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Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View

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Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"

Abstract

John Searle reflections on how to derive “Ought” from an “Is’” present a general theory of the sources of normativity within human civilizations. This chapter explores an alternative grounding of normativity on “laws of essence” (rather than on constitutive rules), a grounding that proceeds by addressing the crucial problem of how to locate essences (and thus values) in a world of facts. To that end, classical phenomenology is shown to be an ontology of concreteness, but this, far from removing it from the dimension of ideals and norms—even practical, ethical, and political ones—instead makes it the philosophy of ideals and relative “oughts” par excellence.

This chapter benefited from a fellowship at the Paris Institute for Advanced Study (France), with the financial support of the French State, programme “Investissements d’avenir”, managed by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-11-LABX-0027-01 Labex RFIEA+).

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De Monticelli, R. (2021). Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View. In: Di Lucia, P., Fittipaldi, E. (eds) Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is". Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3_7

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