Abstract
In this paper, I present a new “taxonomy of functions” that reviews the different theories on functional explanations which can be found in the current debate in philosophy of biology. I begin by presenting a critical survey of the classical ways of interpreting the notion of function (the “causal-role” and the “evolutionary” approaches) under the light of the current theoretical proposals. I then analyze the major novelty in the philosophical discussion on functions: the Organizational Approach. According to organizational theories, a function is a disposition of a particular current biological trait that has explanatory relevance with regard to the presence of the function-bearing trait. The organizational account claims that a functional effect can be understood as a “condition of existence” of that very trait (without appealing to evolutionary history) to the extent that it is a necessary condition for the process of biological self-maintenance of the organism.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
According to the classical definition based on the Simple Conditional Analysis, an item is disposed to do something in given circumstances if and only if this item would do that very same thing in the cases that these circumstances are present. So, for instance and following the canonical example proposed by Carnap: “x is soluble iff, when x is put into water, it dissolves”. In this paper I claim that functions are dispositions in this sense. A trait T has a biological function F if and only if T has the disposition to perform F, or in other words, F is a function of T iff, given the “appropriate circumstances”, T effectively performs F. Of course, a theory of functions should clarify what are the “appropriate circumstances” because, in the absence of a developed theory, a biological trait has a potentially undetermined list of potential effects or dispositions that can be interpreted as functions.
- 3.
In a recent work, P.S. Davies defends that the act of considering functional ascriptions as teleological and normative corresponds to a “conceptual conservationism”, with psychological and cultural roots, which should be avoided to build proper, objective knowledge (Davies 2009).
- 4.
Cummins’ analysis can be understood as an epistemological proposal: a functional analysis is interesting when the analyzed system has a remarkable organizational complexity. Thus, Cummins specifies three necessary conditions for this functional analysis:
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(a)
The analyzing capacities are “less sophisticated” than the analyzed capacity;
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(b)
The analyzing capacities are “different in type” from the analyzed capacity;
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(c)
The analyzing capacities exhibit a “complex organisation” such that together they explain the emergence of the analyzed capacity (Cummins 1975, p. 759)
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(a)
- 5.
To avoid this problem, many evolutionary theories specify that this selection has to occur in a period which is relevant for the current activity of the trait. Theorists such as Godfrey-Smith (1994), Griffiths (1993) and Schwartz (1999) have introduce new temporal restrictions to the SET. The so-called Modern History Theories consider that only recent history is relevant for functional ascriptions. According to this approach, the function of a trait is the effect that has caused this trait to be selected in the most recent period of time. Thus, it does not matter that bones had a metabolic function during a certain evolutionary period, because the reason for the current presence of bones is that they support the body, and that is now their proper function.
This kind of theory is able to account for the cases of exaptations, and includes the contribution to the fitness of the system as a condition to consider a concrete effect as a function. However, even when restricting the period of time, many of the objections for SET, such as their inability to address the origin of functional behaviors or the emergence of functional diversity in biological systems, are not satisfactorily answered.
- 6.
See Saborido et al. (2011) for an organizational answer to the challenge of the ascriptions of biological functions to cross-generation traits.
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Acknowledgement
The author wish to thank Alba Amilburu, Susana Monsó, Christian Sachse and Marcel Weber for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper. The work was funded by UNED (“Proyectos de Investigación propia 2013”).
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Saborido, C. (2014). New Directions in the Philosophy of Biology: A New Taxonomy of Functions. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_16
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