Abstract
Language is one of the constituents of science, which is studied from the semantics of science. Scientific prediction can be understood as language, so it can be analyzed within the theory of meaning. Nicholas Rescher is one of the authors who made most contributions to the study of prediction. When he analyses scientific prediction from language, his starting point is a pragmatic conception, since he gives primacy to the view of meaning as use. In his pragmatic conception of meaning, scientific prediction is the result of an activity that seeks to obtain justified answers to meaningful questions about future occurrences.
Within this framework of the primacy of pragmatics, the paper seeks to offer an analysis of the predictive statements in Rescher’s proposal. In order to do this, the problems at stake are considered. (i) The attention goes to his proposal about prediction as a statement. Thus, the features of the predictive statements are studied and the timing feature is analyzed, so the problem of retrodiction is also considered. (ii) The focus is on different types of scientific prediction, which Rescher does not develop in an explicit way. In this regard, we can see differences between the language of basic science and the language of applied science. (iii) His approach on the limits of prediction and language is analyzed, both regarding the barriers between the scientific predictive language and the non-scientific predictive statements and the confines of ceiling of the predictive language of science.
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Notes
- 1.
His pragmatic approach regarding language and scientific prediction has been also analyzed in Guillan (2017), ch. 2, pp. 37–65.
- 2.
Besides correctness and credibility, Rescher points out four other values that a predictive statement should fulfill: Relevance, accuracy, precision, and robustness (1998a, 119–125). On Rescher’s axiological approach for philosophy, in general, and prediction, in particular, see Guillan (2017, ch. 8).
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
This perspective of the application of science clearly links prediction with ethical issues, which arises due to the need of regulating professional practices and reducing risks in policy issues that have clear repercussions for society (see Guillan 2017, 318–321).
- 6.
An analysis of the limits of science from both perspectives can be found in Gonzalez (2016).
- 7.
“Predictions whose merits can be recognized only after the fact with the wisdom of retrospective hindsight are effectively useless,” Rescher (1998a), p. 55.
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This paper is related to the research project FFI2016-79728-P supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economics, Industry and Competitiveness (AEI).
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Guillan, A. (2021). Characterization of Scientific Prediction from Language: An Analysis of Nicholas Rescher’s Proposal. In: Gonzalez, W.J. (eds) Language and Scientific Research. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60537-7_9
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