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La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attack on Opinion and Superstition

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Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy

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Abstract

François de La Mothe Le Vayer (1588–1672) is usually viewed as a major free thinker and libertine, engaged, through his revival of ancient Pyrrhonism, in destroying Christianity. This chapter focuses on his attack on two main enemies of Charron’s Academic skeptical wisdom: opinion and superstition. By showing the extent to which he was a follower of Charron’s and that Academic skepticism also plays an important role in his work, a different La Mothe Le Vayer emerges. Neither a skeptical apologist nor a disguised libertine, La Mothe Le Vayer is presented as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. Like the ancient Academic skeptics, he is portrayed as genuinely believing in the compatibility between his skepticism and religion, in a way similar to Charron’s view. However, by arguing for the compatibility between skepticism and Christianity, his main interest is to eliminate a major obstacle to the acceptance of the Hellenistic philosophy, not at al to use this philosophy in an apology for Christianity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A contemporary and Descartes’s friend, Guez de Balzac, writes in a letter that “Nous le considérons … comme le successeur de Montaigne et de Charron” (Wickelgren 1934, 39). Wickelgren claims (p. 95) that La Mothe Le Vayer was more influenced by Charron than by Montaigne. A similar point is made by Samuel Sorbière, who was a great admirer of Gassendi and Hobbes: “Je loue Dieu … de ce que n’étant pas au-dessus du commun, il m’a néanmoins donné ce bon goût et ce discernement des bons livres qui m’empêche de perdre mon temps à une lecture indifférente de tout ce qui s’imprime. Je loge M. de Balzac dans mon étude immédiatement après Charron et Montaigne, les deux seuls auteurs français que j’égale aux anciens et que je préfère à tous les modernes en ce qui est du bon sens et de la profonde doctrine. M. de la Mothe le Vayer les suit de fort près, et ces quatre Messieurs font presque toute ma bibliothèque française” (cited by Kerviler 1879, 9). For a different view on the relations between Charron and La Mothe Le Vayer, see Giocanti (2001a, 21). Giocanti opposes the views of Montaigne and Charron and places La Mothe Le Vayer in the footsteps of the former, whose skeptical views he radicalizes and from which he derives an ethics of the divertissement.

  2. 2.

    One difference is stylistic: whereas Charron’s work is systematic and plain (he says he uses a “langage brusque et masle,” PTS, 821), La Mothe’s style is erudite and baroque. Another difference is that Charron is much more optimistic than La Mothe about human nature (and man’s capacity to achieve—limited—wisdom and happiness), though Charron emphasized the difficulty to attain them.

  3. 3.

    See the reproduction of the frontispiece in the Introduction. I argued in Chap. 3 that in his Exercitationes Gassendi attacks another enemy of Charron’s wisdom: dogmatic (mainly Aristotelian) science. La Mothe also attacks dogmatic (mainly Aristotelian) science—see, in particular, his dialogue “De l’ignorance louable”—but he strikes more often opinion in general and more incisively superstition.

  4. 4.

    Basically, the project consists in the restriction of skepticism to natural things accessed by human beings’ natural faculties, thus accepting Christian doctrine on the grounds that it is revealed supernaturally by God. The much debated question whether La Mothe’s skepticism is really restricted in this way will be addressed below.

  5. 5.

    See the works published in the volumes 13 and 14 of La Mothe’s Oeuvres (the Billaine edition published in 1669), while La Mothe was still alive. The editor says in the “avertissement” to these volumes that “[t]ous ceux, qui connoissent Monsieur de la Mothe le Vayer savent qu’il suivoit la doctrine de Pyrrhon; mais en même tems tous ceux, qui veulent bien lui rendre justice, conviennent, que son Pyrrhonisme n’a rien que de très raisonnable, & que jamais il n’étend ses doutes sur les articles de Foi, ou sur le moindre objet, qui touche la Réligion.” The project was avowed even in such “official” work as De la Vertu des Payans (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, vol. V, 303), which was probably written at Richelieu’s request to combat the Jansenists.

  6. 6.

    This work was first published under the pseudonym of Tubertus Ocella in 1662 at Paris by T. Jolly.

  7. 7.

    The Tulleries garden is located just besides the Louvre, at the occasion the official residence of the royal family. La Mothe Le Vayer was preceptor of the king’s brother, the Duck d’Anjou.

  8. 8.

    Cicero, De Officiis I.153; De finibus bonorum et malorum II.37; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Physicists I.13.

  9. 9.

    Descartes considered the following title for his Discours: “Le projet d’vne Science vniuerselle qui puisse éleuer nostre nature à son plus haut degré de perfection” (letter to Mersenne, March 1636, AT, I, 339). Gilson points out that the Regulae ad directionem ingenii aims at unifying science and wisdom which the crises of Aristotelianism had broken apart in a reaction to the kind of skeptical wisdom proposed by Montaigne and Charron (Gilson 1947, 93–94). Descartes’s wisdom concerns only knowledge of human things.

  10. 10.

    “[le sage] est citoyen du monde … il se promene par tout comme chés soy, void comme un Soleil, d’un regard égal, ferme, et indiferent, comme d’une haute guette tous les changemens, diversités et vicissitudes des choses, sans se varier, et se tenant tousjours mesmes à soy, qui est une livrée de la divinité, aussi est-ce le haut privilege du sage, qui est l’Image de Dieu en terre” (S, II, 2, 406).

  11. 11.

