Abstract
K. J. Arrow is one of the few economists to attempt to apply categories which are a primary component of other sciences to the field of economics. In a relatively unknown essay from 1979, he analyses the potential for introducing the category “communication” (The following sentences, numbered 1–17 are continuous text in Arrow (Rational discourse and conflicts in value & ‘judgement’. In: Betz HK (ed) Recent approaches to social sciences. The University of Calgary, Calgary, pp. 3–16, 1979), p. 10f. The subdivision is the author’s own (B.P.)). The experiment was, in a certain way, a failure. However, this is of less significance than are his methodological conclusions. In the following pages Arrow’s text is discussed and commented upon, section by section (Arrow’s text is continuous; the structuring is the author’s own).
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Notes
- 1.
The following sentences, numbered 1–17 are continuous text in Arrow (1979), p. 10f. The subdivision is the author’s own (B.P.).
- 2.
Arrow’s text is continuous; the structuring is the author’s own.
- 3.
This is implied hermeneutics which is not explained. On ‘communication of belief’ in equilibrium-theory see Bettzüge and Hens (2000), 21 pp.
- 4.
By analogy with ‘framing’ theories cp. Weiß (1998).
- 5.
On contingency in economics cp. Fulda et al. (1998).
- 6.
In Bettzüge and Hens (2000) (as an example for actual reasoning of communication within an Arrow-Debreu-model) ‘communication of beliefs’ (21 pp.) is used in the same mode as Arrow’s idea of the ‘convergence of beliefs’: “Generally speaking, agent’s beliefs will become more homogeneous the more the communication graphs are connected” (24p.). Communication is introduced for looking for ways “of obtaining homogeneous beliefs” (26p.) of the agents, i.e. by modelling “communication by some iterative process along which agents update their beliefs” (26p.), with the result, under certain restrictive conditions, “then all agents’ beliefs converge to the same belief” (27p.). It is absolutely correct to construct these theories, but we have to be aware of the restricted communicational mode. It seems to be useful to call this Arrowian idea of introducing communication into economics a ‘theory of communicational convergency’. Economic theories of ‘communicational convergence’ are interested in communication only by identifying stable cores of coherent beliefs of the agent’s. When communication has reached this goal, is becomes a disturbing dimension, economics is systematically interested to eliminate. It is an idea of something like ‘communication under control’. To define efficient financial innovations as a coordination problem which can be solved by introduction communication (31p., with regard of Citanna and Villanacci 1996), uses communication as a coordination-technique. But it is not a kind of definition: communication is communication, with its own results, irritations and disturbances. To introduce communication is to introduce communication as a coordinative/discoordinative-ambuguity.
- 7.
- 8.
On the introduction of ‘beliefs’ in (Bayesian) ‛rational choice’, cp. Schmidt (1995).
- 9.
- 10.
Perception works with signals (signals as information – a semiotic dimension); now we are turning to semantics (meaningful proposition).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
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Priddat, B.P. (2014). Communication of the Constraints on Action K. J. Arrow on Communication. In: Communication and Economic Theory. Ethical Economy, vol 47. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06901-2_4
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