Abstract
Game theory has played a progressively more noticeable and important role in computer science topics, such as artificial intelligence, computer networking, and distributed computing, in recent years. In this paper, we provide a preliminary review of where efforts on this topic have been focused over the past several decades and find that currently, the most remarkable interface between algorithmic game theory and theoretical computer science is the computational complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium.
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Lu, Y., He, Y. (2014). Towards the Computation of a Nash Equilibrium. In: Zeng, Z., Li, Y., King, I. (eds) Advances in Neural Networks – ISNN 2014. ISNN 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8866. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12436-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12436-0_11
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