Abstract
In this chapter, I will suggest (i) that Kevin Mulligan has given a powerful analysis which suggests that the descriptive account of perception is incomplete: We perceive not only properties of objects but objects themselves, (ii) that problems for descriptive theories and the solutions identified by philosophers such as Mulligan (following, among others, Husserl; see Mulligan and Smith, Grazer Philos Stud 28:133–163, 1986; Mulligan, West Ont Ser Philos Sci 62:163–194, 1999) are the basis for contemporary cognitive theories of object tracking, (iii) that theories of object tracking help explain the phenomenology of delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS). DMS are best explained on the assumption that we perceive objects, not just their properties. The objects in question are selves. The claim defended here is that when we see a familiar face we see a particular person, not merely an assembly of facial features from which we infer the identity of their owner. The way in which we see that person is the same way in which we see an object in virtue of its perceptual appearance.
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Notes
- 1.
It is not necessary to this descriptive view that representations produced by feature detecting systems are linguistic. Properties might be represented simply by covariation with internal properties of the feature-detecting system. The important point is that the covariation tracks changes in properties not individuals.
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Gerrans, P. (2014). Singular Thoughts, Seeing Doubles and Delusional Misidentification. In: Reboul, A. (eds) Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_16
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