    I argue in Chap. 5 that the Academic ephetic stance of Charron’s wise man, “fondee premierement sur ces propositions tant celebre entre les Sages. Qu’il n’y a rien de certain, que nous ne sçavons rien, solum certum nihil esse ceti. Hoc unum scio quod nihil scio” (PTS, 839), is transformed by Descartes, thanks to his hyperbolic doubt, into his first principle. In the beginning of the Second Meditation, he claims he will pursue his search for something certain, “vel, si nihil aliud, saltem hoc ipsum pro certo, nihil esse certi, cognoscam. Nihil nisi punctum petebat Archimedes, quod effet firmum & immobile, ut integram terram loco dimoveret” (AT, VII, 24).

  12. 12.

    See also the dialogue “De la Philosophie Sceptique”: “Nous examinons la France, une autre partie de l’Europe, quelque chose de plus esloigné, nous figurans que tout le reste va de mesme, sans jamais faire reflexion sur l’étenduë immense de ce vaste univers … ny faire ouverture aux yeux de nostre esprit de ce beau livre du monde, dont la lecture sert de leçon à la vraye, pure, et essentielle Philosophie. Là nous verrions qu’il n’y a rien de si constant, certain, et arresté en un lieu, dont l’opposite ne soit encores plus opiniastrement tenu ailleurs; et dans la contemplation de cette obstinée varieté, nous ne nous estonnerions plus si un Philosophe interrogé de quelle matiere l’homme luy sembloit estre composé, respondit, d’un amas de disputes et contestations” (DIA, 24). La Mothe’s montaignean/charronian legacy is also found in Descartes (for more details, see Chap. 5). “Et me resoluant de ne chercher plus d’autre science, que celle qui se pourroit trouuer en moymesme, ou bien dans le grand liure du monde, i’employay le reste de ma ieunesse à voyasger, a voir des cours & des armées, a frequenter des gens de diuerses humeurs & conditions, a recueillir diuerses experiences, a m’esprouuer moymesme dans les rencontres que la fortune me proposoit, & partout a faire telle reflexion sur les choses qui se presentoient, que i’en pûsse tirer quelque profit” (AT, VI, 9). “voyant plusieurs choses qui, bien qu’elles nous semblent fort extrauagantes & ridicules, ne laissent pas d’estre communement receuës & approuuées par d’autres grans peuples, i’apprenois a ne rien croyre trop fermement de ce qui ne m’auoit esté persuadé que par l’exemple & par la coustume; et ainsi ie me deliurois peu a peu de beaucoup d’erreurs, qui peuuent offusquer nostre lumiere naturelle” (AT, VI, 10). The difference, as I claim in Chap. 5, is that whereas La Mothe continues on this approach, Descartes uses it only as one of the personal preliminaries for his project of the foundation of a new philosophy that could reunite wisdom and science. For the source in the Essais, see “De l’instituition des enfants”: “A cette cause, le commerce des hommes y est merveilleusement propre, et la visite des pays estrangers … pour en raporter principalement les humeurs de ces nations et leurs façons, et pour frotter et limer nostre cervelle contre celle d’autruy” (E, I, 26, 153). See also, De la Sagesse II, 2. For an erudite comparison of this topic in Sebond, Montaigne, Descartes and La Mothe Le Vayer, see Spallanzani (2007).

  13. 13.

    In the dialogue “De la divinité,” Orasius says that “pource qu’il n’y a rien de plus opposé à nostre heureuse suspension d’esprit que la tyrannique opiniastreté des opinions communes, j’ay tousjours pensé que c’estoit contre ce torrent de la multitude que nous devions employer nos principales forces” (DIA, 304).

  14. 14.

    Besides Wisdom’s motto (“Je ne sçai”), Charron’s motto is also present in “Le banquet sceptique,” where Xenomanes says that “Peu, et Paix” are “les deux choses du monde que j’estime les plus souhaittables” (DIA, 74). Charron’s motto, together with “know yourself,” were inscribed at the oracle at Delphos.

  15. 15.

    According to Pintard (1983, 127–208), the two formed, together with Gabriel Naudé and Elie Diodati, the “tetrad,” a semi-secret group of intellectuals who talked freely about irreligious views. The period of closer and more frequent interaction was, according to Pintard, just before and during the anonymous publication of the two sets of Dialogues. “Là-dessus, il rencontra Gassendi et Naudé, puis se laisse embrigader par eux dans la ‘Tétrade’; et voici que tout d’un coup ce qui n’était en lui que virtualités ou intentions prit forme. Deux volumes, publiés à peu d’intervalle, de Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, donnèrent enfin carrière à sa réflexion si longtemps contenue” (Pintard 1983, 140).

  16. 16.

    Those closer to Le Vayer such as Guez de Balzac knew the real identity of Orasius Tubero (see Kerviler 1879, 90). Scholars have claimed that the pseudonym was easily identifiable (see, for instance, Kerviler 1879, 28). One of the meanings of the Latin tubero is “little mount,” “la mothe” in French. “Orasius” derives from the Greek, meaning the one who regards, in French “le voyer,” very close to “Le Vayer.” Another possible source of the pseudonym is a Roman authority—Lucius Tubero—to whom the founding book of ancient Pyrrhonism was dedicated. Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonian Discourses is no longer extant but a synopsis is given by Photius in which we learn that the book was dedicated to Lucius Tubero who was, according to Brochard (1969, 248) a friend and relative through marriage of Cicero’s and, like Cicero and Aenesidemus before his book, a member of the Academy. By dedicating his book to him, Aenesidemus probably wanted to bring Tubero to his new (re)founded Pyrrhonian school. See Caizzi (1992). Note that “Lucius” belongs to the same Latin semantic field as the Greek “Orasius.”

  17. 17.

