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Retail-to-Farm Demand Linkages, Imperfect Competition, and Short-Run Price Determination

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Abstract

In this chapter, we consider both vertical and horizontal effects on derived demand for raw materials, and total effects of exogenous variables on retail and farm prices. In the last chapter we showed how retail-to-farm price linkages could be formulated and estimated consistently. In this chapter, these relationships are combined with the retail demand elasticities for meats from Chapter 5 to derive total impacts of retail demand, farm supply, and marketing costs on derived demand and retail and farm prices. We derive the properties of these generalized derived demands as well as formulas for the total elasticities. This chapter also evaluates this approach to retail-to-farm price linkages in light of role imperfect competition may play on the price relationships. Finally, causes of short-run price determination from lags between retail and farm prices are evaluated, and an empirical application to beef price spreads is presented.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The theorem here is different and new in that it is for derived demand functions that depend on real income through the Slutsky decomposition. The past studies cited assumed “normal” conditions on Marshallian demand elasticities such that own-price elasticities exceed cross-price elasticities. Such a requirement is not implied by Theory. Use of Hicksian demand functions insures negative semi-definiteness and is actually more relevant for policy analysis (Friedman 1976, Chapter 2).

  2. 2.

    This is because \(\left( {\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} - \varvec{D}_{\varvec{p}}^{\varvec{c}} } \right) - \varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} \ge 0.\) Multiplying both sides by \(\left( {\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} - \varvec{D}_{\varvec{p}}^{\varvec{c}} } \right)^{ - 1}\) gives \(\varvec{I} - \left( {\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} - \varvec{D}_{\varvec{p}}^{\varvec{c}} } \right)^{ - 1} \varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} \ge 0.\) Finally post-multiplying by \(\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}}^{ - 1}\) gives \(\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}}^{ - 1} - \left( {\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} - \varvec{D}_{\varvec{p}}^{\varvec{c}} } \right)^{ - 1} \ge 0\). Thus, \(\varvec{S}_{\varvec{r}}^{\varvec{'}} \left[ { \left( {\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} - \varvec{D}_{\varvec{p}}^{\varvec{c}} } \right)^{ - 1} - \varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}}^{ - 1} } \right]\varvec{S}_{\varvec{r}} = - \varvec{S}_{\varvec{r}}^{\varvec{'}} \left[ {\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}}^{ - 1} - \left( {\varvec{S}_{\varvec{p}} - \varvec{D}_{\varvec{p}}^{\varvec{c}} } \right)^{ - 1} } \right]\varvec{S}_{\varvec{r}} \le 0.\),

  3. 3.

    As in Chapter 7, with the Slutsky decomposition, consumer demand relationships are expressed in terms of relative prices and real income. With multi-product supply and multi-input demand functions homogeneous of degree zero in prices, it follows that the industry derived demand functions must also be homogenous of degree zero in prices.

  4. 4.

    Standard errors are not reported. Asymptotic standard errors could be computed using, for example, the formulas provided by Theil (1971, pp. 537–538).

  5. 5.

    Following Breshnahan (1989), the term “relation” is used instead of relationship or function to describe both (8.15) and (8.16). The reason for this distinction is that neither a supply function nor input demand function exists in the case of imperfect competition, but rather only points in the price-quantity space. On the other hand, derivatives with respect to marginal prices can be used to properly characterize displacement from equilibrium for small changes from the initial equilibrium.

  6. 6.

    Holloway (1991) contends that one should not use deflated data for this test. However, this is incorrect because the price elasticity of demand will be zero homogeneous in prices and income if the demand function is. This follows from the fact that first-order derivatives of a demand function will be homogeneous of degree −1 so when multiplied by ratio of price/quantity to obtain the elasticity, the resulting function must be homogeneous of degree zero. So long as the index of market power is independent of proportional price changes, the zero homogeneity condition will be preserved.

  7. 7.

    Note that \(L\) must be less than one so long as marginal cost is positive. It still can be zero, which would define price-taking behavior. On the other hand, there is really no upper bound on \(N\) but a value of zero would define price-taking behavior.

  8. 8.

    In principle, inventories could take on negative values. Following Holt et al. (1960), I assume any excess demand is treated as unfilled orders and is filled at the beginning of the next time period. However, firms can essentially avoid this by setting depletion costs high enough.

  9. 9.

