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Introduction

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Adaptive Logics for Defeasible Reasoning

Part of the book series: Trends in Logic ((TREN,volume 38))

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Abstract

The purpose of this introduction is to familiarize the reader with defeasible reasoning. It will, on the one hand, answer the questions what defeasible reasoning is and how it is different from deductive reasoning. On the other hand, I will introduce some themes concerning the formalization of defeasible reasoning that will recur frequently in this book. I will close the section by indicating some gaps in the formal treatment of defeasible reasoning which will bridge to the central topic of this manuscript: the use of adaptive logics as a unifying formal framework for defeasible reasoning.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    I agree with Blair that “an argument’s warrant is not a premise, but instead an assumption” that warrants “inferences from such grounds to such conclusions”: were the warrant a premise we would face a “vicious regress” ([3, p. 127] , see also Hitchcock [4]).

  2. 2.

    There are exceptions such as the Weak Rescher-Manor inference relation [10] which is monotonic but which can be modeled by means of a dynamic proof theory that explicates internal dynamics (see point 2’ below): this has been done in [11] and [12].

  3. 3.

    A proof from some premises \(\varGamma \) is static if for any \(A\) that is derived on a line of it, \(A\) is a consequence. The reader will be introduced to the dynamic proof format of ALs in Part 2 of this book.

  4. 4.

    For a more thorough overview see Chap. 4.

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    Christian Straßer

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Straßer, C. (2014). Introduction. In: Adaptive Logics for Defeasible Reasoning. Trends in Logic, vol 38. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00792-2_1

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