    Most philosophical works of La Mothe Le Vayer’s contain “sceptique” in the title: “Discours pour montrer que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences;” “Discours sceptique sur la musique;” “Opuscule ou Petit traité sceptique sur cette commune façon de parler, ‘n’avoir pas le sens commun’;” “Doute sceptique si l’étude des belles lettres est préférable à toute autre occupation;” “Problèmes sceptiques.” “Academiques” in the title of the work “Discours ou Homelies Academiques” means “problematic,” that is, the speeches were written in the neo-Academic skeptical fashion. All these were included in the publication of the works of La Mothe’s during his lifetime.

  18. 18.

    Because this book explores aspects of the Charronian Academic skeptical view of wisdom in the seventeenth century, I focus on this brand of ancient skepticism in examining La Mothe Le Vayer. The Pyrrhonian aspect has been more often studied (see, in particular, Paganini 1997, 2008, 61–100 and Giocanti 2001a). Both scholars indicate the novelties introduced by La Mothe in the skeptical tradition and Giocanti also points out neo-Academic aspects of his skepticism. The relevance of the Academic doctrine of probability in La Mothe’s skepticism has also been examined by Moreau (2007, 537–579), who highlights the dissimilarities and by Capitani (2009, 1–29), who emphasizes similarities without reducing La Mothe’s skepticism to the ancient Academic model.

  19. 19.

    These are the basis of dialectical reasoning which is not apodict as the scientific demonstrative one. See Aristotle, Topics I.1 100a–b.

  20. 20.

    In the English translation by H. Rackham (Loeb edition) of De Finibus: “the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impression” (III.31). La Mothe Le Vayer’s implicit claim that Arcesilaus (and not Pyrrho) was the founder of épochè reveals the skeptic’s acute historical/philological knowledge of the ancient history of skepticism. In fact, according to the available sources, the term was not used by Pyrrho and his follower Timon, but was introduced by Arcesilaus, first head of the New Academy.

  21. 21.

    See the references to Galen in Burnyeat (1982, 27n).

  22. 22.

    Burnyeat calls it “country gentleman’s” skepticism. Barnes (1982) calls it “urbane.”

  23. 23.

    However, as has been argued by Moreau (2007, 537–579) and Loque (2012, 199–247), La Mothe Le Vayer’s inquiry differs from Cicero’s Philonian one of arguing pro and contra to find the more probable opinion. The probability of opinions examined by La Mothe is equipollent, in Pyrrhonian fashion.

  24. 24.

    The first Homélie Académique is “Sur les disputes opiniâtres,” (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, Vol. III, Partie II). The ultimate source (behind Charron) is Montaigne: “l’opinion trouve en moy le terrein mal propre à y penetrer et y pousser de hautes racines” (E, III, 8, 923); “L’affirmation et l’opiniastreté sont signes exprez de bestise” (E, III, 13, 1075).

  25. 25.

    “On le regarde comme le Plutarque de nôtre Siècle, soit pour son érudition qui n’a point de bornes, soit pour sa maniere de raisonner & de dire son sentiment toujours fort éloignée de l’air décisif des Dogmatiques” (Perrault, “Les hommes illustres du dernier siècle,” cited in La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, vol. I, I, 33–34). For Plutarch’s Academic skepticism, see Domini (1986) and Opsomer (1998).

  26. 26.

    Bury (2002) shows that Cicero’s De Natura Deorum is a model with respect to both form and content of La Mothe’s “De la Divinité.” He interprets Cicero’s work as irreligious, an interpretation I dispute below.

  27. 27.

    Cicero, Ac. II.108.

  28. 28.

    Plutarch, Platonic Questions I.1000c.

  29. 29.

    “Bref, si nous possédons ce criterium des Dogmatiques pour la discerner, ou si notre plus haute faculté de juger ne s’étend pas plus loin que le vraisemblable des Sceptiques; de telle sorte que nous ayons bien les instruments pour la chercher; mais non pas ceux qui seraient nécessaires pour la reconnaître … étant bien loin au-dessus de notre Nature, il la faut tenir pour le propre de Dieu Seul” (PTSC, 57–59).

  30. 30.

    See Trabattoni (2005). Plato argues in the Phaedon (66b) that human beings cannot apprehend the essence of ideas because the soul cannot totally abstract from the senses. See also Plato’s Apology 23, which grounds Plutarch’s view of Socrates.

  31. 31.

    Montaigne: “la vraye raison et essentielle … loge dans le sein de Dieu” (E, II, 12, 541). Charron: “la verité … [ne] se laisse … posseder à l’esprit humain. Elle loge dedans le sein de Dieu” (S, I, 14, 138). “La troisiesme partie de ceste liberté et cinquiesme office [in the Short Treatise] de Sagesse … est une surseance et indifference de jugement, par laquelle l’homme considerant tout … froidement et sans passion, ne s’aheurte, ny ne se lie ou oblige à aucune chose, mais se tient libre … et ouverte à tout, toujous prest à recevoir la verité, si elle se presente, adherent cependant au meilleur et plus vray semblable qui luy apparoit tel” (PTS, 838).

  32. 32.

    See Sextus, PH I.62, Montaigne’s “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” and Charron’s chapter in De la Sagesse on presumption (I, 40).

  33. 33.

    La Mothe Le Vayer (1756, IV, 221).

  34. 34.

    This passage sheds light on Descartes’s project. After charging Chandoux with a kind of charlatanism, for he promises the truth but gives only the “vraysemblable,” he moves to Holland (supposedly following Bérulle advise) to establish a new science (or at least a new metaphysics) not limited by the senses. See Maia Neto (2013).

  35. 35.

