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Confessions of a Complexity Skeptic

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Abstract

Three objections to Max Urchs’s paper on complexity are discussed. First, Urchs’s macroeconomic illustrations of the benefits of complexity thinking are open to more conventional interpretations. Second, Urchs formulates a thesis concerning the relationship between science and society which is untenable if taken as a historical claim and insufficiently developed if taken as a metaphor. Third, methodological problems in history and philosophy of science plague Urchs’s discussion of neuroscience.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Unlike Urchs, however, I would strongly caution against a definition of complexity in which subjective psychological experiences such as surprise play a role.

  2. 2.

    Urchs also gives us quotations from Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1973b), and I have no comments to make about these. I agree that it would be worthwhile to read the Treatise on Probability from the point of view of complexity.

  3. 3.

    Proponents of austerity would not, however, deny the savings/investment equality. Instead, they might argue that government investment in the present would increase interest rates and so “crowd out” private sector investment. Or they might argue that increased government spending would be taken as a sign of higher government deficits in the future. This in turn would lead to an expectation of higher future corporate taxes, which would again induce companies in the present to reduce investment.

  4. 4.

    This is not a rejection of neuroeconomics (for a discussion, see Mäki 2010). My rather more modest argument is that the neurosciences may not be needed in the particular case discussed by Urchs.

  5. 5.

    See for instance Chaps. 10 and 11 in the textbook by N. Gregory Mankiw (2002), and for a brief blog-sized overview see Paul Krugman (2011).

  6. 6.

    But see also Mankiw’s discussion of the liquidity trap in his pre-crisis textbook (Mankiw 2002), Chap. 11.

  7. 7.

    Another worrisome note is offered by a reviewer of Mitchell’s book. Kristin Shrader-Frechette (2012) points out that some of Mitchell’s phrases such as “flexible management”, “continued investigation” and “learn by doing” can be weaponized by Washington lobbyists to mean toothless regulation, delayed action and science-blindness.

References

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Correspondence to Raphael Scholl .

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Scholl, R. (2014). Confessions of a Complexity Skeptic. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_15

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