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Part of the book series: The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings ((EPSP,volume 2))

Abstract

In this paper I propose a theory of evidence – which I call the Argument Theory – for domains where it is appropriate to demand high standards of rigor, explicitness and transparency, as in evidence for scientific conclusions and especially for evidence-based policy, which is where the need for such a theory first became apparent to me. I then apply the Argument Theory to answer a question that is too seldom asked, and never properly answered, in evidence-based policy where randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are taken as the ‘gold standard’ for evidence for predicting policy effectiveness: What does it take to makes positive RCT results evidence for policy predictions? The answer it turns out is quite a lot: information is required both about the causal role of the policy in the local circumstances and the helping factors required for it to work there.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The results I shall describe are essentially the same for more complicated functional forms.

References

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Acknowledgement

I want to thank Alex Marcellesi and the members of both the EPSA audience and the audience for my Pufendorf lectures who participated in the discussion for help with the immediate contents of this paper and the AHRC, the British Academy, LSE’s Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, the Spencer Foundation and the Templeton Foundation for support for the research for it.

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Correspondence to Nancy Cartwright LSE and UCSD .

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© 2013 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Cartwright, N. (2013). Evidence, Argument and Prediction. In: Karakostas, V., Dieks, D. (eds) EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01306-0_1

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