Abstract
Chapter 4 reconstructs the road from the “great light” of 1769 to the 1770 Dissertation, and then through Kant’s silent decade towards the antinomy of pure reason. Our detailed reconstruction disproves a long-established view of the critical turn, according to which the Dissertation should have provided a resolution of the cosmological antinomy. In fact, at that time, there was no cosmological antinomy. In 1770, Kant was still attempting to reconcile his new theory of space and time as pure forms of intuition with a rational cosmology in Wolff’s style. His 1770 arguments concerning the limitations of metaphysical cognition supported a strategy of avoiding any conflict between the claims about the sensible and the intelligible worlds. Only later, when he developed a new theory of objective cognition, did Kant reverse his 1770 strategy. His distinction between logical and real grounds was decisive, and required the real use of the mathematical concept of infinity. It was this insight that made him claim the antinomy. After the failure of the analytic-synthetic method, Kant now tried the skeptical method—without, however, adopting Hume’s skepticism. The first clear indications of the cosmological antinomy are to be found in his notes on metaphysics from 1773–1775.
Initially I saw this doctrine as if in twilight. I tried […] to prove propositions and their opposite, not in order to establish a skeptical doctrine, but rather because I suspected I could discover in what an illusion of the understanding was hiding. The year ’69 gave me a great light. (18:69)
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Notes
- 1.
It was first presented by Fischer (1860, 1909). Erdmann (1884), Adickes (1897), and Riehl (1924) were particularly influential. See also the overview by Reich (1958, VII–XII). More recently, Kreimendahl (1990) has continued this long-established misconstruction of Kant’s development; see below. In contrast, Beiser (1992, 36–46, 55) points out that Crusius was more important for Kant’s development than Hume’s skepticism, and he emphasizes Rousseau’s influence on Kant’s critical attitude towards metaphysics expressed in the Dreams.
- 2.
After Paulsen (1875), Kuno Fischer (1909, 212) emphasized Hume’s influence on Kant. The relevant passages stem from the third edition (1882) of Fischer’s book; see the explanations in the appendix to Fischer (1909, 659–660). The dispute about the influence of Hume is as old as the attempts to reconstruct Kant’s development (Fischer 1909, 683; Kreimendahl 1990, 15).
- 3.
- 4.
Engelhard (2005, 280) follows Hinske in suggesting that Kant’s remarks have been overstated, but were not completely mistaken.
- 5.
My translation.
- 6.
This is the strategy adopted by Ertl (2002, 620). He explains the notion of antinomy in the literal sense, i.e., as a contradiction of laws, and claims that “we must treat Kant’s usage of the term ‘antinomy’ and the corresponding notion as two closely related, but different issues. Plainly, a notion can be present before the appropriate term has been coined for it.” The literal sense of the notion matches Kant’s expression ‘antithesis’ (N. 4275), i.e., his skeptical method (see Sect. 4.3.2), but it does not match Kant’s later, critical concept of the antinomy, in the sense of an inevitable cosmological conflict of reason with itself. The latter can be found neither in the notes 3922, 3942, 3999, 4007, 4225, on which Ertl relies, nor in the Berlin papers (N. 3716 and 3717) which he (most convincingly) dates to 1768–1769.
- 7.
- 8.
“Ob es ein spatium absolutum oder tempus absolutum gebe, würde soviel sagen wollen, ob man zwischen zwey Dingen im Raume alles […] dazwischen liegende vernichten könne und doch die bestimte leere Lücke bleiben würde, und ob, wenn […] ein gantzes Jahr Bewegungen und veränderungen überhaupt aufhöreten, nicht das folgende Anheben könne, so dass ein leeres zwischen Jahr verlaufen wäre. Wir lösen diese Schwierigkeiten nicht auf, sondern antworten unseren Gegnern durch die retorsion, weil ihre Auffassung eben diese Schwierigkeiten hat.” My translation (note not contained in the Cambridge edition).
- 9.
“Die Welt hat einen Anfang, d.i. einen Zustand, der keine folge aus einem andern Zustande ist: terminum a priori; non est aeternus a parte ante. Den wenn ein ieder Zustand der Welt eine Folge aus einem andern Zustand der Welt wäre, so würden alle Zustände der Welt einen andern Zustand der Welt vor sich haben; also würde ein Zustand der welt von allen Zuständen unterschieden seyn. welches contradictorium.” My translation (note not contained in the Cambridge edition). It is the last note of phase ι, dated phase ι 2–κ 3, hence probably not earlier than 1768.
- 10.
“Die principia subiectiva, wenn sie obiectiv erwogen werden, wiedersprechen sich. Z.E. Alles hat einen Grund, wiederspricht diesem satz: nichts ist nothwendig durch sich selbst etc etc.” My translation (note not contained in the Cambridge edition).
- 11.
The Cambridge edition translates “Wiederspruch” (contradiction) as “self-contradiction”. However, compare this with N. 3936 quoted above, which claims that certain opposite metaphysical principles “contradict each other”; see above.
- 12.
