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A Static Recognition Mechanism for Indirect Call Based on Static Single Assignment

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Pervasive Computing and the Networked World (ICPCA/SWS 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 8351))

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Abstract

By preventing attacks which exploit stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities, address space layout randomization is an effective way for embedded systems protection. However, ASLR will probably suffer exhaustive attacks because the pertinence is not strong. At present only coarse-grained randomization has been implemented because one of the key bottlenecks for fine-grained randomization is the dependencies between functions cannot be constructed completely due to indirect calls. As a result, we give a static inter-procedural backtracking recognition mechanism in this paper by using intermediate code analysis technologies to identify the destination addresses of indirect callings generated by function pointers.

This work is funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 61373010 and the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China under Grant No. 2011AA01A202.

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Gao, S. et al. (2014). A Static Recognition Mechanism for Indirect Call Based on Static Single Assignment. In: Zu, Q., Vargas-Vera, M., Hu, B. (eds) Pervasive Computing and the Networked World. ICPCA/SWS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8351. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09265-2_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09265-2_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-09264-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-09265-2

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