Abstract
This section provides a comprehensive analysis comparing both systems from a social welfare point of view and hence asking whether academic publishing should be organized by means of a universal closed or open access mode. The first subsection is an extensive view on both regimes and their impact in the light of the publishing game and hence the prevailing “publish or perish”—environment in scientific research. The impact on researcher’s private incentives to write high quality papers will be investigated as well as the social welfare effects when shifting towards an universal OA regime. Several robustness checks and a model extension to think outside the box of the model’s inherent contest character provide a broad picture on the superiority of either regime. The second subsection picks up on the distributive effects from shifting towards an “author pays” principle when introducing OA as the dominant publishing mode, briefly highlighting some possible distortions that may result in an obviously heterogeneous world. In this regard, especially the consequences for developing countries will be addressed, providing the analytical framework for investigating the international political economy of access to scientific knowledge in Sect. 4.2 of this chapter.
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Notes
- 1.
This section is joint research with Eberhard Feess (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management). However, this subsection presents a shortened version of the original model in Feess and Scheufen (2013). In particular, the model extensions (robustness) are not presented here, but will be discussed in the conclusions.
- 2.
See Congleton et al. (2008) on the theory of rent-seeking.
- 3.
Of course, such a perspective does not necessarily contradict the relevance of intrinsic motivation. See e.g. the case studies discussed in Andreff and Szymanski (2006) on intrinsic motivation in tournaments. As we have seen, there are two types of intrinsic motivation in scientific research: community-based intrinsic motivation (peer recognition/reputation) and enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation (intellectual satisfaction).
- 4.
- 5.
This is a direct consequence of the “publish or perish” environment of scientific research. Obviously, researchers are “locked-in” to a system that gives credit only based on publications and rankings. Meho (2007) finds empirical evidence that more and more of research has been produced, but is hardly ever read. The author shows that only 50 % of all peer-reviewed journal articles are ever read by anybody else but the reviewers and the authors. About 90 % of all articles are never cited. See also Laband and Tollison (2003). We will pick up on the negative incentives of “publish or perish” in Chap. 5
- 6.
See Konrad (2009) for a comprehensive overview on contest models.
- 7.
Crane (1965) provides evidence that scientists at major schools also attract higher peer recognition than researchers at minor universities.
- 8.
Costs for a single publication, for example in a Public Library of Science (PLoS) journal, currently ranges from $1,350 (PLoS ONE) to $2,900 (PLoS Biology or PLoS Medicine). See http://www.plos.org/journals/pubfees.html (last accessed on September 1, 2014). Besides, King (2007) estimates that the average fixed costs for publishing a single article is $3,000.
- 9.
We will elaborate on this aspect in Sect. 4.1.2.
- 10.
Please note that our model seeks a welfare comparison of both pure systems, i.e. we do not analyze the decisions of scientists between coexisting regime (closed versus open access), but the assume that all scientists publish under the same mode. Consequently, our paper does not address the previously mentioned problem of an inefficient Nash equilibrium in a system where both publishing modes coexist. For a game theoretical analysis of this aspect see e.g. Hanauske et al. (2009).
- 11.
While top universities dominate the ranking, it contains also many academics from smaller institutions with lower reputation, and rules on the coverage of submission fees are quite different. Notwithstanding the fact that the ranking is subject to reasonable criticism, it has high incentive effects.
- 12.
Normalizing readership with open access to 1 is without loss of generality.
- 13.
Both properties also hold for the more general case where \(p_{H} = \frac{\theta \left (e_{H}\right )^{t}} {\theta \left (e_{H}\right )^{t}+\left (e_{L}\right )^{t}}\) and \(p_{L} = \frac{\left (e_{L}\right )^{t}} {\theta \left (e_{H}\right )^{t}+\left (e_{L}\right )^{t}}\). In this more general version, t captures the degree of discrimination, that is the sensitivity of winning the contest to the efforts taken by the players.
- 14.
As submission costs are only positive for the low type under open access, we will subsequently write g instead of g L o for short.
- 15.
In our non-strategic model below, we follow Shavell (2010) by deriving readership explicitly as a function of prices. Including this in a contest-model, however, would yield a very convoluted model structure and would add nothing to the points we wish to make.
- 16.
Superscript “f” denotes “first best”.
- 17.
