2) Treatment of Impossibility in German Law

Aksoy, Hüseyin Can

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-01704-4_2

Hüseyin Can Aksoy²

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Abstract

In 2002, Germany reformed its law of obligations (Schuldrechtsreform) and amended the German Civil Code (BGB) dated 1 January 1900. The 2002 amendments, which are considered the most important reform of the BGB since its enactment, have dramatically changed German law. One of the most significant changes is in the field of impossibility. In fact, German lawmakers have almost rewritten the impossibility regime of the law. Within this scope, both the distinctions based on types of impossibility and the results of impossibility of performance have been amended.

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Notes

1.
Zimmermann, Breach of Contract, p. 2.
2.
In 1999, the EC enacted three Directives, which were required to be transposed into German law. These were: the Consumer Sales Directive No. 1999/44/EC; the E-Commerce Directive No. 2000/31/EC and Late Payment Directive No. 2000/35/EC. The German legislator accepted such transposition as a chance to improve the reform proposal of 1992 in accordance with the Directives. The result was the Government Draft (Regierungsentwurf) of an Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations of May 9, 2001, which was approved by the German Parliament in July in its first reading. For a historical background of the reform, see Schlechtriem, German Act, p. 1 ff.
3.
Zimmermann, Breach of Contract, p. 2.
4.
Schulte-Nölke, p. 1; Zimmermann, Breach of Contract, p. 1.
5.
For a study on the problematic aspects of the reform of the German law of obligations, see Lorenz, NJW 2005, 1889, 1889 ff.
6.
The amendments include a reform of the provisions regarding impossibility of performance as well.
7.
Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 40. According to Huber, the concept of “Pflichtverletzung” is identical to the term “non-performance” (which is recognized by the Unification Instruments). Author argues that the concept of non-performance is not appropriate for use in German law, since BGB has accepted fault-liability system. Huber, ZIP 2000, 2273, 2278 ff. For a critique of the term “Pflichtverletzung” and also “Nichterfüllung” (non-performance) as an alternative term, see Schwingenheuer, p. 44; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 42 II, Nr. 361. For the conceptual difference between the terms, see Berghoff, p. 19 ff.
8.
Brunner, p. 81; Schlechtriem, German Act, p. 1 ff.
9.
For a detailed description of the changes brought by the reform, see, Mathias, TLR 2009, 877, 877 ff.; Löwisch, RLR 2003, 157, 157 ff.; Krajewski, EBLR 2003, 201, 201 ff.; Lorenz, ELR 1997, 317, 317 ff.
10.
Lorenz, ELR 1997, 317, 318; Huber, ZIP 2000, 2137, 2139.
11.
The logic behind the voidness of contracts due to initial impossibility was that in such cases the law assumed that the parties have made a mistake regarding ability to perform; hence the contract is not in uniformity with their free wills. In other words, parties would not conclude the contract should they be aware of the impossibility. Mitzkait, p. 210; Huber, Leistungsstörungen I, § 4 IV 2, p. 122, fn. 91. However, the former BGB did not limit voidness of the contract to the cases of mistake on initial impossibility. In other words, initial impossibility caused voidness of the contract regardless of the knowledge of the parties on the existence of initial impossibility at the time of contract formation. Mitzkait, p. 210. As a result, the distinction of initial and subsequent impossibility was highly criticized in the former BGB.
12.
Lorenz, ELR 1997, 317, 327; Schwingenheuer, p. 43; Kaiser, ZfBR 2001, 147, 148. According to Mitzkait, in cases of impossibility § 275 BGB eliminates the debtor’s duty to perform regardless of his responsibility for impossibility. Therefore, once such duty is eliminated, it is a contradiction to base the creditor’s compensation claim to a breach of duty. Mitzkait, p. 249 ff.
13.
Canaris argues that in the new BGB, the significance of the concept of impossibility has rather increased as an exemption from the obligation to perform the primary claim, but it has decreased as regard to claim for damages. Canaris, Schuldrechtsmodernisierung, p. XIII.
14.
However, impossibility in technical and traditional sense falls under § 275/I BGB. Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 6, Nr. 402. In fact, the term “impossible” is only used in the first paragraph of the provision.
15.
For the English translation of § 275 BGB, see <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/>.
16.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 32.
17.
Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 129, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>. The term impossibility under § 275 I BGB corresponds to the cases termed as “echte Unmöglichkeit” or “wirkliche Unmöglichkeit”. Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 3; Fehre, p. 22; Vogt, p. 29; Blank, p. 47; Jousssen, Nr. 351; Wagner, p. 97; Dörner/Staudinger, p. 32; Looschelders, Nr. 456; Schimmel/Buhlmann, p. 240.
18.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 2; Gauch/Schluep, Band I, Nr. 632.
19.
“Legal impossibility occurs, when performance cannot be provided due to legal reasons.” MMR 2012, 89, 91. For the differences between logical and legal impossibility, see Berckemeyer, p. 8 ff.
20.
Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 309; Vogt, p. 31; Medicus, Nr. 367; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 42 III 2, Nr. 369; Mitzkait, p. 45; Blank, p. 47; Jousssen, Nr. 358; Dörner/Staudinger, p. 32.
21.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 18–19; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 2, Nr. 393; Koller, § 53, Nr. 14; Hirse, in: Tonner/Willingmann/Tamm, § 275, Rdnr. 26. For a detailed explanation on accomplishment and destruction of purpose, see, Beuthien, p. 1 ff. On the concept of destruction of purpose, also see Quass, p. 1 ff. on the accomplishment of purpose, also see Sarrazin, p. 1 ff.
22.
Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 309; Looschelders, Nr. 459; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 2, Nr. 393; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 18; Maile-Zinser, p. 16. The notion of performance under § 275 is not the act of performance, but the result of performance. In other words, if the performance would not yield any results, there exists impossibility even if the debtor can act to perform. BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 41. However, such cases must be separated from frustration of purpose (Zweckstörung), where there is an impossibility of use (Verwendungsunmöglichkeit), since the creditor has no interest in performance as he cannot use the performance as intended. In fact, in cases where the impossibility of use occurs, the performance is still possible, despite being useless for the creditor. For instance, if a bride breaks up with the groom a short time before the wedding and the wedding gown that she ordered becomes useless, there is impossibility of use. Koller, § 53, Nr. 15; Looschelders, Nr. 460; Hütte/Helbron, Nr. 384; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 160. For detailed information on frustration of purpose, see Köhler, p. 17 ff.
23.
Former § 275/I BGB required debtor not be responsible for the occurrence of impossibility, otherwise he would not be released from his obligation to perform. Such provision was based on the Roman understanding that each obligation has a duplicate content: One party owes the primary claim and the other owes to make payment. Accordingly, it was argued that the debtor who is responsible for impossibility must not be relieved from his obligation to perform, otherwise the legal ground for the monetary compensation would disappear as well. Therefore the former § 275 I BGB accepted that the debtor’s obligation to perform would be extinguished only if he was not responsible for impossibility. In such case, the creditor would not ask for compensation instead, and therefore no legal ground would be necessary for compensation claim. However, if the debtor was responsible for impossibility, he would still be under the obligation to perform and this would enable the monetary compensation claim of the creditor. Fehre, p. 30.
