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Preconditions of a Monetary Union

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The Euro and International Financial Stability

Part of the book series: Financial and Monetary Policy Studies ((FMPS,volume 37))

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Abstract

Several people pose the question: Why would the EU not accept the conversion of all government bonds to the so called Eurobonds? That would be a reasonable idea, if the Bureaucracy of the EU did not have its own objectives which are quite different from national objectives, a fact that would never occur in the US or the different regions of the UK.

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References

  • Mongelli FP (2008) European economic and monetary integration and the optimum currency area theory, ECB working paper

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  • Sargent TJ (1986) Rational expectations and inflation, Harper and Row

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Correspondence to Efthymios G. Tsionas .

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Tsionas, E.G. (2014). Preconditions of a Monetary Union. In: The Euro and International Financial Stability. Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, vol 37. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01171-4_5

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