The differences in the private and socially optimal efforts with open access are \(\Delta e_{L}^{O} \equiv e_{L}^{O} - e_{L}^{f} = \frac{\theta \left (1-g\right )^{2}} {\left (1+\theta -g\right )^{2}} -\frac{\beta ^{2}} {4}\) and \(\Delta e_{H}^{O} \equiv e_{H}^{O} - e_{H}^{f} = \frac{\theta \left (1-g\right )} {\left (1+\theta -g\right )^{2}} -\frac{\theta \beta ^{2}} {4}\) which gives derivatives of \(\frac{\partial \Delta e_{L}^{O}} {\partial g} = -\frac{2\theta ^{2}\left (1-g\right )} {\left (\theta -g+1\right )^{3}} < 0\) and \(\frac{\partial \Delta e_{H}^{O}} {\partial g} = -\frac{\theta \left (g+\theta -1\right )} {\left (\theta -g+1\right )^{3}} < 0\).
- 18.
Recall that r C implicitly measures the readership with closed access relative to open access as r O is normalized to one.
- 19.
For reasons of clarity we refrain from presenting the specific model extension here, but focus on a short discussion and the results. Please see Feess and Scheufen (2013) for a detailed presentation.
- 20.
Note that differences between the cost functions of the players in the contest is an often applied alternative for modelling heterogeneity in tournaments. See also the overview in Konrad (2009).
- 21.
In our model this is captured by arguing that the effort costs are θ i e i , where \(\theta _{h} <\theta _{l}\) determines that the high type has a cost advantage over the low type researcher.
- 22.
Note that the reputation of an author, e.g. his position in a ranking, may be a signal of quality. With other words, it is not far fetched to believe that well-renowned researchers attract a higher readership as compared to a hardly known (young) academic.
- 23.
We integrate type-specific readership into the social welfare function by introducing a parameter that is h(l) when reading a high-type (low-type) article, where h = 1 > l expresses the higher benefit from reading an article from an author with high reputation. See Feess and Scheufen (2013) for a detailed discussion.
- 24.
In a follow-up paper, we drop the rent-seeking motive and hence the contest character. Instead we consider a non-strategic model of quality provision. In doing so we follow Shavell (2010) as closely as possible, but introduce quality and also depart from the assumptions that all universities will cover the publication costs under OA. We then find that quality incentives are always too low for both types under closed access. Interestingly, however, quality incentives for the low type would be even lower with OA, while the ranking depends on the royalties earned under closed access for the high type. A preliminary conclusion of this paper is that OA may be more beneficial for articles, whereas a closed access regime may be superior for textbooks. See Feess and Scheufen (2014) for a discussion.
- 25.
Note that θ is now endogenous, i.e. author i can choose the level of θ. This differs from the model in Feess and Scheufen (2013), where θ is given by nature and distinguishes the good from the bad type researcher. Obviously, arguing that talent may be directly chosen sounds a bit awkward. However, at least indirectly this may be the case.
- 26.
Obviously \(\varepsilon = 0\) for closed access, since \(\varepsilon = r^{C} - 1 = 1 - 1 = 0\).
- 27.
Of course, one may argue that the productivity level may not be chosen endogenously by the author, but that it is rather exogenously given by nature. Nevertheless, one may also find arguments for the very opposite if we assume that the disposition of the group of researchers regarding θ may decisively be determined by means of labor market characteristics. Thus, it is the researcher’s decision whether to enter the academic labor market that chooses whether high or low qualified researchers are present. If we believe in this argument, both parameters r k and g may drive the decision making of our high (low) qualified author whether to become an academic or not. As a result, the level of θ may at least indirectly depend on the market characteristics and hence on r k and g.
- 28.
Similarly, Feess and Scheufen (2013) find that effort levels are the same under CA.
- 29.
We use the ranking published annually by the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU). The ARWU is the first worldwide ranking of universities to be published. The rankings by ARWU have been conducted since 2003 and are updated on an annual basis. See http://www.shanghairanking.com/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014). For the data see ARWU (2012).
- 30.
To see this just assume that only researchers from the US receive a waiver on the publication costs in an OA regime. Then we would face a situation where g US = 0 < g others . Furthermore, assuming that g Germany < g DC , suggests that the distortion may differ considerably between countries outside the US. Thus, taking account of particular country parameters seems necessary when shaping an appropriate redistribution mechanism for OA funding. The development of a clear framework for such a mechanism is outside the scope of this work. However, we will sketch some basic principles to be considered in Sect. 4.2.
- 31.
Recall from Sect. 3.2 that only 28.24 % of all OA journals do actually charge author fees.