24.
Fehre, p. 22; Blank, p. 47; Kötz, Nr. 789; Dauner/Lieb, in: Dauner-Lieb/Heidel/Lepa/Ring, Schuldrecht, § 275, Rdnr. 4; Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 44; Brunner, p. 82; Kollmann, Nr. 172; Vogt, p. 29; Lutz, p. 8; Medicus, Nr. 378; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 1, Nr. 390–391; Finn, p. 130; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 8; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 5; Schlechtriem/Schmidt-Kessel, Nr. 474; Knütel, JR 2001, 353, 353 ff. Zimmer, NJW 2002, 1, 2; Dörner/Staudinger, p. 31; Schmidt-Räntsch, Nr. 275–277.
25.
Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 9; Fehre, p. 25; Mitzkait, p. 39; Palandt/Grüneberg, BGB, § 275 Rdnr. 4; Jousssen, Nr. 362.
26.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 500; Schwingenheuer, p. 40; Finn, p. 132; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 5; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 128, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
27.
The former § 275 II BGB contained the same provision as well. However, the former distinction between subjective and objective impossibility was caused by the provision of the former § 306 BGB, which was applicable to objective impossibility only. Fehre, p. 23.
28.
Huber, Leistungsstörungen I, § 3I3a, p. 69. Also see, Wilhelm/Deeg, JZ 2001, 223, 226 ff.; Zimmer, NJW 2002, 1, 2.
29.
Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 129, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
30.
For instance, see OLG Brandenburg, Urteil v. 31.07.2008 5 U 107/07 - JurionRS: “It is not necessary that the debtor, alone, cannot currently make dispositions on the subject of the obligation, in order to accept impossibility in terms of § 275 paragraph 1 BGB. It must be certain that the debtor can no longer obtain disposition on the subject of the obligation, in the future as well. The impediment must be almost insurmountable for the debtor. This can happen, for instance, in the case where the third party has definitely refused to participate in the performance.”
31.
Finn, p. 141; Zimmer, NJW 2002, 1, 2; Mitzkait, p. 47; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 52; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 69; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 23.
32.
Finn, p. 140; Fehre, p. 24.
33.
Fehre, p. 24. “If the debtor gives the promised object to a third party, the performance is not automatically impossible for the debtor due to the fact that he cannot dispose on the object anymore and has no right of claim for it. However, if it is determined that the debtor cannot get his power of disposal back and cannot satisfy the claim raised for the object, impossibility occurs. As long as there is a possibility that third party grants the debtor the power of disposal again or consents to disposal, the inability for the debtor is not definite.” MDR 2006, 79, 80.
34.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 51. However, such cases may lead to practical impossibility which is dealt with under § 275 II BGB. Fehre, p. 23; Barta, p. 14; Zimmer, NJW 2002, 1, 2. For a study on impossibility in obligation in kind, see Rohde, p. 1 ff.
35.
According to Ernst, the debtor would be released from his primary obligation if the third party is regarded as absolutely untraceable. However, if there is reasonable possibility for reaching the third party, no such release would take place. In such cases, § 275 II BGB may apply, if there is gross disproportion between the expenses to be made by the debtor to trace the third party and the interest of the creditor. MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 52.
36.
Fehre, p. 24; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 7; Finn, p. 141; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 42.
37.
Mitzkait, p. 47.
38.
Finn, p. 143.
39.
IBR 2009, 388, 388; Finn, p. 141; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 72; Dedek, in: Henssler/Graf von Westphalen, § 276, Rdnr. 12; Willingmann/Hirse in: Kohte/Micklitz/Rott/Tonner/Willingmann, § 276, Rdnr. 14.
40.
Kötz, Nr. 797; Lorenz/Riehm, Nr. 315. For a study on impossibility regarding monetary obligations see, Ahrens, p. 1 ff.
41.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 32; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 48; Jauernig, § 275, Rdnr. 7; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 127. For studies on the partial impossibility, see Marquardt, p. 1 ff. Kaplan, p. 1 ff. For a study on initial partial impossibility during the former BGB, see Kaplan, Ürsprüngliche, p. 1 ff.
42.
BGHZ 116, 334, 337.
43.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 32; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 48; Jauernig, § 275, Rdnr. 7; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 123–124; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 7; Schwab/Löhnig, Nr. 888; Schwarze, § 4, Nr. 32.
44.
For detailed analysis on temporary impossibility in German law, see Canaris, Die einstweilige Unmöglichkeit, p. 144 ff.; Kuhlmann/Nauen, p. 31 ff.; Schmidt, p. 13 ff.; Scheer, p. 1 ff.; Lenczyk, p. 1 ff.; Scheller, p. 1 ff. For the distinction between default and temporary impossibility, see Stelzer, p. 1 ff.; Stipanski, p. 29 ff.
45.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 16. According to Canaris, the phrase “to the extent that” (soweit) covers temporary impossibility, in addition to partial impossibility. According to the author, any confusions regarding the scope of the provision could be avoided by inclusion of the phrase “as long as” (solange) in addition to the phrase “to the extent that” (soweit). Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 500, fn. 19.
46.
BGHZ 174, 61, 65.
47.
Kaiser, Zeitweilige, p. 143.
48.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 42 III 2, Nr. 377; Finn, p. 148. “Namely a temporary impossibility is equal to the permanent impossibility, if it challenges the attainability of the purpose of the transaction and the other party’s adherence to the contract cannot be expected until the abolition of the obstacle to the performance.” NJW 2005, 989, 990. Similarly, see MMR 2012, 89, 91.
49.
Mitzkait, p. 45; Kötz, Nr. 802; Rödl, p. 35; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 24; PWW/Schmidt-Kessel, § 275, Rdnr. 6; Kuhlmann/Nauen, p. 48; Klausch, p. 183; MüKo/Emmerich, § 275, Rdnr. 46; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 34; Jauernig, § 275, Rdnr. 14; Däubler, p. 57; Westermann/Bydlinski/Weber, § 7 II 2, Rdnr. 7/8; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 11; Schwenzer, Obligationenrecht, Nr. 63.04; Förster, Nr. 211; Blank, p. 49; Zerres, p. 135; Hirse, in: Tonner/Willingmann/Tamm, § 275, Rdnr. 15; Maile-Zinser, p. 14.
50.
The burden of proof regarding the length of the term of impossibility is carried by the debtor. Gsell, p. 280.
51.
Finn, p. 157. However, if the obstacle to the performance is surmountable, there exists no impossibility at all (not even temporarily). Finn, p. 158.
52.
