Abstract
Modern cryptographic protocols, such as TLS 1.3 and QUIC, can send cryptographically protected data in “zero round-trip times (0-RTT)”, that is, without the need for a prior interactive handshake. Such protocols meet the demand for communication with minimal latency, but those currently deployed in practice achieve only rather weak security properties, as they may not achieve forward security for the first transmitted payload message and require additional countermeasures against replay attacks.
Recently, 0-RTT protocols with full forward security and replay resilience have been proposed in the academic literature. These are based on puncturable encryption, which uses rather heavy building blocks, such as cryptographic pairings. Some constructions were claimed to have practical efficiency, but it is unclear how they compare concretely to protocols deployed in practice, and we currently do not have any benchmark results that new protocols can be compared with.
We provide the first concrete performance analysis of a modern 0-RTT protocol with full forward security, by integrating the Bloom Filter Encryption scheme of Derler et al. (EUROCRYPT 2018) in the Chromium QUIC implementation and comparing it to Google’s original QUIC protocol. We find that for reasonable deployment parameters, the server CPU load increases approximately by a factor of eight and the memory consumption on the server increases significantly, but stays below 400 MB even for medium-scale deployments that handle up to 50K connections per day. The difference of the size of handshake messages is small enough that transmission time on the network is identical, and therefore not significant.
We conclude that while current 0-RTT protocols with full forward security come with significant computational overhead, their use in practice is feasible, and may be used in applications where the increased CPU and memory load can be tolerated in exchange for full forward security and replay resilience on the cryptographic protocol level. Our results serve as a first benchmark that can be used to assess the efficiency of 0-RTT protocols potentially developed in the future.
Supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG), project JA 2445/2-1 and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement 802823. Part of this work was completed while the authors were employed at Paderborn University.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The server may choose any lifetime for the Bloom filter key material by parametrizing the Bloom filter accordingly. We provide a concrete paramtrization for our anaylsis in Sect. 5.1.
- 3.
Enabling point compression leads to a decrease of 19% in memory consumption on server side while increasing the computational load per decapsulation by roughly 6%.
- 4.
All machines are located within the same room. Hence, the resulting network latency is significantly lower compared to real-world latencies between clients and servers, especially compared to the required computation time of the implemented protocol. Overall, the network latency does not influence our results and is thus neglected in the following sections.
- 5.
Inspection in Wireshark revealed that messages are padded to occupy the full MTU size, canceling out small size differences.
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Dallmeier, F. et al. (2020). Forward-Secure 0-RTT Goes Live: Implementation and Performance Analysis in QUIC. In: Krenn, S., Shulman, H., Vaudenay, S. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2020. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12579. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65411-5_11
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