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Epistemic Considerations on Expert Disagreement, Normative Justification, and Inconsistency Regarding Multi-criteria Decision Making

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Constraint Programming and Decision Making

Part of the book series: Studies in Computational Intelligence ((SCI,volume 539))

Abstract

This paper discusses some epistemic aspects of legitimate expert disagreement between domain scientists, while considering domain specific multi-criteria decision-making problems. Particularly, it articulates both 1) the problem of the normative justification for explaining conflicting expert propositional knowledge, and also 2) the handling of disagreement derived from non-conclusive evidence, standing-in as descriptive properties of expert beliefs. Further, 3) it considers some preliminary consequences of the resulting inconsistency in the automation of conflicting expert multi-criteria decision making, and suggests that the epistemic treatment of this procedure may help to clarify what types of solution and difficulties may be there regarding the many dimensions of knowledge justification.

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Correspondence to Luciana Garbayo .

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Garbayo, L. (2014). Epistemic Considerations on Expert Disagreement, Normative Justification, and Inconsistency Regarding Multi-criteria Decision Making. In: Ceberio, M., Kreinovich, V. (eds) Constraint Programming and Decision Making. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 539. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04280-0_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04280-0_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-04279-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-04280-0

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