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Legitimacy and Justice

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Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination

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Abstract

International law can be considered from many viewpoints. The diverse literature on theoretical approaches bears witness to that. Legal positivism is deemed to be too restrictive as it does not take into account the vast amount of actors and instruments introduced in the preceding chapter. Nevertheless, it is still one of the leading theories in international law and even though it has its shortcomings, it wields much influence. I do not seek to disregard legal positivism completely but I consider a complementary approach, which I have found in legitimacy and justice.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Koskenniemi (1990), p. 10. This section considers what could be termed classic positivism. Modern positivism is—to a certain degree—open towards non-state actors under international law. See Ratner and Slaughter (2004), pp. 29–30.

  2. 2.

    Austin (1971), pp. 13–26.

  3. 3.

    Regarding customary international law, this point can be disputed. For more on this discussion see Sect. 3.2.

  4. 4.

    In this I agree with Thomas Franck who speaks of the post-ontological era of international law, where international lawyers no longer need to defend the existence of international law. See Franck (1995), p. 6.

  5. 5.

    Hart (1994), pp. 217–219.

  6. 6.

    Hart (1994), pp. 231–232.

  7. 7.

    See Kelsen (2000), p. 196.

  8. 8.

    Sloss (2005), p. 170.

  9. 9.

    Kelsen (1996), p. 65.

  10. 10.

    Kelsen (2000), p. 1.

  11. 11.

    Evald and Schaumburg-Müller (2004), p. 18.

  12. 12.

    Ratner and Slaughter (2004), p. 5.

  13. 13.

    One of the exceptions is Judge Fouad Ammoun who addresses this in the North Sea Continental Shelf case. His way of getting out of consent and bindingness is simply to distinguish between general CIL and particular CIL; the former not needing special consent while the latter does. See Separate Opinion, 20/02/1969, at para. 31.

  14. 14.

    In 1950, the United Nations had 60 members. By 1970 the number had more than doubled to 127. See United Nations (2010) United Nations Membership. http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml. Accessed 06 May 2014.

  15. 15.

    Franck (1990), pp. 208–246.

  16. 16.

    Franck (1995), ch. 3.

  17. 17.

    Franck (1995), p. 7.

  18. 18.

    Ida (1996), p. 45.

  19. 19.

    Soft-law, bargaining, equity etc. have been challenged to let law evaporate from international law. See Korhonen (1996), p. 482.

  20. 20.

    For the following see Harris (1997), pp. 6–20; Grotius (1996), pp. 34–37; Canning (2003), pp. 108–123.

  21. 21.

    Harris (1997), p. 12; Kelly (2003), pp. 201–202.

  22. 22.

    Grotius (1996), p. 43.

  23. 23.

    Franck (1988, 1990, 1992, 1995).

  24. 24.

    For the introduction of the four factors determinacy, pedigree, coherence and adherence see Franck (1995), pp. 30–46.

  25. 25.

    Franck (1990), pp. 53–54.

  26. 26.

    Klabbers (2006), p. 199.

  27. 27.

    Franck (1988), p. 725. Franck points out that the three concepts of symbolic validation, pedigree and ritual are related though not the same. I do not regard state symbols or rituals to play such an important role in the making of minority rights. Pedigree is of great importance, as the rules must come about in a way acceptable to states as they will ultimately have to implement the rules.

  28. 28.

    For this argument see Slaughter (1995), p. 532. Slaughter speaks of agreements which could or could not be restricted to treaties. I see no reason why this should be the case as the same conditions apply to political agreements.

  29. 29.

    Franck (1988), p. 712.

  30. 30.

    Franck (1995), pp. 16–17.

  31. 31.

    Franck (1995), pp. 18–22.

  32. 32.

    Rawls (1999a), pp. 65–70.

  33. 33.

    Franck (1995), p. 21.

  34. 34.

    Franck (1995), p. 27.

  35. 35.

    Franck (1995), p. 29.

  36. 36.

    Pomerance (1982), pp. 63–115; Moris (1997), p. 204.

  37. 37.

    See Scobbie (2002), Simpson (1996), Tasioulas (2002), and Cullen (2002).

  38. 38.

    These can be defined in terms of loss of image, reputation, economic, confidence or other costs. These costs are different for each state and subject-matter. Some states may be willing to breach a rule where it loses part of its good reputation but gains a large economic advantage while other states would not do this.

  39. 39.

    Tasioulas (2002), p. 995.

  40. 40.

    For a variety of different critiques see Kukathas and Pettit (1990); especially chs. 5 ‘The Libertarian Critique’ and 6 ‘The Communitarian Critique’; Tasioulas (2002); Schwarzenbach (1991); Esheté (1974).

  41. 41.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 9.

  42. 42.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 118.

  43. 43.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 119.

  44. 44.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 120.

  45. 45.

    Rawls introduces conditions for principles: generality, universality, publicity, ordering effect on conflicts and finality. See Rawls (1999a), pp. 113–118.

  46. 46.

    For a detailed discussion of the four stages see Rawls (1999a), pp. 171–176.

  47. 47.

    Rawls (1999a), pp. 7–9.

  48. 48.

    Rawls uses the term well-ordered societies for liberal peoples and so-called decent non-liberal peoples. I do not delve into this distinction and keep only to first category.

  49. 49.

    Rawls (1999a), pp. 172–173.

  50. 50.

    Rawls (1999b), pp. 82–83.

  51. 51.

    See Sect. 2.1.

  52. 52.

    Slaughter (1995), p. 515.

  53. 53.

    Rawls (1999b), pp. 46–47.

  54. 54.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 10.

  55. 55.

    See below.

  56. 56.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 266; Kukathas and Pettit (1990), p. 36.

  57. 57.

    Initially, Rawls proposes the term ‘everyone’s advantage’ instead of ‘least advantaged’. For more on his discussion and how he arrives at the term ‘least advantaged’ see Rawls (1999a), pp. 57–73.

  58. 58.

    For more on the definition of a minority see Chap. 8.

  59. 59.

    See for example art. 2 Treaty on European Union, EU Doc. OJ C 83/13.

  60. 60.

    Rawls (1999a), p. 12.

  61. 61.

    Rawls (1999b), p. 29.

  62. 62.

    For example the German minority has adopted general principles (Leitbild) that the minority institutions observe. Only those persons who can identify with the underlying values and the principles should be associated with the minority. While it is neither possible nor wishful to control each person, the official institutions of the minority portray a certain approach.

  63. 63.

    Passports in Uzbekistan include the rubric ‘ethnicity’. Soviet passports included the ‘fifth line’; information on nationality which identified members of minorities. This has been dropped in Russian passports as the Russian Constitution form 1993 states that everyone has the right to indicate one’s own nationality but one cannot be forced to indicate it. See art. 26 (1) Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm. Accessed 06 May 2014.

  64. 64.

    Cassese (1995), pp. 5–6.

  65. 65.

    Margalit and Raz (1990).

  66. 66.

    Note that external self-determination cannot necessarily be seen as being contrary to the predetermined values of peace and stability. Prolonged conflicts about external self-determination could be a bigger threat to peace and stability of a state than an act of secession.

  67. 67.

    Brutus (1994), pp. xxv-xxvi. See more details on pp. 18–34 and 129–137.

  68. 68.

    Brutus (1994), pp. 130–131.

  69. 69.

    For this argument see Chap. 10.

  70. 70.

    Klabbers (2006).

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  1. Department of Law, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

    Ulrike Barten

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Barten, U. (2015). Legitimacy and Justice. In: Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08876-1_5

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