    If the firm is imperfectly competitive and faces a constant elasticity demand curve, then we could generalize the first part of (8.39) to \(p_{t} = \mu \left( {ar_{t} + bw_{t} } \right), {\text{where}}\,\mu > 1\). See, e.g., Sumner (1981) in the context of the cigarette industry. Of course, markup pricing could result from other concerns such as uncertainty (e.g., Mills 1959).

  10. 10.

    All price and spread data are divided by CPI. The values are expressed as real prices for December 2018 by multiplying each real variable by 252.723.

  11. 11.

    The Dickey–Fuller test is a test of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in the regression: \(\Delta y_{t} = \alpha + \beta y_{t - 1} + \varepsilon_{t}\). The null hypothesis is unit root and, because it is a non-normal distribution, calculated probability levels of the distribution are tabled values in Dickey and Fuller (1979). The augmented Dickey–Fuller test includes lags in first differences of \(\Delta y_{t}\).

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Appendix: Derivation of Inventory Cost Function

Appendix: Derivation of Inventory Cost Function

The purpose of this Appendix is to derive the inventory cost function according to the method used by Holt et al. (1960, Chapter 11). The more realistic case of n products is analyzed by Holt et al. (1960), but I analyze the simpler case of a single product, which produces essentially the same result. The inventory balance condition is

$$h_{t} = h_{t - 1} + q_{t} - x_{t}$$

where \(h_{t}\) is the end-of-period inventory level, \(h_{t - 1}\) is the beginning-of-period inventory, \(q_{t}\) is production during that period of time, and \(x_{t}\) is sales during time t. Letting overbars denote expected values, we know that with production known at time t,

$$h_{t} = \overline{h}_{t} + \overline{x}_{t} - x_{t}$$

For simplicity, the firm only incurs inventory holding costs (e.g., storage rental, handling, insurance, interest, etc.) and inventory depletion costs. Let \(c_{h}\) denote per unit holding costs and \(c_{d}\) denote per unit depletion costs from unmet demand. Then, omitting time subscripts for notational convenience, expected inventory holding and depletion costs equals:

$$\overline{c}_{I} = c_{h} \mathop \smallint \limits_{0}^{{\overline{h} + \overline{x} }} \left( {\overline{h} + \overline{x} - x} \right)f\left( x \right)dx + c_{d} \mathop \smallint \limits_{{\overline{h} + \overline{x} }}^{\infty } \left( {x - \overline{h} - \overline{x} } \right)f\left( x \right)dx$$

where \(\overline{c}_{i}\) is expected inventory costs and \(f\left( x \right)\) is the probability density function (pdf) of sales. Noting that expected end-of-period inventory equals

$$\overline{h} = \mathop \smallint \limits_{0}^{{\overline{h} + \overline{x} }} \left( {\overline{h} + \overline{x} - x} \right)f\left( x \right)dx + \mathop \smallint \limits_{{\overline{h} + \overline{x} }}^{\infty } \left( {\overline{h} + \overline{x} - x} \right)f\left( x \right)dx$$

expected inventory costs can be written as:

$$\overline{c}_{I} = c_{h} \overline{h} - \left( {c_{h} + c_{d} } \right)\mathop \smallint \limits_{{h + \overline{x} }}^{\infty } \left( {x - \overline{h} - \overline{x} } \right)f\left( x \right)dx$$

Differentiating with respect to expected inventory gives the marginal cost of inventory holding:

$$mc_{I} = \frac{{\partial \overline{c}_{I} }}{{\partial \overline{h} }} = c_{h} - \left( {c_{h} + c_{d} } \right)\left[ {1 - F\left( {\overline{h} + \overline{x} } \right)} \right]$$

where \(F\left( {\overline{h} + \overline{x} } \right) = \mathop \smallint \limits_{0}^{{\overline{h} + \overline{x} }} f\left( x \right)dx\) is the probability distribution function.

