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Cryptographic Voting — A Gentle Introduction

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Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII (FOSAD 2013, FOSAD 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8604))

Abstract

These lecture notes survey some of the main ideas and techniques used in cryptographic voting systems. The write-up is geared towards readers with little knowledge of cryptography and it focuses on the broad principles that guide the design and analysis of cryptographic systems, especially the need for properly designed security models.

We use a system proposed by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta as starting example to introduce some basic building blocks and desirable security properties. We then slowly build towards a comprehensive description of the Helios voting system, one of the few systems deployed in practice and briefly discuss a few of its security properties.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bristol, UK

    David Bernhard & Bogdan Warinschi

Authors
  1. David Bernhard
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  2. Bogdan Warinschi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Scienze di Base e Fondamenti, University of Urbino "Carlo Bo", Piazza dekka Repubblica 13, 61029, Urbino, Italy

    Alessandro Aldini

  2. Department of Computer Science, Network, Information and Computer Security Laboratory, University of Malaga, Campus de Teatinos s/n, 29071, Malaga, Spain

    Javier Lopez

  3. Istituto di Informatica e Telematica - IIT, Security Group, National Research Council - CNR, Via G. Moruzzi 1, 56124, Pisa, Italy

    Fabio Martinelli

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Bernhard, D., Warinschi, B. (2014). Cryptographic Voting — A Gentle Introduction. In: Aldini, A., Lopez, J., Martinelli, F. (eds) Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII. FOSAD FOSAD 2013 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8604. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10082-1_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10082-1_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-10081-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-10082-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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