- 32.
The fees for low or middle income countries are calculated based on the PLoS Global Participation Initiative. See their website at http://www.plos.org/about/viewpoints/global-participation-initiative/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 33.
For a list of eligible group one countries see http://www.plos.org/group-one-countries/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 34.
For a list of eligible group two countries see http://www.plos.org/group-two-countries/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 35.
In this regard, Art.1 of the TRIPS Agreement specifies that “members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice” (TRIPS 1994, Art. 1.1).
- 36.
- 37.
Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006) note that Article 9(2) was primarily intended to govern the use of academic works for research purposes. In fact, the general clause under Article 9(2) was also intended to replace the express reference under Article 10(2) that was included in the draft prior to the Stockholm Act (Ricketson and Ginsburg 2006, p. 782; Reichman and Okediji 2012, p. 1379). Nowadays, the exception under Article 10(2) is limited to only teaching purposes.
- 38.
The TRIPS agreement also incorporates similar statements for trademarks (Article 17), industrial designs (Article 26.2) and patents (Article 30). See section 3 in Kur (2009) for a comparison of the wording of the different provisions.
- 39.
See the case WT/DS160, available at http://www.wto.org/French/news_f/news00_f/1234db.pdf (last accessed on September 1, 2014). See also Oliver (2002).
- 40.
- 41.
Reichman and Okediji (2012) discuss several legislative steps to accommodate the needs of science. Their proposals cover recommendations such as a tailor-made exemption for scientific research, a deliberalisation of the DRM measurements as well as a reform of database protection laws. Despite the equal importance of these aspects for adapting the legal framework to the various needs of science, a broad discussion of all issues involved is beyond the scope of this thesis. Accordingly, we will focus on changes in the copyright law that more specifically serve the promotion of OA publishing. For further reading see besides Reichman and Okediji (2012) also Peukert (2013a,b). In Chap. 5 we will further elaborate on the pros and cons of different OA policies. For now we will more generally assess the openness of the international legal framework and the steps needed to further adapt legislation for the promotion of OA on a global scale.
- 42.
In a recent decision, the WTO has highlighted the importance of the deference provision under Art. 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. See the panel report WT/DS362/R in WTO (2009).
- 43.
A critical assessment of the prevailing legal uncertainty (Netherlands) and inflexibility (France) in the European system is provided by Senftleben (2010). He concludes that “the present regulation of copyright limitations in the EC offers neither legal certainty nor sufficient flexibility. The adaptation of EC copyright law to the digital environment has led to a legislative framework that employs the open-ended three-step test to erode the legal certainty following from precisely defined exceptions instead of using the test as a means for providing sufficient flexibility” (Senftleben 2010, p. 69).
- 44.
See Geiger et al. (2008) for the declaration.
- 45.
Note that the three-step test was similarly recodified also for trademark law (TRIPS Agreement, Art. 17). See Senftleben (2006).
- 46.
- 47.
We will discuss the pros and cons of various policies which aim at fostering the evolution of an OA mode in academic publishing in Chap. 5 In this context, specific references on how to incorporate these aspects into the international legal framework will be made, reverting to the lessons made here.
- 48.
See http://www.eifl.net/access-knowledge-a2k (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for the A2K treaty.
- 49.
Reichman and Okediji (2012) stress that steps towards an implementation of such a soft-law instrument by regional groups such as Latin American or African countries could help to accelerate a broader movement for a deliberalisation of the international copyright framework. Reichman and Okediji (2012) also highlight that Brazil has started to implement a provision on “transformative and incidental uses”. See Helfer et al. (2009) and Armstrong et al. (2010) on similar steps in South America and Africa, respectively.
- 50.
- 51.
As seen before there are two forms of transfer of copyright: (1) Copyright Assignment and (2) Copyright Licensing. We concentrate on the latter, as an assignment of copyright would involve a transfer of (all) rights in an exclusive and definite manner. Thus, this approach does not comply with the “droit d’auteur” principle and does not account for attribution as the most relevant aspect for scientific researchers.
- 52.
See the website of Springer at http://www.springer.com/open+access/open+choice?SGWID=0-40359-0-0-0 (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 53.
For more information see the website of CC at www.creativecommons.org/licenses (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 54.
See the CC website at http://wiki.creativecommons.org/International_Overview (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for a detailed overview on the ten-steps for porting the CC licenses.
- 55.
See Rosenkranz (2011) on the problems of choice of law clauses in CC licenses.