On the other hand, § 311a II BGB is relevant when the debtor is responsible. However, in such cases, the requirement of the debtor’s responsibility is not with regard to the occurrence of impossibility. In other words, the provision requires that the debtor knows the impossibility while concluding the contract or that the debtor is responsible for not knowing the impossibility. The provision reads as follows: “The obligee may, at his option, demand damages in lieu of performance or reimbursement of his expenses in the extent specified in section 284. This does not apply if the obligor was not aware of the obstacle to performance when entering into the contract and is also not responsible for his lack of awareness. Section 281 (1) sentences 2 and 3 and (5) apply with the necessary modifications.”
53.
The provision eliminates the discussions regarding the time for the assessment of initial and subsequent impossibility. Accordingly, the time to be considered for such distinction is the time when the contract is entered into. Fehre, p. 25. This is also valid for contracts with condition and term. Fehre, p. 25; Palandt/Grüneberg, BGB, § 311a, Rdnr. 4.
54.
See, Harke, p. 54 ff. Kley, p. 140.
55.
For a detailed study on initial impossibility from the perspective of former § 306 BGB see Arp, p. 35 ff. also see Reinke, p. 1 ff. Pakuscher, p. 1 ff.
56.
For a study on the impossibility as a reason of voidness, see Fischer, Unmöglichkeit, p. 1 ff.
57.
Grunewald, JZ 2001, 433, 434; Fehre, p. 25. For initial impossibility from the perspective of the former BGB, see Pels Leusden, p. 49 ff. For the results of initial impossibility in former BGB regarding unilateral obligations, see Schweitzer, p. 1 ff.
58.
If the contract is null and void for another reason (such as breach of a legal prohibition or immorality), § 311a BGB would not change such legal result. MüKo/Ernst, § 311a, Rdnr. 25; Fehre, p. 28; BeckOK/Gehrlein, § 311a, Rdnr. 4; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 311a, Rdnr. 56; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 311a, Rdnr. 5; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 165, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
59.
As a result, the lawmakers have shifted the risk against the debtor. Since the contract is valid, the debtor would be obliged to compensate the creditor’s positive interest, in case of the responsibility of the debtor. Motsch, JZ 2001, 428, 430. However, the provision of § 311a I is in principle fully dispositive. The parties may accept in the contract that a specific impediment must not exist at the time of the formation of the contract, otherwise the debtor or the creditor would be entitled to revocation. MüKo/Ernst, § 311a, Rdnr. 102.
60.
Fehre, p. 26.
61.
Fehre, p. 26; MüKo/Ernst, § 311a, Rdnr. 2. In case of initial impossibility, the primary obligations of the parties are excluded. As a matter of fact, § 275 BGB eliminates the debtor’s obligation to perform and § 326/I eliminates the creditor’s counter-obligation. As a result, the contract lacks primary obligations of the parties. Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 11; Jauernig, § 311a, Rdnr. 4; BeckOK/Gehrlein, § 311a, Rdnr. 4; Fehre, p. 27; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 1, Nr. 389; Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 309; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 164, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>. However, since the contract is still valid, it still constitutes a basis for the secondary claims (Sekundäransprüche) of the parties. Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 506; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 1, Nr. 389. Moreover, since the contract is valid, the parties are bound with their side obligations (Nebenpflichten). Staudinger/Löwisch, § 311a, Rdnr. 21. Accordingly, if the debtor is responsible for the occurrence of impossibility, this creates an obligation to compensate the damages of the creditor. However, there are secondary claims which are available even in cases where the debtor is not responsible for impossibility. For instance, even if the debtor is not responsible for the occurrence of impossibility, the creditor is entitled to demand substitutes from the debtor. Fehre, p. 27; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 165, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>. If the contract were invalid, no substitutes could be claimed. The validity regime of § 311a BGB, which entitles the creditor to substitutes, enables the contract to fulfill its purpose. Fehre, p. 27. This is basically a result of the fact that in case of initial impossibility, a valid contractual relationship is established, but only the obligation to perform is eliminated. Staudinger/Löwisch, § 311a, Rdnr. 20.
62.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 311a, Rdnr. 14. For information on the liability for initial inability, see Sutschet, NJW 2005, 1404, 1404 ff.; Hohmeister, p. 1 ff. Also see Krückmann, p. 127 ff.; Kleineidam, p. 45 ff. For the difference between inability and impossibility, see Haake, p. 1 ff. also see Asendorf, p. 1 ff. Specifically on the differences between initial inability and initial impossibility under the former BGB, see Jagielski, p. 1 ff.
63.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 311a, Rdnr. 16.
64.
For a study on impossibility without the responsibility of the debtor regarding sale of a specific good and its treatment under § 275 II BGB, see Canaris, JZ 2004, 214, 214 ff.
65.
In case of limited debt in kind, impossibility occurs if the entire stock is destroyed. Looschelders, Nr. 289; Zerres, p. 135; Kötz, Nr. 793; Huguenin, Nr. 557; Bucher, p. 421.
66.
Dural, Sonraki İmkansızlık, p. 138.
67.
Unless there is limited debt in kind, objective real impossibility may occur if the subject-matter good is destroyed after the concretization of a particular piece of such kind. Within this stance, concretization refers to everything that the debtor must do as required by him for performance. Looschelders, Nr. 290; Hütte/Helbron, Nr. 97 ff. See § 243 II BGB: “If the obligor has done what is necessary on his part to supply such a thing, the obligation is restricted to that thing.” If there is not any concretization as well, then impossibility occurs only when the entire kind is destroyed. MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 34; Förster, Nr. 213; Blank, p. 48; Westermann/Bydlinski/Weber, § 7, Nr. 7/29 - 7/30; Dullinger, § 3, Nr. 3/52; Jousssen, Nr. 366; Zerres, p. 135; Hütte/Helbron, Nr. 385; Markesinis/Unberath/Johnston, p. 410. On the other hand, subjective real impossibility takes place when the debtor may have neither a thing of the kind, nor is it possible to obtain such a thing under any effort whatsoever. For instance, there is subjective real impossibility when the subject-matter good is available abroad, but the debtor cannot obtain such good due to an import ban. Mitzkait, p. 61. Such cases fall under § 275 BGB as well.
68.
Fehre, p. 32.
69.
For an analysis of § 275 II BGB from the perspective of law and economics doctrine, see Köndgen, p. 275 ff.
70.
Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 129, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>; Canaris, Schuldrechtsmodernisierung, p. XII.
71.
NJW 1983, 2873, 2874.
72.
It is argued that it may be difficult to distinguish § 275/I BGB from § 275 II BGB in case of subjective impossibility. Schlechtriem, German Act, p. 1 ff.; Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 47; Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 310. Zimmermann argues that applying the parameters of § 275 II BGB to subjective impossibility sometimes leads to unsatisfactory results. Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 48.
73.
Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 130–131, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
74.
