Abstract
The Baltic region is of great importance to past and present global powers. The argument of this article is that while NATO poses a traditional military threat to Russia and its activities in the Baltic region, Russia resists that threat not solely with traditional military means but with a smart utilization of information warfare, which includes cyberattacks and influence campaigns, combined with sharp power. The Russian spread of propaganda and chaos in the Baltics keeps NATO members apart while also preventing unwanted military escalation with the West. The case of Russian hybrid warfare against NATO in the Baltic region illustrates that soft power measures, such as the spread of fake news and the use of bots and trolls on social networks can be used effectively to resist international military alliances.
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Shuker, P., Topor, L. (2021). Russian Influence Campaigns Against NATO in the Baltic Region: Spread of Chaos and Divide et Impera. In: Mölder, H., Sazonov, V., Chochia, A., Kerikmäe, T. (eds) The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare. Contributions to International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_15
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