- 56.
Similarly see Woods (2009).
- 57.
See the CC wiki at https://wiki.creativecommons.org/4.0 (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for a general overview on CC version 4.0.
- 58.
For the legal code see the CC website at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 59.
On the medieval lex mercatoria see e.g. Donahue (2004).
- 60.
See the UNIDROIT website at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for further information. See also Berger (1996) on the lex mercatoria doctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
- 61.
- 62.
- 63.
See Sect. 3.1 for a review of the history of academic journal publishing.
- 64.
We will further elaborate on the opportunities and requirements of academic associations in Chap. 5
- 65.
Reichman and Okediji (2012) also point to options for imposing analogs to fair use and other codified limitations by contract.
- 66.
Pure OA journals are journals that follow the definition by the BOAI (2002). Pure OA journals are listed by the DOAJ. See the website at http://www.doaj.org/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014). See also Sect. 3.2 for a review.
- 67.
We will focus on the first. Obviously, mandates that require publication with gold OA are not very reasonable as long as OA journals still lack considerably in terms of reputation as compared to established CA journals. The impact factor advantage of CA journals would in fact induce just another distortion between authors with and without commitment to publish in OA journals only. Moreover, Suber (2012) stresses the low number of OA journals, constituting only 25 % of all peer-reviewed journals.
- 68.
OA mandates typically use words like “must” or “shall” and hence require or seem to require OA. In contrast to a mandate, request or encouragement policies merely ask or recommend to their members to publish OA (Suber 2012, p. 78).
- 69.
We will see later that a copyright exception by means of a so-called “inalienable right of secondary publication” may offer a similar tool to ensure rights-retention mandates.
- 70.
See the website at http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 71.
SHERPA/RoMEO classifies publishers in four categories according to their self-archiving policy: (1) “green”, i.e. authors can archive pre- and post-print; (2) “blue”, i.e. authors can archive post-print; (3) yellow, i.e. authors can archive pre-print; (4) white, i.e. archiving is not formally supported. See the website of SHERPA/RoMEO at http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/statistics.php?la=en&fIDnum=|&mode=simple (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 72.
Bitton (2012) analyzes the implementation of the “Public Sector Information” (PSI) directive by the EU member states.
- 73.
For the bill see RegE (2013).
- 74.
See Bundesratsbeschluss (2013). Note that on 27 June 2013 the German Bundestag enacted an inalienable right of secondary publication for academic works, not considering the recommendations of the Bundesrat. See http://open-access.net/de/austausch/news/news/anzeige/bundestag_beschliesst_open/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information. See Pampel (2013) for a comment. We will further elaborate on the inalienable right of secondary publication in Chap. 5
- 75.
See Senftleben (2010) on an EC fair use doctrine.
- 76.
See Hackl and Pruckner (2001) for further reading.
- 77.
This subsection serves as a draft for a spin-off and joint research project with Frank Mueller-Langer from the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law in Munich. The written words and the analysis are solely my work. However, in the labor-intensive process of data collection I enjoyed support by Frank Mueller-Langer and his student assistant Jonas Jungbauer. Parts of the empirical analysis evolved in joint discussions with Frank Mueller-Langer. Moreover, I am highly thankful for valuable comments from Patrick Andreoli-Versbach, Joel Waldfogel, Ruth Towse and Stan Liebowitz as well as the conference participants at the annual congress of the Society of Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI) on 9 and 10 July 2013 in Washington DC, USA.
- 78.
Obviously, we have seen that an OA publishing mode may also have a downside, especially when considering the publishing costs which have to be born by the author. Nevertheless, our analytical setting is not influenced by this potential threat to the participation constraint as the journals under the Research4Life regime do not raise any author fees. By contrast, most of the journals are actually “closed access”. The publishers instead commit to provide with an open or reduced fee access to their journals. As a result, these journals provide a perfect setting as they are freely accessible (benefit of OA) but without charging authors for publication (cost of OA).
- 79.
See the website of HINARI at http://www.who.int/hinari/en/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 80.
In fact, the participating publishers themselves may decide who is eligible or not. Several scholars in this respect argue that emerging markets like India and China may have been excluded from such OA initiatives as these countries account for a significant part in the subscriber portfolio of publishers.
- 81.
Please note that the collected data allows for an analysis of all “Research4Life”-initiatives. Nevertheless, we focus our investigation on the OARE initiative as there is no research available so far and as a coverage of all four initiatives would be beyond the scope of this thesis.