Finn, p. 137. “Performance is objectively impossible and therefore cannot be demanded or enforced (§ 275 paragraph 1 BGB), if, under the laws of nature, or existing knowledge of science and technology it cannot be absolutely provided. It is so in case of the promise of using supernatural, ‘magical’ or psychic powers and abilities.” BGHZ 188, 71, 73. According to Fehre, sometimes the obligation arising from the contract may be nonsensical according to the views of third parties at the time of contract formation. For instance, an obligation to convert a car into an airplane by using magical powers is a nonsensical obligation. Similarly, an obligation to beam someone from one place to another might be accepted as a nonsensical one. It is quite difficult to concretize which obligations are nonsensical and which are sensible. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to accept that the contract is valid in accordance with § 311a/I BGB. In other words, in accordance with the intentions of the parties, the contract must be deemed valid. Fehre, p. 29.
75.
Medicus, Nr. 376.
76.
Finn, p. 135.
77.
§ 275 II BGB: “The obligor may refuse performance to the extent that performance requires expense and effort which, taking into account the subject matter of the obligation and the requirements of good faith, is grossly disproportionate to the interest in performance of the obligee. When it is determined what efforts may reasonably be required of the obligor, it must also be taken into account whether he is responsible for the obstacle to performance.”
78.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 93.
79.
Fehre, p. 40; Klausch, p. 87; Mitzkait, p. 49; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 55; Jauernig, § 275, Rdnr. 25; Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 501; Hirse, in: Tonner/Willingmann/Tamm, § 275, Rdnr. 38; Dauner/Lieb, in: Dauner-Lieb/Heidel/Lepa/Ring, Schuldrecht, § 275, Rdnr. 15; jurisPK-BGB/Alpmann, § 275, Rdnr. 28; Maile-Zinser, p. 34.
80.
Opportunity costs are not taken into consideration within the scope of the assessment of required expenses and efforts. Opportunity costs are profits that could be acquired through other transactions that could be made by the debtor, if he had not concluded the contract with the creditor. The debtor cannot claim to be released from his duty to perform with an argument based on opportunity costs because when concluding the contract with the creditor, the debtor has already relinquished from other transactions which may bring profit. Fehre, p. 41; MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 85; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 60.
81.
Fehre, p. 41; MüKo/Ernst, 275 Rdnr. 84; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 33.
82.
Mitzkait, p. 49; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 84.
83.
Fehre, p. 41–42; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 84.
84.
Mitzkait, p. 56.
85.
Fehre, p. 43; Mitzkait, p. 56; Dedek, in: Henssler/Graf von Westphalen, § 275, Rdnr. 15; Schmidt-Räntsch, Nr. 289; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 72; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 131, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
86.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 502; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 56.
87.
Mitzkait, p. 57.
88.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 77.
89.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 78.
90.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 79; Fehre, p. 42.
91.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 79.
92.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 80; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 92; Fehre, p. 42; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 27; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 54.
93.
Mitzkait, p. 50
94.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 80.
95.
If these legal results are taken into consideration in comparison of interests, the creditor’s interest in performance would be comparatively higher, whenever he had no compensation claim against the debtor; because, when the creditor is entitled to compensation due to non-performance, this would decrease his interest in performance. In other words, the gap between the creditor’s interest and the required efforts and expenses of the debtor would be higher when the debtor is responsible for impossibility. As a result, it would be easier for the debtor, who is responsible for the obstacle to be released from his obligation to perform under § 275 II BGB. Fehre, p. 43; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 81; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 31. On the other hand, when the debtor is not responsible for impossibility, since the creditor will not receive compensation due to non-performance, he would be better-off if the debtor performed. In other words, the creditor would have higher interest in performance. In such cases the disproportion between the creditor’s interest in performance and the debtor’s interest in non-performance would be lower. Therefore it would be harder for the debtor to rely on § 275 II BGB to be released from his obligation. This would contradict with the logic and also the intention of the lawmakers. Fehre, p. 43.
96.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 89.
97.
Huber/Faust name this as absolute approach. Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 43–44. On the other hand, relative approach considers how the proportion between the required expenses of the debtor and the creditor’s interest in performance has changed within time. Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 43. In other words, according to the relative approach only the change is decisive. Within this context, there is disproportion if the proportion between the expenses and efforts of the debtor and the creditor’s interest in performance has changed against the benefit of one of the parties. Fehre, p. 44.
98.
Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 43.
99.
Fehre, p. 45; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 45.
100.
Fehre, p. 45.
101.
In case of defective performance, § 439 I BGB entitles the buyer to “demand that the defect is remedied or a thing free of defects is supplied.” However, if the defect cannot be cured under § 275 I - III BGB, this constitutes qualitative impossibility (qualitative Unmöglichkeit). In case of qualitative impossibility, the debtor’s release from his obligation to perform may occur under any of the paragraphs of § 275 BGB, including paragraph 2. However, § 439 III BGB, which deals with defective goods, enables the seller’s release from his obligation under lower standards than § 275 II BGB. The said provision reads as follows: “Without prejudice to section 275 (2) and (3), the seller may refuse to provide the kind of cure chosen by the buyer, if this cure is possible only at disproportionate expense. In this connection, account must be taken in particular, without limitation, of the value of the thing when free of defects, the importance of the defect and the question as to whether recourse could be had to the alternative kind of cure without substantial detriment to the buyer. The claim of the buyer is restricted in this case to the alternative kind of cure; the right of the seller to refuse the alternative kind of cure too, subject to the requirements of sentence 1 above, is unaffected.” For a study on the competition between the rules of impossibility and the rules on defective performance, see Lehmann, Unmöglichkeit, p. 1 ff.
102.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 70.
103.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 96.
104.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 100.
105.
BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 55.
106.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 502; Fehre, p. 46.
107.
Mitzkait, p. 51–52.
108.
Mitzkait, p. 51; Fehre, p. 47; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 87.
109.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 502; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 3, Nr. 397.
110.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 88.
111.
Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 50; Fehre, p. 49.
112.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 69.
113.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 74.
114.
Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 68.
115.
Fehre, p. 51–52.
116.
Medicus, Rdnr. 370.
117.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 72; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 102; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 131, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
118.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 103.
119.
Mitzkait, p. 56–57; Klausch, p. 104; Wallow, p. 26.
120.
Mitzkait, p. 56–57.
121.
Medicus also states that setting such ratios to determine gross disproportion fails. Medicus, Nr. 372.
122.
For instance, see Fehre, p. 52.
123.
Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 46; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 93; Fehre, p. 45.
124.
Brunner, p. 83; Fehre, p. 45; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 41.
125.
Brunner, p. 79.
126.
For a procedure law approach to § 313 BGB, see Schmidt-Kessel, NJW 2002, 2076, 2076 ff.
127.
Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 130, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 21; Maile-Zinser, p. 48.
128.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 501; Finn, p. 515; Mitzkait, p. 50; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 53; Eckert, Nr. 306; Petersen, Nr. 263; Schmidt-Recla, p. 662. For a critique of § 275 II BGB in comparison with § 313 BGB, see Schmidt-Recla, p. 641 ff. jurisPK-BGB/Alpmann, § 275, Rdnr. 34.
129.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Rdnr. 21; Finn, p. 515; Mitzkait, p. 50; Maile-Zinser, p. 48; Lorenz/Riehm, Nr. 408.
130.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 501.
131.
Fehre, p. 44.
132.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 75.