    See Naya (2009). Maybe unaware of Sextus’ criticism of Academic probability, in the preface to his translation of Sextus’ Adversus Mathematicos, Hervet says that Sextus’ work can be “very effective in stimulating and sharpening intelligence of young people, who only then [after skeptical attack on dogmatists] will be able to distinguish the truth from the probable and likely, thereby extracting the truth that the probable and likely had concealed” (Popkin and Maia Neto 2007, 91).

  36. 36.

    In another Homélie Académique, on ignorance, he also supports Ciceronian probabilism: “nous ne laissons pas de soutenir apres Carneades le Fondateur de cette renommée Academie, que si toutes choses sont incomprehensibles à notre esprit trop limité pour les connoïtre, ce n’est pas à dire, que toutes ces mêmes choses soient absolument incertaines” (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, III, 162–163). For other passages in which La Mothe Le Vayer claims to follow probability, see Moreau (2007) and Loque (2012).

  37. 37.

    Cicero’s following definition of wisdom is cited by La Mothe Le Vayer in the PTSC, 85: “Nervos atque artus esse sapientiae, non temere credere.”

  38. 38.

    Montaigne describes himself and his Essays in similar terms. “Le monde n’est qu’une branloire perenne. Toutes choses y branlent sans cesse: la terre, les rochers du Caucase, les pyramides d’Aegypte … Je ne puis asseurer mon object. Il va trouble et chancelant, d’une yvresse naturelle” (E, III, 2, 804). For a detailed comparison between Montaigne and La Mothe Le Vayer on this issue see Giocanti (2001a).

  39. 39.

    In the Petit Traité, Charron replies to the same charge but, unlike La Mothe, he distinguishes the stability of the Academic from the irresolution of the Pyrrhonian: “Ils objectent que j’enseigne icy une incertitude douteuse et fluctuante, telle que des Pyrrhoniens, laquelle tient l’esprit en grande peine et agitation … Je reponds premierement, qu’il y a difference entre mon dire et l’advis des Pyrrhoniens, bien qu’il en ait l’air et l’odeur, puisque je permets de consentir et adherer à ce qui semble meilleur et plus vray-semblable, tousjours prest et attendant à recevoir mieux s’il se presente. Mais pour venir au poinct, … je soustiens que c’est le vray repos et sejour de nostre esprit … Mais, disent-ils, douter, balancer, surseoir, est ce pas estre en peine? Ouy aux fols, non aux sages” (PTS, 858).

  40. 40.

    La Mothe Le Vayer’s demarche is similar to Descartes’s, with at least three differences: (1) Descartes holds Eudoxe’s negative view of the skeptics; (2) the skeptical arguments are different: those of La Mothe’s are new extensions and adaptations of the ancient tropes whereas those of Descartes’s are hyperbolic and new (though inspired by ancient neo-Academic ones); and as a consequence of (2) and of the metaphysical foundation of the mind/body distinction: (3) Descartes transforms the certainty of épochè into a substance, the res cogitans. (I argue in Chap. 5 that Descartes’s move is a reaction to Charron). See Discours, third part: “Non que i’imitasse pour cela les Sceptiques, qui ne doutent que pour douter, & affectent d’estre tousiours irresolus: car, au contraire, tout mon dessein ne tendoit qu’a m’assurer, & a reietter la terre mouuante & la sable, pour trouuer le roc ou l’argile. Ce qui me reussissoit, ce me semble, assez bien, d’autant que, taschant a descouurir la fausseté ou l’incertitude des propositions que i’examinois, non par de foibles coniectures, mais par des raisonnemens clairs & assurez, ie n’en rencontrois point de si douteuses, que ie n’en tirasse tousiours quelque conclusion assez certaine, quand ce n’eust esté que cela mesme qu’elle ne contenoit rien de certain” (AT, VI, 29). In Descartes’s dialogue Recherche de la vérité, whose similarity to La Mothe’s “De la philosophie sceptique” has been indicated by Popkin (2003, 344n) and Mehl (1999) (besides the similarity of the names of the characters, the common major subject is doubt), Epistemon tells Eudoxe that “[c]es doutes si generaus nous meneroient tout droit dans l’ignorance de Socrate, ou dans l’incertitude des Pirroniens” (AT, X, 512). La Mothe’s Ephestion (not Epistemon) denies precisely this charge raised by Eudoxe.

  41. 41.

    This looks like a rebuttal to the charge raised against Pyrrho that he need the help of (dogmatic) friends to avoid being hit by cars and falling into precipices (Diognes Laertius, Lives IX.62). In Metaphysics IV.15, Aristotle raises the same charge against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction.

  42. 42.

    “Chère Sceptique, douce parure de mon âme, et l’unique port de salut d’un esprit qui aime le repos” (PTSC, 73).

  43. 43.

    “Je conclus ces deux derniers traicts et offices de Sagesse qui sont cousins [namely, to examine everything and to assent to nothing] … Par lesquelles le sage excelle pardessus le commun, se garde de deux escueils contraires, ausquels tombent les fols et populaires, sçavoir testuës opiniastretez, honteuses desdites, repentirs et changemens, et se maintient libre, liberté d’esprit que jamais le sage ne laissera ravir” (PTS, 841).

  44. 44.

    Augustine, C. Ac. III.34–36.

  45. 45.

    In fields where scientia is not possible, Augustine makes a distinction between two kinds of assent: opinare and credere. The first, justly condemned by the neo-Academics as not proper to the wise man, should be avoided. But the second is justified on the grounds that it concerns matters of fact not directly observed about which no certainty is possible and whose ground is authority and confidence in others (the witnesses). See Augustine’s De utilitate credendi and Confessions VI.5. This lies behind Pascal’s criticism of suspension of judgment about the immortality of the soul (about which one cannot have certainty apart from revelation) in the famous “wager argument” (La 418) and his attack on casuistry in Les Provinciales.

