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Russia’s Strategic Blame Narratives: Comparative Analysis of Domestic and International Media Coverage About 5G

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The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare

Part of the book series: Contributions to International Relations ((CIR))

Abstract

In this chapter, we analyse discourses about 5G mobile technology in the context of US–China relations in major media outlets financed by the Russian government: Anglophone RT and Sputnik, and Russophone Perviy Kanal, NTV and ITAR-TASS. We combine strategic narrative theory and discourse analysis to study Russia’s media coverage in terms of strategic blame narratives about the development of 5G cellular networks in NATO countries. The aims of strategic blame narratives are to achieve a shift in the status of actors to undermine the opposing actor’s reputation and to create alliances. Our framework helps to reveal how 5G-related threats are framed, how the main actors (USA, China, NATO, EU) are depicted and how various articulations of blame are strategically used in Kremlin-backed media.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rossiya Segodnya (current name of the news agency owned and operated by the Russian government) means Russia Today in Russian. International broadcasting network RT was known as Russia Today prior to 2009.

  2. 2.

    For further information, see also https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Рейдерство_(бизнес).

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Estonian Research Council grants PRG314 ‘Semiotic fitting as a mechanism of biocultural diversity: instability and sustainability in novel environments’ (Estonian Research Council), SHVFI19127 ‘Strategic Narrative as a Model for Security Dilemma’ and ‘this work was supported by the Estonian Research Council grants PRG314 ‘Semiotic fitting as a mechanism of biocultural diversity: instability and sustainability in novel environments’ (Estonian Research Council) and SHVFI19127 ‘Strategic Narrative as a Model for Security Dilemma’.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Andreas Ventsel, Mari-Liis Madisson & Sten Hansson

  2. Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia

    Mari-Liis Madisson & Sten Hansson

  3. Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

    Mari-Liis Madisson

  4. University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

    Sten Hansson

Authors
  1. Andreas Ventsel
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  2. Mari-Liis Madisson
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  3. Sten Hansson
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Correspondence to Andreas Ventsel .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Holger Mölder

  2. Estonian Military Academy, Tartu, Estonia

    Vladimir Sazonov

  3. Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Archil Chochia

  4. Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Tanel Kerikmäe

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Ventsel, A., Madisson, ML., Hansson, S. (2021). Russia’s Strategic Blame Narratives: Comparative Analysis of Domestic and International Media Coverage About 5G. In: Mölder, H., Sazonov, V., Chochia, A., Kerikmäe, T. (eds) The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare. Contributions to International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73955-3_14

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