133.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 3, Nr. 398; Canaris, Neuregelung, p. 14.
134.
Fehre, p. 45; Brunner, p. 83; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 93; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 41.
135.
Finn, p. 519. Even for this reason, when compared to § 313 BGB, the cases dealt with under § 275 II BGB have more of a theoretical importance. In fact it is comparatively unlikely to experience cases, which fall under the so-called practical impossibility.
136.
For a study on the adaptation request and the obligation to negotiate (Verhandlungspflichten) under § 313/I BGB, see Lüttringhaus, p. 266 ff.
137.
For the relationship between revocation of the contract due to impossibility and revocation due to collapse of the basis of transaction, see Feldhahn, NJW 2005, 3381, 3382.
138.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 21; Fehre, p. 54; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 33.
139.
Fehre, p. 54. For the opinion that the debtor must be given the right to choose between refusing performance under § 275 and using his rights under § 313 BGB, see Emmerich, § 3, Nr. 68; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 23; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 79; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 115; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 29.
140.
Fehre, p. 54; Finn, p. 516; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 176, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
141.
§ 275 III BGB: “In addition, the obligor may refuse performance if he is to render the performance in person and, when the obstacle to the performance of the obligor is weighed against the interest of the obligee in performance, performance cannot be reasonably required of the obligor.”
142.
In the former BGB, moral impossibility was dealt with under the rules concerning change of circumstances. Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 49. For a study on the unexpectedness of performance due to personal reasons, see Joachim, p. 49 ff.
143.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 112. For a case on moral impossibility, where a Turkish employee is called for his compulsory military service in Turkey and the employee was granted the right to refuse performing the employment contract for the duration of military service, see NJW 1983, 2782.
144.
Canaris, Schuldrechtsmodernisierung, p. XIII; Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 49; Brunner, p. 84; Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 310; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 4, Nr. 400; Klausch, p. 112; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 34; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 118. It is debated in the doctrine, if § 275 III BGB covers performance difficulty arising from reasons of conscience. For instance, it is debatable if a catholic doctor may refuse to participate in an abortion, or a female publisher may refuse to publish a misogynistic paper. Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 5, Nr. 401. In such cases the reasoning of the law makes reference to § 313 BGB, dealing with collapse of the basis of transaction or § 242 BGB on performance in good faith. See Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 130, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
145.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 39; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 108; jurisPK-BGB/Alpmann, § 275, Rdnr. 39.
146.
Fehre, p. 55; Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 49.
147.
MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 107.
148.
Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 87. When the obstacles may be overcome by the use of financial means, § 275 II BGB would apply; if § 275 II BGB is not relevant, § 313 BGB may apply. Fehre, p. 57.
149.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 4, Nr. 400.
150.
Medicus, Nr. 375.
151.
Within this stance, expecting performance is unreasonable, when the negative results of performance for the debtor are highly burdensome in comparison to the interest of creditor in performance. Fehre, p. 56.
152.
Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 49; Fehre, p. 55.
153.
Jauernig, § 275, Rdnr. 30. For instance, the soprano may refuse to sing even if she, herself, has caused the illness of her child. Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 49. The responsibility of the debtor for moral impossibility rather affects the claims of counter-obligation and compensation. Fehre, p. 56.
154.
Mitzkait, p. 59; Klausch, p. 135.
155.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 275, Rdnr. 106.
156.
Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 49. According to the author, § 275 III BGB is a specific manifestation of the rules regarding change of circumstances and therefore “undermines the subtle line the law has drawn in § 275 II between impossibility and change of circumstances.”
157.
Mitzkait, p. 59; MüKo/Ernst, § 275 Rdnr. 113; Wagner, p. 101.
158.
See Fehre, p. 56.
159.
§ 278 BGB: “While he is in default, the obligor is responsible for all negligence. He is liable for performance in the case of chance as well, unless the damage would have occurred even if performance had been made in good time.”
160.
Looschelders, Nr. 519.
161.
Emmerich, § 9, Nr. 22; Mitzkait, p. 119.
162.
Emmerich, § 9, Nr. 23; Medicus, Nr. 385.
163.
Emmerich, § 9, Nr. 25.
164.
The terms cas fortuit and force majeure are mentioned under Article 1148 CC as reasons which prevent damage claim for non-performance. The terms are used equivalently in French law to refer to cases, where the performance is prevented without the fault of the debtor. Zweigert/Kötz, p. 498; Brunner, p. 67.
165.
§ 278 BGB: “The obligor is responsible for fault on the part of his legal representative, and of persons whom he uses to perform his obligation, to the same extent as for fault on his own part. The provision of section 276 (3) does not apply.”
166.
“… the impossibility applies only to the sole obligation to perform, not the obligatory relationship (Schuldverhältnis) in its entirety.” MMR 2012, 89, 91.
167.
Finn, p. 173; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 459; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Nr. 162; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Nr. B 69.
168.
Fehre, p. 31; Vogt, p. 29; Finn, p. 154.
169.
Fehre, p. 32.
170.
Schlechtriem states that in the Discussion Draft of BGB, it was proposed that the debtor must refuse performance in order to be released from his obligation to perform. However, in the final draft it was accepted that § 275 I BGB automatically eliminates the debtor’s obligation. This is criticized as an influence of the former BGB’s approach: no obligation in case of impossibility. Schlechtriem, German Act, p. 1 ff.
171.
Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 129, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
172.
Fehre, p. 52; Brunner, p. 84; Medicus, Nr. 376; Förster, Nr. 233; MüKo/Ernst, § 275, Rdnr. 96; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 61; Huber/Faust, Section 2, Nr. 6.
173.
Canaris, Kategorie der Unmöglichkeit, p. 48; Medicus, Unmöglichkeit, p. 349.
174.
Fehre, p. 52; Medicus, Nr. 376.
175.
Fehre, p. 57.
176.
As it will be explained below, § 326/I s. 2 BGB sets forth that “Sentence 1 does not apply if the obligor, in the case of failure to perform in conformity with the contract, does not, under section 275 (1) to (3), have to effect cure.”
177.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 326, Rdnr. 2; BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 2.
178.
Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 18; BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 4; MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 7.
179.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 33. However, exceptionally in some cases the law has placed the price risk beforehand on the creditor. Accordingly, §§ 326 II, 446, 447, 616, 644, 645, 2380 BGB and § 56 I ZVG (Foreclosure Law) are examples of such exceptional provisions. In such cases, the creditor is obliged to perform the counter-obligation, even if he does not receive the performance of the debtor. Emmerich, § 9, Nr. 6; Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 311; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 3, Nr. 454.
180.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 32. In imperfect reciprocal contracts, the creditor’s counter obligation arises after the birth of the obligation of the debtor. Therefore in such contracts, when the first obligation becomes impossible to perform, the second obligation does not come to existence at all. As a result, in such contracts, there is no room to apply the provision.
181.
BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 5; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 31; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 21.
182.
Huber/Faust, Section 5, Nr. 51; Schlechtriem/Schmidt-Kessel, Nr. 493; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 1, Nr. 447; MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 8; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 21.