- 82.
See Ahmed (2007) on page 349 for an overview on OA initiatives in Africa.
- 83.
See their website at http://www.research4life.org (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 84.
Among them were Blackwell, Elsevier Science, the Harcourt Worldwide STM Group, Wolters Kluwer International Health & Science, Springer Verlag and John Wiley.
- 85.
Eligible institutions are national universities, research institutes, professional schools (medicine, nursing, pharmacy, public health, dentistry), teaching hospitals, government offices and national medical libraries. Access is provided to staff as well as students of these institutions. See http://www.who.int/hinari/eligibility/en/index.html (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 86.
The data is obtained from World Bank figures and can be accessed via the HINARI website at http://www.who.int/hinari/eligibility/en/index.html (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 87.
The only country eligible for registration with HINARI that did not register is North Korea. The core of Band 1 countries is geographically located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Among the countries with the most registered institutions (more than 100) are primarily countries located in Latin America (Venezuela, Columbia and Peru) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana).
- 88.
Among them are Blackwell Publishing, CABI Publishing, Elsevier, Kluwer Academic Publishing, Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins, Nature Publishing Group, Oxford University Press, Springer Verlag and John Wiley & Sons.
- 89.
See the AGORA website at http://www.aginternetwork.org/en/about_agora/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014). Eligible institutions are universities and colleges, research institutes, agricultural extension centres, government offices and libraries.
- 90.
As is the case with HINARI, the core of Band 1 countries are geographically located in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- 91.
See their website at http://www.oaresciences.org/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 92.
Eligible institutions and non-governmental organizations are for example universities and colleges, professional training schools, research institutes, government ministries and other governmental offices, libraries, public media and local NGOs. See http://www.oaresciences.org/eligibility/en/index.html (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 93.
See the website of “Research4Life” at http://www.research4life.org/about.html (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 94.
See the website at http://www.itoca.org/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 95.
See the website at http://www.itoca.org/node/81 (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for an overview on upcoming trainings.
- 96.
In this regard, the WIPO cooperated especially with 12 major publishers in the field of development and innovation. The publishers are: American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Institute of Physics, Elsevier, Institute of Physics, John Wiley & Sons; Oxford University Press, National Academy of Sciences, Nature Publishing Group, Royal Society of Chemistry, Sage Publications, Springer Science+Business Media; Taylor & Francis. Other programme partners include the FAO, the International Association of Scientific, Technical & Medical Publishers, the United Nations Environment Programme and the WHO. See http://www.wipo.int/ardi/en/partners.html (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 97.
See their website at http://www.wipo.int/ardi/en/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for more information.
- 98.
See http://www.wipo.int/ardi/en/ (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 99.
- 100.
See Ahmed (2007), p. 348.
- 101.
Note that this draft is work in progress and is the start for a joint research project with Frank Mueller-Langer. In the proceedings of the project the scope will be broadened to include all “Research4Life” programmes. Furthermore, also the role of pure OA journals shall be analyzed. We will further elaborate on the proceedings in our section on “limitations and proceedings”. The fact that this is the first research to include all programmes as well as OA journals in general, shows the innovativeness of the project as a whole.
- 102.
Selection criterion: More than 75 institutions registered to Research4Life.
- 103.
Selection criterion: More than 75 institutions registered to Research4Life.
- 104.
Selection criterion: At the edge of eligibility for the Research4Life initiative based on GNI per capita.
- 105.
For instance, inserting the query “cu=(“Cameroon”)” allows to search for publications from authors with affiliations to Cameroon universities.
- 106.
Please note that Thomson Reuter’s allows to retrieve only 500 full records at a time. In cases where more than 500 records were listed, the data extraction was segmented into several steps. That is, if for example 1,261 records were listed, three country files were extracted, where file one contained records 1–500, file two the records 501–1000 and file three 1001–1261. Afterwards, all record files were merged to one single country file containing the full record of publications of a country for the time from January 2000 until June 2012.
- 107.
Editing of the files included the creation of separate excel sheets for the evaluation of “the references” and “author affiliations”. Most importantly, the raw data as retrieved from the Web of Science database arranged the information on authors and references in single fields. Accordingly, all authors were listed in a single column and each separate cited reference with information on year, journal, author etc. was also listed in one column. For a further evaluation of both citations and affiliations via the “VLOOKUP” function in excel the information on the particular journal, for instance, had to be separated in columns.
- 108.