  46. 46.

    In H. Hubbell’s translation: “I live from day to day; I say anything that strikes my mind as probable; and so I alone am free” (Tusc disp V.33). La Mothe adds “adoxasticus” in Cicero’s neo-Academic claim, using one of the Pyrrhonian strategies to free the skeptical statements from dogmatism.

  47. 47.

    More on La Mothe on religion bellow.

  48. 48.

    For more on this aspect, see Giocanti (2001a).

  49. 49.

    “Il n’y a point de meilleure escole pour former la vie, que voir incessamment la diversité de tant d’autres vies, et gouter une perpetuelle varieté de formes de nótre nature” (S, III, 14, 696). See also PTS, 864.

  50. 50.

    The fact that the opinionated in the dialogue is a grammarian may come from Montaigne’s “De l’institution des enfants,” see Essais I, 26, 160–161.

  51. 51.

    Charron’s analysis is inspired in Montaigne’s lack of presumption as described in the essay “De la presumption” (II, 17, in particular 654–659).

  52. 52.

    Plato, Theaetetus, 149a.

  53. 53.

    Theaetetus, 150e–151d. The dialogue finishes with Socrates telling Theaetetus that he must go to court to hear the accusation brought against him by Meletus (Theaetetus, 210d).

  54. 54.

    “examining both myself and others is really the very best thing that a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living” (Plato, Apology, 38a).

  55. 55.

    After refuting the best effort of Theaetetus’ to define knowledge, which had been benefited from his previously refuted definitions, Socrates concludes the dialogue: “And so, Theaetetus, if ever in the future you should attempt to conceive or should succeed in conceiving other theories, they will be better ones as the result of this enquiry. And if you remain barren, your companions will find you gentler and less tiresome; you will be modest and not think you know what you don’t know. This is all my art can achieve—nothing more” (Theaetetus, 210c). “According to some authorities the end proposed by the Skeptics is … gentleness” (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, IX.108). Modesty is a recurrent qualification of Charron’s Academical skeptical wisdom, see, for instance, S, I, 43, 292; PTS, 838, 853, 859.

  56. 56.

    In De la Vertu des Payans, defending Socrates against some charges, La Mothe le Vayer says that he would be the last to engage in “colere”: “Un homme qui a le premier protesté, que sa plus certaine science consistoit en la connoissance qu’il avoit, de ne savoir rien de certain, n’étoit pas pour s’opiniâtrer dans une dispute, ni pour se mettre en colere, contre ceux, qui avaient des sentimens contraires aux siens. C’est ce qui fait dire à Ciceron en traitant des passions, qu’il nomme fort proprement des perturbations, que la raison leur doit être comme une médicine Socratique, pour les reduire à la moderation” (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, V, 123). Chapter 2 shows that Socrates—the Pagan of whose salvation La Mothe has most hope—is the main model of Charron’s wise man.

  57. 57.

    Cicero, Tusc disp V.10–11.

  58. 58.

    Assuming that the view of Pyrrho as the founder of Pyrrhonism was a creation of Aenesidemus’, who was a former member of the new Academy from which he broke to recover a genuine skepticism not compromised by the probabilism introduced by Carneades and interpreted epistemically by Philo of Larissa. See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.

  59. 59.

    The private nature of La Mothe Le Vayer’s skepticism has been examined since Pintard (1983). For recent work on this topic, see Bury (2002).

  60. 60.

    Philosophy requires leisure from pragmatic concerns (Theaetetus, 172c–177c).

  61. 61.

    “je n’ay point trouvé de stile plus commode, que celuy de ces conversations honnestes, où chacun découvre familiarement à ses amis ce qu’il a de meilleur en sa pensée, & sous les noms d’Eudoxe, de Poliandre & Epistemon, je suppose qu’un homme de mediocre esprit, mais duquel le jugement n’est perverti par aucune fausse creance, & qui possede toute la raison selon la pureté de sa nature, est visité, en une maison de campagne où il demeure” (AT, X, 498).

  62. 62.

    “[Le pédant] ne se peut tenir qu’il ne soit partisan, encores qu’il s’en puisse garder, et le fera outré, transporté. [Le sage] tant qui s’il peut tient neutre ou moderateur et common, et s’il luy convient estre partisan, il le sera avec moderation, et ne fera jamais le pire qu’il pourra au party contraire. … Si lon vient en dispute et conference, celuy-là procedera fiérement d’une façon Magistrale, avec termes affirmatifs et resolus, condamnant roguement les opinions contraires, comme absurdes, fausses, et ridicules. Cettuy-cy modestement et doucement avec mots douteux et retenus, disent, Je ne sçay, peut estre, il semble. Celuy-là se fonde tout sur l’authorité et dire d’autruy, qu’il allegue avec soigneuse cottation des lieux, pour faire monstre de memoire et grand lecture. Cettuy-cy se range à la raison, au prix de laquelle l’authorité luy est peu. Celuy-là ne regarde qu’à vaincre, soutenir et defendre son opinion, à tort ou à travers, se deffaire de sa partie. Cettuy-cy vise tousjours à la verité, à laquelle il tend les bras et joint les mains si-tost qu’elle luy apparoist. Celuy-là veut este creu” (PTS, 853–854).

  63. 63.