To proceed further, we need to specify a specific pdf for \(f\left( x \right)\). Following Holt et al. (1960), I assume a normal distribution so that

$$\left[ {1 - F\left( {\overline{h} + x} \right)} \right] = \left[ {1 - N\left( {\overline{h} /\sigma } \right)} \right] = N\left( { - \overline{h} /\sigma } \right)$$

where \(N\left( t \right) = \mathop \smallint \limits_{ - \infty }^{t} \frac{1}{\surd 2\pi }e^{{ - z^{2} /2}} dz\). Totally differentiating the above marginal cost function yields:

$$dmc_{I} = \left[ {N^{\prime}\left( { - \overline{h} /\sigma } \right)\left( {c_{h} + c_{d} } \right)/\sigma } \right]\left[ {d\overline{h} - \left( {\overline{h} /\sigma } \right)d\sigma } \right]$$

If we also assume as in Holt et al. (1960) that the standard deviation of demand is proportional to expected demand or sales, i.e., \(\sigma = \nu \overline{x}\), then the total differential of marginal costs equals:

$$dmc_{I} = \left[ {N^{\prime}\left( {\frac{{\overline{h} }}{{\nu \overline{x} }}} \right)\frac{{\left( {c_{h} + c_{d} } \right)}}{{\nu \overline{x} }}} \right]\left[ {d\overline{h} - \left( {\overline{h} /\overline{x} } \right)d\overline{x} } \right]$$

The linear approximation at \(\overline{h}^{0} , \overline{x}^{0}\), and \(mc_{i}^{0}\) is:

$$mc_{I} = mc_{I}^{0} + \left[ {N^{\prime}\left( {\frac{{\overline{h} }}{{\nu \overline{x} }}} \right)\frac{{\left( {c_{h} + c_{d} } \right)}}{{\nu \overline{x} }}} \right]\left[ {\left( {\overline{h} - \overline{h}^{0} } \right) - \left( {\frac{{\overline{h} }}{{\overline{x} }}} \right)\left( {\overline{x} - \overline{x}^{0} } \right)} \right]$$
(A.1)

Consider now the quadratic approximation for inventory costs presented in Eq. (8.32):

$$c^{*} = \frac{1}{2}c_{I} \left[ {h - g_{0} - gx} \right]^{2}$$
(A.2)

The parameters of (A.1) can then be matched with those of the derivative of (A.2):

$$\frac{{\partial c^{*} }}{\partial h} = c_{I} \left[ {h - g_{0} - gx} \right]$$

This will be the same formula for marginal costs in (A.1) if:

$$c_{I} = \left[ {N^{\prime}\left( {\frac{{\overline{h} }}{{\nu \overline{x} }}} \right)\frac{{\left( {c_{h} + c_{d} } \right)}}{{\nu \overline{x} }}} \right]$$
$$g_{0} = \frac{{ - mc_{I}^{0} }}{{c_{I} }}$$
$$g = \frac{{\overline{h} }}{{\overline{x} }}$$

These results therefore give us the desired cost coefficients.

Problems

  1. 8.1

    Show that the submatrix of price effects, \(\varvec{m}_{r}^{*} \left( {\varvec{r},\varvec{w},\varvec{I}} \right)\), from Table 8.1 is negative semi-definite at the sample means. Use data from Table 5.2 and Table 7.1 in your calculations.

  2. 8.2

    Re-calculate the incidence of market charges using the formula shown in problem 7.2 using the results from Table 8.1. Compare the results with those obtained in problem 7.2. If there are differences, explain why you think they are different.

  3. 8.3

    The food stamp program, SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), is said to have significant effects on commodity prices. The maximum amount spent by consumers through SNAP was $76 billion in 2011. PCE was $ 10,641.1 billion in 2011. SNAP benefits can only be used for food consumed at home. Proportions of meats consumed at home are estimated to be approximately 0.47 for beef and veal, 0.79 for pork, and 0.78 for poultry (Reed et al. 2002). Estimate the effects of SNAP on retail and farm prices of beef and veal, pork, and poultry using the elasticities reported in Table 8.1.

  4. 8.4

    Suppose that market intermediaries form quasi-rational expectations on raw material prices such that \(E_{t} r_{t + 1} = b_{0} + b_{1} r_{t} + b_{2} r_{t - 1}\) Substitute into (8.40) to show the price spread can be expressed as a distributed lag in current and past raw material prices. Under what conditions would this specification result in a negative relationship between the price spread and the current period raw material price? Is this purely coincidental or does it have a theoretical basis? (Hint: see Wohlgenant [1985]).

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Wohlgenant, M.K. (2021). Retail-to-Farm Demand Linkages, Imperfect Competition, and Short-Run Price Determination. In: Market Interrelationships and Applied Demand Analysis. Palgrave Studies in Agricultural Economics and Food Policy(). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73144-1_8

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