The Berlin papers (NN. 3716 and 3717), which Ertl (2002) convincingly dates to 1768–1769, also seem to belong in this context: “The principium of the form of all experiences is space and time. The principium of the form of all judgments of pure reason: identity and contradiction. The principium of the form of all a posteriori judgments of reason: ground and force” (N. 3717, 17:255).
- 13.
- 14.
CPR, A 26/B 42; A 32–34/B49–51. Edition B of the CPR distinguishes the metaphysical exposition and the transcendental exposition of the conceptions of space and time and adds as an independent new mark that space and time are given infinite quantities. See my more detailed discussion in Falkenburg (2000, 131–134). As Carson (1998) aptly notes, this is an independent argument that is by no means the starting point of Kant’s reflections on the character of space and time. This argument is not needed to show that space and time are singular representations a priori. However, it shows in addition that Kant’s criticism of Leibniz’s theory of the complete concept and the corresponding concept of the actually infinite enforces the assumption that space is a pure intuition.
- 15.
Here Kant uses the expression ‘concept’ more generally in the sense of ‘idea’.
- 16.
According to n. 26 to the text in the Cambridge Edition, “Leibniz seems to be the most probable” candidate for the “great man” (Friedman 2004, 44). Gerlach (1998), however, suggests that the “great man” may have been the Leibnizian Ploucquet, who in 1748 submitted a prize essay to the monadology debate of the Berlin.
- 17.
Baum (1994) also suggests this interpretation. According to him, in 1770 Kant is still “firmly on the side of Platonism in matters of rational cosmology (A 471/B 499), i.e., on the side of the thesis in the antinomy of the CPR, or on the side of ‘dogmatic rationalism’ of Dohn’s metaphysics lecture” (Baum 1994, 188). In contrast to the present work, however, Baum (1994, 193) sees the origin of the later antinomy of pure reason in “the theme of the third antinomy taken for itself” (my translations). Grier (2001, 109–111) suggests that the doctrine of the antinomy as an inevitable conflict of reason with itself emerged from the very distinction between understanding and reason, during the silent decade.
- 18.
According to Gerlach (1998), Kant here followed the Leibnizian Ploucquet.
- 19.
According to Kreimendahl (1990, 213), in the Dissertation Kant presented the outline of a consistent dogmatic cosmology and metaphysics in which he no longer believed, because he already knew the antinomy of pure reason including its resolution. This hypothesis seems to be conceived ad hoc, given that it serves to save the traditional interpretation of Kant’s critical turn, without taking seriously Kant’s struggle with cosmological problems and his search for a coherent theory of cognition to overcome these problems. See also Baum 1994.
- 20.
The problem named here does not refer to the topic of Kant’s later deduction of the categories (as assumed in Carl 1989), but primarily to the intellectual idea of the world as the key cosmological concept of the Dissertation.
- 21.
This harsh criticism of Hume’s skepticism is in striking contrast to Kreimendahl’s interpretation, according to which this very passage “clearly shows why Kant was interested in Hume. It is the skeptical procedure that Hume handled more virtuously than anyone before and which Kant has advanced into the ‘skeptical method’ […]” (Kreimendahl 1990, 12, my translation).
- 22.
“Ursache und Anfang sind ienes intellectuell, dieses sensitiv. Der Anfang ist nur in der Welt, aber nicht von der Welt. Warum Gott die Welt nicht eher erschaffen? Gott ist in keinem [abs] Verhaltnis gegen die absolute leere Zeit.” My translation; not contained in Cambridge edition.
- 23.
“Das mathematisch unendliche ist ohne Ende nach Gesetzen der sinnlichen schätzung, das metaphysisch unendliche ist ohne Ende überhaupt, d.i. ohne Schranken.” Note not contained in Cambridge edition; my translation.
- 24.
“Im Unendlichen ist die Schwierigkeit, die totalitaet mit der unmöglichkeit einer synthesis completae zu vereinbaren. folglich ist die Schwierigkeit subjectiv. Dagegen ist das potentialiter infinitum (infinitum coordinationis potentialis) sehr wohl begreiflich, aber ohne totalitaet.” Note not contained in Cambridge edition; my translation.
- 25.
Accordingly, in the first antinomy of 1781 the proof of the thesis employs Kant’s concept of the infinite of 1770 (see below Sect. 5.4.1.1).
- 26.
“Die Schwierigkeit, sich ein Quantum simultaneum als unendlich vorzustellen, beruhet auf der Natur des Menschlichen Verstandes, der ein totum seiner Möglichkeit nach nur synthetisch denken kann, d.i. successive addendo unum uni. Die synthesis aber, die ins unendliche gehen soll, ist niemals complet.” Note not contained in Cambridge edition; my translation.
- 27.
“Die Frage ist, ob eine gegebene Größe unendlich sey. Die Bedingung ist, dass sie gegeben sey.” Note not contained in Cambridge edition; my translation.
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Falkenburg, B. (2020). A Closer Look at the Critical Turn. In: Kant’s Cosmology . European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52290-2_4
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