    “Nostre Sextus s’est contenté de quelques observations singulieres, ou en petit nombre; … Or pour vous monstrer combien il est aisé d’adjouster à ces commencemens, et d’augmenter cet admirable ouvrage, attachons-nous à quelqu’une de ses parties; et par exemple, arrestons-nous sur le dixiéme et dernier moyen, qui considere les mœurs, coustumes, et opinions diverses des hommes” (DIA, 29). Sextus’ tenth mode opposes exempla of myths, laws, customs, dogmatic views and life styles: a myth with a myth, a myth with a law, a myth with a custom, and so on in a complete permutation. The point is always the establishment of equipollence (one is no more plausible than its opposition). See Beaude (1982).

  64. 64.

    That the Christian religion is considered in the works of Charron and La Mothe Le Vayer should cause no wonder for they propose, respectively, a skeptical wisdom and a skeptical philosophy to their contemporary Christians.

  65. 65.

    The fideism would be a mask designed to conceal from authorities and vulgar men the irreligious intention of the author displayed indirectly between the lines through irony and fragrant contradictions easily detected by the intelligent reader who has got free from subjection to religion. See Strauss (1952). This view of La Mothe Le Vayer has largely prevailed in the literature. See, among many others, Pintard (1983), Grenier (1949), and more recently: Cavaillé (2002, 141–197), Moreau (2007, 536–579), Gros (2009, 85–105).

  66. 66.

    In “De la divinité,” as in all other dialogues he wrote, La Mother exhibits a vast erudition, citing numerous ancient and modern authors. In “De la divinité,” Cicero’s De natura deorum is cited ten times, Lucretius’ De rerum natura is cited eight times, Sextus’ Against the Physicists, which contains a large section on the nature of gods (M IX.49–194), is cited three times (I mention only the acknowledged citations). For the relevance of De Natura Deorum in “De la divinité,” both in what concerns literary form and content (though in an irreligious interpretation from which I disagree), see Bury (2002).

  67. 67.

    Superstition (superstitionem) is defined by Cicero as “a groundless fear of the gods” but Epicureans, by attempting to destroy it, also destroy “religion, which consists in piously worshipping them” (Nat deo, I.117). By “atheism” here is not meant strictly denial of the existence of god (or the gods) but irreligious views in general, in particular with relation to established religion.

  68. 68.

    For instance, Cavaillé (2002).

  69. 69.

    “But there is no infirmity comprehending such a multitude of errors and emotions, and involving opinions so contradictory, or rather antagonistic, as that of superstition. … We must try, therefore, to escape it in some way which is both safe and expedient, and not be like people who incautiously and blindly run hither and thither to escape from an attack of robbers or wild beasts, or from a fire, and such into trackless places that contain pitfalls and precipices. For thus it is that some persons, in trying to escape superstition, rush into a rough and hardened atheism, thus overleaping true religion which lies between” (Plutarch, Moralia, II.171).

  70. 70.

    “As I said just now, in almost all subjects, but especially in natural philosophy (physicis), I am more ready to say what is not true than what is. Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day’s grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for 2 days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, ‘Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure (obscurior) the matter seems to me’. But Simonides is recorded to have been not only a charming poet but also a man of learning and wisdom in other fields, and I suppose that so many acute and subtle ideas came into his mind that he could not decide which of them was truest, and therefore despaired of truth altogether” (Cicero, Nat deo, I.60).

  71. 71.

    See Cicero, Tusc disp I.23. This Academic skeptical position on religion is not Augustine’s Christianized version who takes advantage of the legend of an esoteric doctrinaire Platonism held by the Academic skeptics to argue that their acceptance of the probable presupposed and pointed to the truth which can be fully apprehended only through grace (Augustine, C Ac III.37–43). See Naya (2009, 23–24) for the relevance of this position in the Renaissance, in particular as an apologetic use of ancient skepticism. La Mothe le Vayer’s position on this issue is more cautious than Augustine’s (see the Petit discours chrétien sur l’immortalité de l’âme in La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, III, 398).

  72. 72.

    The study of which is “le premier office de Sagesse” (Book II, chapter 5).

  73. 73.

    Pride leads to atheism according to the following reasoning: “if I cannot understand the divinity then it does not exist.”

  74. 74.

    Since the main topic of this book is skepticism I do not investigate the possibility of a “deistic” religion shared by Charron and La Mothe le Vayer. For a recent interpretation along these lines, see Magnard (2006, 342–351). I can only say here that if they hold such a religious position it is held after the Academic probable manner, deprived of any pretention that it is the true religious view.

  75. 75.

    Paganini (1997, 22) has noted that rather than establishing equipollence, La Mothe Le Vayer often argues much more against than in favor of a Christian doctrine, therefore making the irreligious view more probable. I think that as the religious accepted views are strongly held, he has to argue more in favor of the contrary one in order to establish equipollence. Excessive doubts (paradoxes) such as those that challenge metaphysical principles “sont utiles aux Sceptiques, comme aux maîtres de musique de prendre un peu plus haut, ou plus bas que le juste ton, pour y ramener ceux qui ont discordé; leurs sentiments nouveaux et étranges ayant le même effet pour nous tirer du courant des maximes de la multitude, dont nous ne pouvons trop nous écarter. … j’ai même quelque soupçon que les plus saines opinions … sont peut-être les plus paradoxiques, bien que la plupart des nous ne les puissent souffrir; non plus que les vues basses une trop éclatante lumière” (PTSC, 97–98). See Williams (2010, 300) for this strategy in ancient Pyrrhonism. Note that some (l’esprit fort) can “suffer” these paradoxical opinions. The goal is Charronian: to liberate the mind from the “tyranny” of vulgar opinions. See Chap. 3, where I examine Gassendi’s Exercitationes paradoxicae along these Charronian lines.

  76. 76.