183.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 459.
184.
§ 326 I sets forth that “in the case of part performance, section 441 (3) applies with the necessary modifications.” § 441 III reads as follows: “In the case of a price reduction, the purchase price is to be reduced in the proportion in which the value of the thing free of defects would, at the time when the contract was entered into, have had to the actual value. To the extent necessary, the price reduction is to be established by appraisal.”
185.
MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 18. Such provision regarding partial impossibility would also apply to temporary impossibility. This means that as long as temporary impossibility exists, the creditor is entitled not to perform the counter-obligation. Provided that the creditor loses his interest in the performance in case of delay, the creditor is also entitled to terminate the contract. Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 189, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
186.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 2, Nr. 448; Huber/Faust, Section 5, Nr. 59; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 33; Wieser, MDR 2002, 858, 861; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 40; Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 188, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>. However, it must be underlined that such loss of interest does not cause partial impossibility revert into full impossibility. This means that the creditor’s obligation is not extinguished ipso iure, and the counter-obligation is not fully eliminated. In case of loss of interest in partial performance, the creditor is given a right to revoke the contract. This might then end up in full extinguishment of the obligations of both parties. Wieser, MDR 2002, 858, 861. According to Ernst, in such cases the debtor does not have the right of revocation, since partial impossibility has affected the performance of the debtor. Hence the debtor must bear its consequences in the first place. MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 25.
187.
However, an application of § 441 III requires that the counter-obligation is divisible; otherwise the provision would not apply. MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 28. If performance is indivisible in nature, partial impossibility would be deemed to be equivalent to full impossibility. Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 32; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Nr. B 40.
188.
MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 32 ff. Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 57 ff.
189.
Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 66; Lorenz/Riehm, Nr. 327.
190.
Hütte/Helbron, Nr. 441.
191.
Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 58.
192.
Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B 59.
193.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 500; Schwingenheuer, p. 42.
194.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 500.
195.
BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 3; MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 41.
196.
MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 11.
197.
For a detailed study on the responsibility of the creditor, see Dötterl, p. 19 ff. For a study on impossibility for which both the debtor and the creditor are responsible, see Reinhard, p. 16 ff. Also see Seichter, p. 1 ff.
198.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 2, Nr. 451.
199.
MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 52.
200.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 39; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 2, Nr. 451.
201.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 40. The lawmakers have not regulated in detail the results of impossibility, for which both the debtor and creditor are responsible. Within this stance, § 326 II BGB is a rare case, where the lawmakers have regulated the effects of impossibility caused by both parties of a contract. Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. C 73.
202.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 459.
203.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 326, Rdnr. 10; MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 12.
204.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 2, Nr. 453; MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 69.
205.
§ 300/I BGB reads as follows: “The obligor is, during the period of the default of the obligee, only responsible for intent and gross negligence.”
206.
MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Nr. 69.
207.
Brox/Walker, §22, Nr. 44; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 2, Nr. 453.
208.
MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 80.
209.
If the creditor’s act constitutes a breach of duty under § 280 I BGB (or a tortuous act), the debtor can ask for compensation in addition to the counter-performance. Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. C 72; MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 83.
210.
BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 21.
211.
BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 21.
212.
If the debtor was unaware of the availability of such deduction and has performed the entire counter-obligation, he may request return of the deductable amount through the provisions of unjust enrichment (§ 812/I BGB). MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Nr. 84.
213.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 V, Nr. 459.
214.
For a study on surrogation principle in case of impossibility, see Kalbhen, p. 1 ff.
215.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 20.
216.
As explained above, in cases, which fall under § 275 II and III BGB, the debtor must first of all use his right to refuse performance. Reasoning of BGB, Drucksache 14/6040, p. 145, available at <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/060/1406040.pdf>.
217.
“Since such obligation of the claimant has become impossible within the meaning of § 275 BGB, in principle, as compensation, the claimant owes according to the leasing contract, the surrogate of the amortization or transfer on account of performance of the claim on the insurance claim assigned to the defendant.” AG Hamburg-Altona, Urteil v. 11.08.2004 319B C 79/04 - JurionRS. For an evaluation on the availability of the claim of substitutes in cases of initial impossibility, see Hammen, Stellvertretendes, p. 41 ff.
218.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 5, Nr. 442; Mitzkait, p. 117; BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 1; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 2; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 2.
219.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 3.
220.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 19; Mitzkait, p. 117. § 285 BGB sets fort that the substitute of the “object owed” may be demanded by the creditor. Therefore, it is argued that the provision would not apply when the debtor is released from his obligation due to moral impossibility because in such cases the subject matter of the obligation is not an object but services. BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 7.
221.
BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 14; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 9.
222.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 285, Rdnr. 8.
223.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 V, Nr. 459; BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 21; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 39; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 285, Rdnr. 60; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 13.
224.
Kötz, Nr. 808; Förster, Nr. 288; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 5, Nr. 443; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 21; Mitzkait, p. 117; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 27; BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 10; Jauernig, § 285, Rdnr. 7; jurisPK-BGB/Alpmann, § 285, Rdnr. 17.
225.
Mitzkait, p. 117; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 22.
226.
BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 8; Mitzkait, p. 117; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 17; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 285, Rdnr. 30.
227.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 7; Staudinger/Löwisch, § 285, Rdnr. 30. § 285 II further sets forth that “If the obligee may demand damages in lieu of performance, then, if he exercises the right stipulated in subsection (1) above, the damages are reduced by the value of the reimbursement or the claim to reimbursement he has obtained.” This prevents the enrichment of the creditor at the expense of the debtor. Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 23.
228.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 8. If impossibility is caused by the damage or destruction of the raw material that is required for the subject matter of the contract, § 285 I BGB would not apply. Similarly, § 285 I BGB is excluded when the leased property is destroyed because in such cases the lessor is under an obligation to leave the leased property to the lessee only for use. However, the compensation received by the lessor from the third party is given due to the destruction of the good and it pertains to the total value of the leased property. Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 21.
229.
MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 4; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 16.
230.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 285, Rdnr. 28; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 16; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Nr. 3.
231.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 17; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 12.
232.
Fehre, p. 27; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 17.
233.
BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 7; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 17; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Nr. 14.
234.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 5, Nr. 443; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 24; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 29; BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 13; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 9. However, in cases where the creditor is entitled to compensation, the debtor cannot force the creditor to demand substitutes under § 285 I BGB. Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 24.
235.
MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 34.
236.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 9; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 25.
237.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 25.
238.
MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 32
239.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 26; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 30.
240.
MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr.30.
241.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 26.
242.
§ 326 III BGB indicates that § 441 III would apply to such reduction of consideration. BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 10. “… any further claim on the payment of additional profits through the substitute is not available, according to the value judgment of the law. According to the value judgment of the law, the creditor can, instead, reclaim the substitute, when it has a higher value than the provided performance.” AG Hamburg-Altona, Urteil v. 11.08.2004 319B C 79/04 – JurionRS.
243.
Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 359; BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 10; Huber/Faust, Section 5, Nr. 55.
244.
This provision regulates the return of what has been performed before extinguishment of the counter-obligation. However, if performance has taken place after extinguishment of the counter-obligation, return would take place in accordance with the provisions regarding unjust enrichment (§ 812 BGB). MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 99.
245.
Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. E 3.
246.
Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. E 16.
247.
Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 331; MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 18.
248.
Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 331.
249.
In fact, in such cases it would be meaningless to specify a certain amount of time. Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. F 8.
250.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 27. In the former BGB, initial impossibility was a reason of voidness of the contract. Therefore in such cases there existed no contract that could be revoked.
251.
Dörner/Staudinger, p. 38; Rüssmann, p. 285. According to Emmerich, such amendment has importance only in limited cases because in cases where the debtor has no responsibility for impossibility, § 326 I BGB releases the creditor from his counter-obligation. Therefore there would generally be no need for the creditor to revoke the contract. Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 28.
252.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 28; Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 311; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. F 2; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 82; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 457; Klausch, p. 245; BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 35; Huber/Faust, Section 5, Nr. 66; Köhler/Lorenz, p. 40.
253.
Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 29; Staudinger, Eckpfeiler, p. 311; Köhler/Lorenz, p. 41; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. F 2; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 85–86; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 457; Klausch, p. 245; BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 36; Huber/Faust, Section 5, Nr. 64.
254.
§ 323 I reads as follows: “If, in the case of a reciprocal contract, the obligor does not render an act of performance which is due, or does not render it in conformity with the contract, then the obligee may revoke the contract, if he has specified, without result, an additional period for performance or cure.”
255.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 83; Köhler/Lorenz, p. 40; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 457; BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 34; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. F 2; Huber/Faust, Section 5, Nr. 67. Since § 326/V BGB makes reference to § 323 BGB, a valid revocation requires the breach of contract, namely the defect, not being trivial. Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 457.
256.
Also applicable to revocation under § 323 BGB, § 324 BGB and § 326 BGB. Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 31.
257.
Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. F 29.
258.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 458.
259.
Fehre, p. 22; Blank, p. 47; Zimmermann, New German Law, p. 44; Brunner, p. 82; Vogt, p. 29; Medicus, Nr. 378; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 II 1, Nr. 390–391; Finn, p. 130; BeckOK/Unberath, § 275, Rdnr. 8; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 275, Rdnr. 5; Schlechtriem/Schmidt-Kessel, Nr. 474; Knütel, JR 2001, 353, 353 ff.; Zimmer, NJW 2002, 1, 2.
260.
For a study on the foundations of the liability doctrine – also in relation with impossibility doctrine, see Hamburger, p. 23 ff.
261.
As explained above, the burden of proof can be derived from § 280 I s. 2 BGB.
262.
According to Fikentscher/Heinemann, although it is not explicit in the BGB, § 283 applies solely to subsequent impossibility because compensation of damages has been specially regulated under § 311a II BGB for the cases of initial impossibility. Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 3, Nr. 419.
263.
The second, third and fourth paragraphs of § 281 deal with setting a period of time (Fristsetzung) prior to claiming damages so that the debtor can perform. However, these provisions are inapplicable to cases, which fall under § 275 BGB. In fact, in such cases, either there is impossibility that the debtor cannot perform, or he cannot be expected to perform due to gross disproportionality or personal reasons. In all cases, it is clear that setting a period of time would not result in performance. Medicus, Nr. 386; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 3, Nr. 420; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 56; MDR 2006, 858, 858. For a critique of § 281 I BGB, see Altmeppen, DB 2001, 1131, 1131 ff. For the responses of Canaris to the critique of Altmeppen, see Canaris, DB 2001, 1815, 1815 ff. For Altmeppen’s counter-response to Canaris, see Altmeppen, DB 2001, 1821, 1821 ff.
264.
According to the § 281 V: “If the obligee demands damages in lieu of complete performance, the obligor is entitled to claim the return of his performance under sections 346 to 348.” This shows that the creditor cannot rely on the provisions of unjust enrichment (§ 818 f.). Medicus, Nr. 387.
265.
Hirse, in: Tonner/Willingmann/Tamm, § 311a, Rdnr. 11.
266.
According to § 281/I s. 2: “If the obligor has not rendered performance as owed, the obligee may not demand damages in lieu of performance if the breach of duty is immaterial.”
267.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 57; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 3, Nr. 419.
268.
Hk-BGB/Schulze, § 283, Rdnr. 4. According to Koller, in case of subsequent impossibility for which the debtor is responsible, the creditor has a right to choose between his negative or positive interest. Koller, Leistungssörungen, p. 46. According to the author, a claim of negative interest makes sense when the creditor has lost his interest in the performance. Koller, Leistungssörungen, p. 54.
269.
MüKo/Ernst, § 283, Nr. 10.
270.
MüKo/Ernst, § 283, Nr. 11.
271.
In an assessment of the debtor’s responsibility, the provision of § 276 BGB would apply. NJW 2005, 989, 990.
272.
In cases, which fall under § 275 II BGB, the awareness must be with regard to all circumstances giving rise to gross disproportionality. MüKo/Ernst, § 311a, Rdnr. 44. For the problem of knowledge-attribution to the debtor (Wissenszurechnung) when the people in the domain of the debtor have access to knowledge, but the debtor lacks access to information, see MüKo/Ernst, § 311a, Rdnr. 58 ff.
273.
Looschelders, Nr. 660.
274.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 2, Nr. 407; Looschelders, Nr. 661.
275.
Hk-BGB/Schulze, § 311a, Rdnr. 6; Sy, p. 163; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 311a, Rdnr. 10; Dedek, in: Henssler/Graf von Westphalen, § 311a, Rdnr. 16; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 2, Nr. 414; Petersen, Nr. 313; Hirse, in: Tonner/Willingmann/Tamm, § 311a, Rdnr. 10. If it can be argued that the creditor was aware of initial impossibility or he must have been aware of it, this constitutes contributory negligence (Mitverschulden). Therefore, the compensation to be paid to the creditor would be reduced proportionally with his fault (in accordance with § 254 BGB) and then the counter-obligation that he would perform under § 326 II would be offset. Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 2, Nr. 412.
276.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 311a, Rdnr. 3; Hk-BGB/Schulze, § 311a, Rdnr. 7; Sy, p. 160; Canaris, AGB, p. 1084; Medicus, Nr. 390c; Schimmel/Buhlmann, p. 251; Hirsch, Nr. 663; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 311a, Rdnr. 7; jurisPK-BGB/Alpmann, § 311a, Rdnr. 29; Koller, Leistungssörungen, p. 45; PWW/Medicus/Stürner, § 311a, Rdnr. 16; Brieskorn, p. 49; Dauner-Lieb/Heidel/Lepa/Ring, Das neue Schuldrecht, § 2, Nr. 88; Schultz, p. 75; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 2, Nr. 407; Lorenz, Schuldrechtsmodernisierung, p. 27; Dauner/Lieb, in: Dauner-Lieb/Heidel/Lepa/Ring, Schuldrecht, § 311a, Rdnr. 14.
