-
Rate of Return
- SFA:
-
Stochastic Frontier Analysis
- TE:
-
Technical Efficiency
- VRS:
-
Variable Returns to Scale
- vrste:
-
Technical Efficiency from Variable Returns to Scale
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Yardımcı, O., Karan, M.B. (2015). Efficiency and Service Quality Analyses of the Natural Gas Distribution Companies: A Case Study of Turkey. In: Dorsman, A., Westerman, W., Simpson, J. (eds) Energy Technology and Valuation Issues. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13746-9_9
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