    That this is the central goal of the dialogue is clear from the fact that it circulated in some seventeenth century editions of the Dialogues faits à l’imitation des anciens under the title “De la diversité des religions” (for instance, an edition published in Liège, by Grégoire Rousselin, in 1673). This alternative title describes the zetetic nucleus of the dialogue, not mentioning the fideist introductory and concluding passages.

  77. 77.

    “There is in fact no subject upon which so much difference of opinion exists, not only among the unlearned but also among educated men; and the views entertained are so various and so discrepant, that, while it is no doubt a possible alternative that none of them is true, it is certainly impossible that more than one should be so” (Nat deo, I.5). See also Sextus, Against the Physicists, after relating the arguments for and against the existence of the gods: “As a result of these the Skeptics’ suspension of judgment is introduced, especially since they are supplemented by the divergency of the views of ordinary folk about the Gods. For different people have different and discordant notions about them, so that neither are all of these notions to be trusted because of their inconsistency, nor some of them because of their equipollence” (M IX, 191–192).

  78. 78.

    “Le Sceptique porte sa consideration, et donne atteinte à tout, mais c’est sans pervertir son goust, et sans s’opiniastrer à rien, demeurant juge indifferent de tant de mets, et de tant de saulces diverses, comme la plus notable personne du convive, au milieu d’une table qu’elle trouve esgalement bien servie par tout” (DIA, 386). See also “Le banquet sceptique,” (DIA, 66 and 105) and “De la divinité,” (DIA, 313). For the relevance of this to La Mothe Le Vayer’s particular kind of skepticism, see Giocanti (1997, 2001a, 603–675).

  79. 79.

    See for instance, Cavaillé (2001).

  80. 80.

    “Ignorance and blindness in regard to the gods divides itself at the very beginning into two streams, of which the one produces in hardened characters, as it were in stubborn soils, atheism, and the other in tender characters, as in moist soils, produces superstition” (Plutarch, On Superst. 164e).

  81. 81.

    In Chap. 6, I examine how Pascal reacts to this view of Charron’s.

  82. 82.

    This view was picked out by Garasse as one of the most irreligious ones in De la Sagesse, whereas the Augustinian Duvergier d’Hauranne, the abbé de Saint-Cyran, one of the leaders of the so called Jansenist movement, took it as orthodox. See Garasse (1625, 398) and Duvergier d’Haurane (1626, 418).

  83. 83.

    Charron. Les Trois Veritez I, chapitre 5 in Charron (1970, vol. II, 11–21).

  84. 84.

    We find in the introduction and conclusion of the dialogue many more references to Paul than we find in Charron, but these are external to the skeptical examination of religion. The main point of these references it to claim that our inability to attain religious truth by our own means indicates the need to submit to revelation. Charron establishes a link between our dual reaction to religion and Christology.

  85. 85.

    Popkin (2003, 85–89). Loque (2012) is thus right when he differentiates Charron’s from La Mothe Le Vayer’s skeptical fideism, for the first is not strictly a fideist since he claims in Les Trois Verités that Christianity is more probable (in the Philonian Academic fashion) than the other religions and in De la Sagesse he does relate the strictly skeptical view of divinity to Christian doctrine. To the extent that La Mothe does not argue in the sense of making Christianity more probable, his fideism is blind.

  86. 86.

    La Mothe condemns Pyrrho in De la Vertu des Payans because he accepted religion only out of tradition, as an appearance, i.e., without taking it as true. For the relevance of his judgment of Pyrrho for the irreligious nature of skepticism, see Paganini (2008, 88–100) and the discussion at the end of this chapter.

  87. 87.

    Orasius cites this passage in DIA, 338.

  88. 88.

    Authority is grounded ultimately on God, mediately on the Apostles who wrote the Gospels and immediately on the Christian common people—such as Augustine’s mother who educated him. See Augustine, De utilitate credendi and Confessions, VI.5.

  89. 89.

    Orasius doubts that the Emperor of Moscow converted to Christianity because he sent messengers to report on every available religion. “Car ce n’est pas, à mon advis, l’abondance de connoissance, mais bien celle de la grace divine, qui nous peut rendre icy clairvoyans” (DIA, 347).

  90. 90.

    The Petit discours chrétien sur l’immortalité de l’âme is an exception, see note 92 below.

  91. 91.

    Renaissance and early modern skeptics (Montaigne, Charron, La Mothe Le Vayer) recognize religion and politics as the proper place of authority. So does Descartes (AT, VI, 13–15, 22–23) and Pascal (see the “Preface to the Treatise on the Vacuum”).

  92. 92.

    The Petit discours chrétien sur l’immortalité de l’âme (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, Vol. III, Partie I, 387–182) is La Mothe Le Vayer’s sole attempt in Christian apologetics. Although the author’s skepticism is never avowed in this work, important traces of it are the following: (1) the long first section of the work consists in showing that, in particular on the subject of the immortality of the soul, Aristotelian philosophy is of no help in Christian apologetics; (2) he claims that the specific feature of his apology is its modesty, recognizing that reason has a secondary role—and mainly negative (to eliminate errors—p. 394), that one must submit to the doctrine of immortality as one submits to the revealed mysteries that are above reason (trinity, original sin, etc.)—p. 397; (3) although he claims that his arguments in favor of immortality are demonstrative, they are not absolutely certain because its premises are not self-evident, that is to say, they are only probable arguments (unlike Descartes’s in favor of the immateriality of the soul), which explains their elevated number (probability may be thereby increased and some may be persuaded by one argument, others by other, and so on).

  93. 93.