277.
According to Popescu, dogmatically the liability of the debtor under § 311a II cannot be positive interest. The author argues that positive damages may only be compensated under § 311a II if the debtor already knew the existence of an impediment that can be overcome. Popescu, p. 135–135.
278.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 311a, Rdnr. 6. For the discussion, whether § 311a II is necessary in addition to §§ 280 I and II, 283 BGB, see Käunicke, 78 ff. Canaris, Grundlagen, p. 11 ff.; Cekovic-Vuletic, p. 32 ff.
279.
Canaris, DB 2001, 1815, 1818; Grunewald, JZ 2001, 433, 435; Looschelders, Nr. 657; Dauner-Lieb/Heidel/Lepa/Ring, Das neue Schuldrecht, § 2, Nr. 88; Dedek, in: Henssler/Graf von Westphalen, § 311a, Rdnr. 13; Brieskorn, p. 49–50. In fact, § 311a II functions as an explicit provision, which enables the positive interest claims of the debtor. Otherwise the creditor could only claim his negative damages based on culpa in contrahendo. Schlechtriem, Unmöglichkeit, p. 131. According to Canaris, there is a warranty in the promise of the debtor. Canaris, Grundlagen, p. 35.
280.
For a study on the differences between the application of rules of impossibility and mistake in case of initial impossibility, see Schneider, p. 1 ff.
281.
Dörner/Staudinger, p. 36.
282.
Dörner/Staudinger, p. 36; Hk-BGB/Schulze, § 311a, Rdnr. 9; Dedek, in: Henssler/Graf von Westphalen, § 311a, Rdnr. 20. Hirse rejects such opinion since the option of claiming compensation based on culpa in contrahendo is already theoretically available. Hirse, in: Tonner/Willingmann/Tamm, § 311a, Rdnr 13. Similarly, Dauner/Lieb reject the option of analogy to § 122 BGB, since there is not a gap in the law. Dauner/Lieb, in: Dauner-Lieb/Heidel/Lepa/Ring, Schuldrecht, § 311a, Rdnr. 18.
283.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 71.
284.
Looschelders, Nr. 683. According to Fikentscher/Heinemann, rather than as an alternative to positive damages, reimbursement of futile expenses must have been designated as a cumulative remedy. Authors think that there is a construction mistake with regard to § 284 BGB. Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 4, Nr. 440.
285.
Looschelders, Nr. 678; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 74.
286.
Prior to the reform of 2002, to ease such difficulty of proof, the courts have applied a presumption of profitability (Rentabilitätsvermutung). Accordingly, it was presumed that the expenses made by one party for the performance of the contract are first palpable damages (ersten handgreiflichen Schaden). Therefore, even if the creditor cannot prove his lost profit, he can at least cover his expenses. However, this presumption applies only if the creditor has concluded the contract with a purpose of making profit. Unlike the presumption of profitability, the new provision of § 284 BGB does not require that the creditor has the purpose of making profit. Medicus, Nr. 388; Looschelders, Nr. 675–676; Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 72; Dedek, in: Henssler/Graf von Westphalen, § 284, Rdnr. 1; Willingmann/Hirse, in: Kohte/Micklitz/Rott/Tonner/Willingmann, § 284, Rdnr. 1; Hk-BGB/Schulze, § 284, Rdnr. 2; Dauner-Lieb, in: Dauner-Lieb/Langen, § 281, Rdnr. 64.
287.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 71.
288.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 80.
289.
Looschelders, Nr. 678.
290.
Medicus, Nr. 389; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 4, Nr. 441.
291.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 4, Nr. 441. For instance, bribes paid by the creditor cannot be accepted within the scope of fair expenses. Fehre, p. 127.
292.
Arnold, in: Dauner-Lieb/Langen, § 284, Rdnr. 1; MüKo/Ernst, § 284, Rdnr. 18.
293.
Staudinger/Löwisch, § 311a, Rdnr. 40; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 4, Nr. 439; Fehre, p. 125; Arnold, in: Dauner-Lieb/Langen, § 284, Rdnr. 1.
294.
Canaris, JZ 2001, 499, 517.
295.
MüKo/Ernst, § 284, Rdnr. 18.
296.
Fehre, p. 131.
297.
MüKo/Ernst, § 284, Rdnr. 28.
298.
Cekovic-Vuletic, p. 46.
299.
In this opinion, see Canaris, DB 2001, 1815, 1816. Peres argues that compensation claim arising from culpa in contrahendo and § 311a II are concurring claims. Peres, p. 55. According to Fehre, in addition to the claim based on § 311a II, a claim based on culpa in contrahendo may also be possible, when the debtor has failed to immediately inform the creditor about the impediment to the performance. Fehre, p. 146.
300.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 79.
301.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 3, Nr. 456; Dauner-Lieb, in: Dauner-Lieb/Langen, § 281, Rdnr. 61; Looschelders, Nr. 666 ff.
302.
Willingmann/Hirse, in: Kohte/Micklitz/Rott/Tonner/Willingmann, § 283, Rdnr. 8; Looschelders, Nr. 672.
303.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 326, Rdnr. 2; BeckOK/Grothe, § 326, Rdnr. 2.
304.
Gruber, JuS 2002, 1066, 1067; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 1, Nr. 447; Schlechtriem/Schmidt-Kessel, Nr. 495.
305.
Laimer, p. 44.
306.
Looschelders, Nr. 672.
307.
BeckOK/Unberath, § 326, Rdnr. 5; Staudinger/Otto, § 326, Rdnr. B6.
308.
For the relevant criticism, see MüKo/Ernst, § 326, Rdnr. 13.
309.
BeckOK/Unberath, § 285, Rdnr. 7; Emmerich, § 10, Nr. 17; MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Nr. 14; Medicus, Nr. 390; Ergüne, İÜHFM 2004, 351, 369.
310.
MüKo/Emmerich, § 285, Rdnr. 35; Palandt/Grüneberg, § 285, Rdnr. 10.
311.
Brox/Walker, § 22, Nr. 26; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 III 5, Nr. 445. “The value of the obtained substitute is to be deducted in accordance with § 285 para. 2 BGB from an additionally given compensation, if any.” AG Hamburg-Altona, Urteil v. 11.08.2004 319B C 79/04 – JurionRS.
312.
Palandt/Grüneberg, § 326, Rdnr. 2a; MüKo/Ernst, § 284, Rdnr. 13.
313.
Rüssmann, p. 285; Laimer, p. 44; Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 458; Dauner-Lieb/Arnold, p. 31.
314.
Fikentscher/Heinemann, § 43 IV 4, Nr. 458; MüKo/Gaier, § 346, Rdnr. 66.
315.
Döll, p. 63; Lorenz, Kaufrecht, p. 9.

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Hüseyin Can Aksoy

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Aksoy, H.C. (2014). 2) Treatment of Impossibility in German Law. In: Impossibility in Modern Private Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01704-4_2

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