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Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 288))

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Abstract

A method to detect good approximations of Nash equilibria in Action Graph Games (games represented as graphs) based on evolutionary computation is presented in this paper. This technique can allow to represent, reason and solve symmetric games. A fitness solution based on non-domination for the search in the configuration set of an Action Graph Game is proposed.

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Correspondence to Tudor Dan Mihoc .

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Mihoc, T.D. (2014). A Generative Relation for Nash Equilibria on Symmetric Action Graph Games. In: Tantar, AA., et al. EVOLVE - A Bridge between Probability, Set Oriented Numerics, and Evolutionary Computation V. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 288. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07494-8_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07494-8_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-07493-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-07494-8

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