    La Mothe’s apology for skepticism includes the claim of its superiority vis-à-vis the other ancient philosophies. Ephestion says (DIA, 61) that the “Lycée Peripatetique” is good for those who look for wealth, the Portic for those ambitious, the Garden for those attached to “volupté” (if Epicurus was not calumniated). Note that the apology requires indicating the merits of skepticism vis-à-vis the other ancient philosophies.

  94. 94.

    Of course one can argue that his skeptical treatment of religion leads to irreligious and atheistic views.

  95. 95.

    Paganini (2008, 92) notes that a skeptic cannot be strictly an atheist but argues for the insincerity of La Mothe’s professed fideism. Se also Cavaillé (2002, 182): “le scepticisme de Le Vayer … doit être compris dans le cadre d’une pensée de la dis/simulation. … moins comme une fin que comme un moyen, un dispositif doctrinal propice à la dissimulation libertine, une arme du soupçon et de la défiance malveillante; moins une méthode conduisant à la suspension du jugement et à l’ataraxie, qu’un instrument critique de dépréciation et d’appréciation, qui crée et entretient le trouble.”

  96. 96.

    This is the dramatic context of “De la divinité,” for Orantes says in the beginning that the incompatibility of skepticism with the Christian religion is the major obstacle to his acceptance of the former (DIA, 305). At the end, persuaded by Orasius, he believes in the incompatibility of dogmatic philosophy with Christianity (DIA, 348–350).

  97. 97.

    The expression comes from Saint Gregory of Nyssa and is applied to the Christian skeptics in La Vertu des Payans: “Car comme a très bien observé Saint Grégoire de Nysse il n’y a pas une de toutes les Philosophies seculieres, où il ne se trouve quelque chose de charnel, & qui est comme un prepuce qu’on est obligé de couper, afin que le corps de chacune demeure purifié, par le moien de cette circoncision spirituelle” (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, Vol. V, 146–147).

  98. 98.

    Loque (2012, 230–247) argues that La Mothe Le Vayer in the “Dialogue sur la Divinité” on the question of the relation between skepticism and Christianity holds the compatibility thesis and the propaedeutic thesis but fails to establish the latter.

  99. 99.

    See Chap. 3, note 35, for secondary literature on Gassendi’s reception of Epicureanism.

  100. 100.

    “Et puisque la Sceptique Chrétienne ne lui (to the Divine Law) est pas moins soumise, que toutes les autres Sectes, que nous avons déja catechisées, ses doutes seront d’autant moins à craindre, qu’étant encore Païenne, elle ne laissoit pas de déferer aux constituitions & aux coutumes de son siècle. Voilà ce qui m’a donné des pensées si favorables pour une Philosophie, que je ne crois pas plus criminelle, que les autres, pourvû qu’on lui fasse rendre les respects, qu’elles doivent toutes à notre sainte Théologie, & comme une suivante seulement, elle soit appellée avec les autres au service de cette divine maitresse” (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, V, 309).

  101. 101.

    Of course such “circuncizitation” may become problematic depending on the centrality of the doctrine circumcised in the pagan philosophy in question.

  102. 102.

    “Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of ‘unperturbedness’ or quietude” (Sextus, PH I.8).

  103. 103.

    See Burnyeat (1982, 1984).

  104. 104.

    Paganini (1997) claims that La Mothe Le Vayer’s dynamics of doubt is irreligious but notes that he is aware of this fact, removing Christianity from its scope. He holds that this “insulation” (it is my term) of Christianity cannot be disregarded by the libertine interpretation but nor can the irreligious dynamics be dismissed by the “fideist” or “sincere Christian” interpretation. In his more recent book (2008, 61–100), Paganini develops further this tension, pointing out the difficulty—even impossibility—of restraining the “dynamisis antithetique” in this way and brings out evidence that atheism was already a leaving option at the time. All this, according to him, suggests that, despite what he claims, La Mothe Le Vayer is ultimately working against Christianity.

  105. 105.

    Hervet’s preface is published in English in Popkin and Maia Neto (2007, 90–91). But note that the two main utilities of Sextus’ works according to Hervet, namely, an intellectual weapon against the Reformers and the provision of a way of discerning the most probable, thus approaching the religious truth (something not contemplated at all in Sextus’ work), are not among the utilities of skepticism in its recovery by La Mothe Le Vayer.

  106. 106.

    He has no hope for the salvation of the ancient skeptics, not because they were atheists (they were not). “Mais outre qu’ils ne se sont jamais determinés à reconnoitre une cause premiere, qui leur fit mépriser l’Idolâtre de leur tems; il est certain, qu’ils n’ont rien crû de la Nature Divine, qu’avec suspension d’esprit … & pour s’accommoder seulement aux loix & aux coutumes de leur Siécle, & du païs, où ils vivoient. Par consequent, puisqu’ils n’ont pas eu la moindre lumiere de cette foi implicite, sur laquelle nous avons fondé l’esperance du salut de quelques Païens, qui l’ont possedée conjointement avec une grace extraordinaire du Ciel, je ne vois nulle apparence de croire qu’aucun Sceptique ou Pyrrhonien de cette trempe ai pû éviter le chemin de l’Enfer” (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, V, 300–301). The qualification “de cette trempe” leaves no doubt: the lack of hope does not apply to the Christian skeptic who has explicit Christian faith. Note that in more than one place, for instance in his Homilies Académiques (La Mothe Le Vayer 1756, III, 12), Le Vayer distinguishes two kinds of skeptics (the Ephetic and the Christian skeptic). Orasius and the others characters of his dialogues are Christian skeptics.

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  1. Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil

    José R. Maia Neto

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Neto, J.R.M. (2014). La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attack on Opinion and Superstition. In: Academic Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century French Philosophy. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 215. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07359-0_4

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