Note that the ISSN number allows for a perfect matching of both journal lists, as the number is unique and hence guarantees the identification of a certain journal. However, for some journals the ISSN number was not provided. In such cases, a separate matching via the journal name allowed for an identification.
- 109.
See the descriptive statistics for an evaluation.
- 110.
In the proceedings of the research project the empirical analysis will be broadened to allow for a more elaborate assessment of this complex matter. In this regard, we will for example apply a regression discontinuity model. See our section on “limitations and proceedings” for a discussion.
- 111.
Gap years included the years 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012.
- 112.
See Fig. 7.8 in the Appendix for a detailed picture, also on the number of registered institutions with OARE.
- 113.
See also Fig. 7.9 in the Appendix.
- 114.
In doing so, we created five dummy variables for each single publication to control for co-authors affiliated with institutions from (1) OECD countries, (2) EU countries, (3) EU 15 countries, (4) countries from North America and the (5) USA. That is, the dummy took the value 1 if at least one co-author was affiliated with such an institution, 0 if not. With other words: For publications that were referred to authors solely from developing countries, the value was 0. For all others, some form of cooperation with the developed world was found.
- 115.
See Figs. 7.10 (for Sub-Saharan Africa) and 7.11 (for South America) in the Appendix for the numbers.
- 116.
Please note the overlap between the control variables (1)–(5) as the EU memberstates and the USA are also members of the OECD. As the OECD reveals the broadest coverage, we will primarily report the findings for control variable (1) in this section. An overview on all numbers is given in Figs. 7.10 and 7.11 of the Appendix.
- 117.
Exceptions are reported in Nigeria and Uganda (both Sub-Saharan Africa) and Venezuela (South America).
- 118.
A comparison between both control variables (2) EU countries and (3) EU 15 shows that the majority of cooperations was driven by EU 15 memberstates.
- 119.
Other indicators were the number of academic journals and the number of OARE registrations.
- 120.
For a definition and overview of the different World Bank indicators see their website at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (last accessed on September 1, 2014).
- 121.
See Fig. 7.12 in the Appendix for an overview.
- 122.
Please note that Cameroon stands out as one of the “richest” countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa sample. Among the poorest countries is Congo with a GDP per capita (in constant US dollars) of 86.75 (109.81) in 2000 (2011).
- 123.
The summary statistics of all previously reported variables are also shown in Fig. 7.13 of the Appendix.
- 124.
We use a robust regression based on iteratively reweighted least squares. Stata offers this robust option via the rreg command. A similar robust regression is the so-called cluster option. In executing our empirical analysis we also used this option by clustering our regression by means of both “country number” and “country group” (Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, control group), with results similar to the results presented here.
- 125.
As discussed in the descriptive statistics, the controls include aspects like research cooperations with researchers from (1) OECD, (2) EU, (3) EU15, (4) North America or (5) USA as well as variables related to the level of economic development and ICT infrastructure.
- 126.
Please note that the OARE initiative was launched in October 2006. To account for possible timegaps in the registration process we set the start of the initiative to January 2007 (i.e. for the years 2007 and later the dummy After i takes on the value 1, before the value is 0). In the Appendix we also present an empirical analysis where we account for a longer timegap. Such an assessment may be reasonable as the time between writing and publishing an academic paper is (very) long for some disciplines. However, we will see that this does not change much for the results as presented here.
- 127.
Obviously, as EU memberstates as well as the USA are also members of the OECD, we have to assess their role separately from one another.
- 128.
This is an aspect that will have to be investigated in more detail as the project advances. We will elaborate on the proceedings of our research project in the next section.
- 129.
Interesting in this regard would be to examine the possible effect of HINARI on common health indicators, such as life expectancy.
- 130.
Please note that the matching data—i.e. the list of OA journals—was generated by using the metadata harvesting tool from the DOAJ. See OAI (2008) for more information on the metadata harvesting tool.
- 131.
See Fig. 3.9 Obviously, all three countries belong to the top ten list of most active countries in launching OA journals. See also the website of the DOAJ at http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=byCountry&uiLanguage=en (last accessed on September 1, 2014) for an updated overview.
- 132.
The “synthetic control” method is a very new empirical method to account for problems associated to the common trend assumption in the “DiD”-methodology. See Abadie et al. (2010).
- 133.
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Scheufen, M. (2015). On the Access Principle in Science: A Law and Economics Analysis. In: Copyright Versus Open Access. International Law and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12739-2_4
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